TE OPE KĀTUA O AOTEAROA
DEFENCE FORCE

Headquarters
Joint Forces NZ

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND DISASTER RELIEF (HADR)

DOMESTIC and OFFSHORE
AIDE MEMOIRE

2nd Edition

August 2021

FOREWORD

The Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) Aide Memoire, published by HQ JFNZ in September 2012, was compiled following NZDF responses to three significant domestic disaster events; Operation's PIKE, CHRISTCHURCH QUAKE and RENA. The booklet captured best practices at the time through lessons learned emerging from the three events.

The 2012 Aide Memoire focused on the response to domestic crises but in the years since its publication, there have been a number of significant offshore events in the South Pacific that required a very different response. The devastating and deadly tropical cyclones that hit Vanuatu and Fiji involved extremely detailed HADR planning and support for an extended period offshore, the likes of which had not been conducted before. There have been other significant domestic events - Port Hills fire, Bay of Plenty floods, Kaikoura earthquake, Nelson fires, and the White Island volcanic eruption - resulting in the activation of NZDF elements to provide assistance to the civil power in times of emergency.

More recently, the NZDF has provided front-line support to combat the impact of COVID-19 in New Zealand, and has been instrumental in effecting the delivery of vaccines to remote locations in the South Pacific. Both can be viewed as Humanitarian Aid and demonstrates the flexibility of our forces in assisting people at home and overseas.

The collection and analysis of key observations from these domestic and offshore events have contributed to the refinement of our contingency plans and changes to SOPs, capabilities and organisations in order to meet the future demand of such responses.

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Commander Joint Forces New Zealand

AUTHORISATION

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J8 Branch acknowledges an intellectual debt in preparing this publication to independent documents including:

NZDDP 3.20 – Humanitarian Operations, of July 2015.

QCJWC HADR Paper, of August 2018.

MFAT Offshore Deployment Guidelines, of October 2016.

Coordinated Incident Management System (CIMS) 3rd Edition, of 1 Jul 20.

National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan 2015, reprinted 14 Jul 17.

NZJSP 101 – PLAN AWHINA, of 23 Jan 18.

HQJFNZ CONPLAN 101: AWHINA, of 24 Feb 20.

HQJFNZ CONPLAN 102: PACIFIC RELIEF, of 31 Jul 20.

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Chapter One

OVERVIEW

OVERVIEW

> *A humanitarian operation is specifically mounted to save lives and alleviate human suffering where responsible civil actors in an area are unable to support a population. A humanitarian operation can take the form of a disaster relief operation, a humanitarian assistance operation, or a humanitarian intervention operation.*
>
> NZDDP 3.20 – Humanitarian Operations

New Zealand's humanitarian action is based on the rights and needs of persons affected by crises and aims to protect the safety, dignity and rights of the most vulnerable. The use of military assets in a humanitarian crisis is a situation when:

- A specific capability or asset requirement that cannot be met with available civilian assets has been identified.
- Military assets would help meet the requirement and provide unique advantages in terms of capability, availability and timeliness.
- Military assets would complement civilian capabilities.

Characteristics of Disasters

The nature and characteristics of an event, its magnitude, frequency, duration, velocity of occurrence and origin create particular types of damage. Each disaster is unique in the way it affects the population and the physical characteristics of the impact zone. In general, the manner in which a disaster starts determines the speed at which the humanitarian assessment and response actions should be implemented.

A disaster is defined as a serious disruption to the normal functions of a country or area that significantly impacts or threatens human life, health, and property. The resultant situation is an urgent requirement to provide goods and services to meet the immediate needs of affected communities. This is particularly relevant where poverty coupled with population growth means that greater numbers of people are more vulnerable to natural hazards.

Not all disasters are as a result of a natural event such as cyclones, earthquake or floods. A disaster can unfold over a period of time and be declared as a result of drought, crop failure or epidemic disease for example, but the need for humanitarian assistance when requested is equally important.

Role of the NZDF

The role of the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF), as part of an All-of-Government (AoG) response, is an established concept but, in the past 15 years, there has been an increasing requirement for the NZDF to provide military support to humanitarian crises both at home and offshore. A response can take many forms including mounting strategic airlift and evacuation operations, real life support of basic needs – food, water, shelter, recovery and rebuilding tasks. More recently, the NZDF support to Government is response to the COVID-19 pandemic demonstrates the flexibility necessary to provide assistance.

Generally, military intent is for the NZDF to be prepared to provide appropriate operational and logistical support to the Government authorities during any type of local or national disaster or emergency, while maintaining operational outputs and missions. The end state is determined as having successfully responded to the emergency and redeployed to home locations for reconstitution, ready to provide support to future contingencies.

The 2018 Quinquepartite Combined Joint Warfare Conference (QCJWC) forum of the Five-Eye's community partners (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom, and United States) discussed the themes and challenges experienced during HADR operations. The outcome clearly illustrated common challenges documented by all five nations including:

- Provision of military response and support with little or no warning;
- Coordination with government and non-government agencies;
- Management of uncertain security situations;
- Operating in austere, self-supporting environments; and
- Working under intense public scrutiny and pressure.

It was also evident that nations receiving HADR support vary considerably in size, economic resources, culture, and climate. Each disaster is unique in cause, scale, and scope, therefore, each response is tailored to meet specific government assistance requests, to integrate with existing command and control arrangements, and to comply with local policies concerning foreign assistance.

There was unanimous agreement at QCJWC that contingency plans are a key enabler for mission success. The lessons learned from each event are factored into such plans to ensure they reflect changing military capabilities and procedures that will enhance future operations. The availability of pre-existing plans are considered vital as much of the short notice planning required is already in place. However, plans must also be flexible enough to cater for a scalable response based on the severity of the disaster.

Any Military Response Option (MRO) requires a multi-agency, multilateral, and sometimes multinational collaborative approach in order to align planning on a mutual understanding basis. Military forces provide a significant part of the response capabilities necessary therefore liaison and training with other agencies promotes mutual understanding of how any assistance will possibly

play out. This is essential given that the lead organisation in an HADR response will be a government department or agency and not the NZDF.

It is important to emphasise that there is no single plan that could possibly account for all eventualities, but the aim of any Government of New Zealand (GoNZ) HADR response will be to save lives, alleviate suffering, foster recovery, and promote stability.

This publication is intended to provide a general view of HADR operations and assist understanding of both civilian and military planning for operations to support disaster events both domestically in New Zealand and the South West Pacific region. The contingency plans (CONPLANS) for emergency responses to such events are known as AWHINA and PACIFIC RELIEF respectively.

Common Themes of HADR

There are agreed common themes across our Five-Eye's partners that will inform planning for future responses. Expansion of these themes is detailed through chapters of this publication.

Contingency Planning. All nations identified CONPLANS as a key enabler for mission success, requiring that they are reviewed and exercised on a regular basis, and are updated after each response. Plans may be particular to an identified area of responsibility or be more regionally specific. Having pre-existing plans proves beneficial when circumstances call for their rapid execution, since much of the detail will have been considered and addressed during plan development. However, it is also important that plans allow for flexibility to provide a scalable response based on the severity of the disaster.

Collaborative Planning. Planning must be conducted collaboratively with non-military partners as early as possible. Working in a collaborative environment requires humility, mutual understanding and professionalism and military planners must strive to make sure options are discussed with partners at regular intervals. Because of the high regard most non-military government agencies hold for the military planning process, consideration should be given to making military planners available to assist other government agencies in developing their plans.

Planning for Transition. The aim of transition (the handover of operational responsibility) to designated agencies or host nation (HN) organisations should be kept in mind, both during plan development and throughout execution. This enables the smoothest possible shift to recovery and reconstruction. Failure to adequately plan, message, or resource the transition can endanger the accomplishment of the overall mission; unexpected extensions to the military contribution must also be factored in. Finally, advance consideration of financial management and accountability is also an important part of planning to enable accurate tracking of resources before, during, and after the operation.

Common Planning Considerations

There are some common considerations that should feature in all planning of HADR responses:

- Have CONPLANs in place. Review, exercise and update them regularly.
- Where possible plan collaboratively and then exercise with appropriate partners.
- Plan to the finish, including the transition to civilian agencies.
- Recognise HN primacy and confirm their requirements early.
- Be cognisant of non-Government Organisations (NGO) sensitivities when working with the military.
- Cellular networks and the internet are vital for non-military communications; establish or re-establish connectivity as a priority.
- A Liaison Officer (LO) that understands the organisation they are attached to can be invaluable.
- Commanders must understand the strategic narrative and have the ways and means to execute messaging objectives.
- Time spent exercising and training with partners will reduce command and control (C2) frictions in a response.
- Establish supported/supporting relationships from the outset.
- Understand the potential mismatch in capabilities when employing high-readiness forces for HADR operations.
- Routine training in HADR operations is required for high readiness forces; arriving at the disaster quickly is only useful if units know what they are supposed to do.
- Include logistic information systems from the outset to correctly manage deployed resources, recovery, and redeployment.
- Consider HN culture and partner sensitivities when considering weapons carriage.
- Risk from injury and disease is increased during HADR operations. Review policy and include in pre-deployment briefing/training.
- Planning for major operations should include a plan for lessons collection. For medium to large-scale responses the deployment of a collection team should be considered.
- Orders should explicitly include requirements to keep records of decisions made in order to support the lessons learned process.
- Senior leaders must champion the lessons learned process, demonstrating support for the process and understanding it will provide for both near and far-term benefits.

Lessons from HADR Responses

There has been a number of significant events in recent years where the NZDF has played a major role in the response and lessons recorded that contribute to the learning process for future activities.

Christchurch Quake (2011)

At 1251 hours on Tue 22 Feb 11, a 6.3 magnitude earthquake struck the Canterbury area. The epicentre of the earthquake was approximately 10 Km SE of Christchurch and resulted in substantial widespread damage to the Christchurch CBD, eastern, and southern suburbs, the Port Hills and Lyttleton. The high intensity of ground shaking led to a number of collapsed or seriously damaged buildings, and extensive infrastructure outages. The city of Christchurch declared a state of local emergency at 1445 hours on 22 Feb; the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management (CDEM[1]) superseded this by declaring a state of National Emergency at 1030 on Wed 23 Feb.

The NZDF Mission was to provide logistical and operational support to CDEM in order to assist in AoG support to the affected area. COMJFNZ was directed to co-ordinate the NZDF response to the emergency with support from Single Service chiefs in the provision of Force Elements (FE) as required by COMJFNZ.

Key Lessons:

- The Chief of Defence Force (CDF) directive appointed COMJFNZ as Operational Commander (OPCOM) of NZDF FE 'as required', but did not formally appoint a Commander Task Force (CTF). Additionally, there were inconsistencies and ambiguities throughout operation orders, instructions and fragmentation orders generally related to the variations in the use of terminology, force assignment, delegated levels and changes of C2. It was recommended that NZDF Strategic and Operational level contingency plans for AWHINA required clarity on C2 terminology and specific delegations of command.

[1] CDEM has since been replaced by the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), commissioned after the November 2016 earthquake, and the Port Hill fires in 2017.

- The command chain for Christchurch Quake was not always followed. Some information requests and reporting requirements were directed to units without informing intermediate commanders, which created divergent or conflicting requirements for some units.

- LOs were a key element of support to the CDEM organisation but it took some considerable time to identify liaison requirements and provide LO into the appropriate agencies. The scale of this disaster realised the need for further LO support in areas not normally considered. The Office of the Minister of Defence and the Mayor of Christchurch proved very successful in providing valuable situational awareness.

- Situational awareness issues were identified where HQ 3LFG initially believed the earthquake was another after shock, there was a lack of understanding across NZDF as to how CDEM works, and transitions by Other Government Agencies (OGA) reduced their own situational awareness and contributed to a delay in decision making that subsequently impacted on the NZDF response.

- The NZDF had very limited capability for tracking and recording the movement of personnel in support of manpower intensive operations such as this. However, the use of a prototype process to gather data post-Christchurch Quake was the starting point in the future development of a robust pan-NZDF system.

Tropical Cyclone PAM – Vanuatu (2015)

TC PAM was a Category 5 cyclone that struck the Pacific nation of Vanuatu on 13-14 Mar 15, causing widespread infrastructure damage. The NZDF HADR response was at the request of the Government of Vanuatu and focused on the northern Shefa Province and the Shepherd Islands, a group of seven small islands dispersed across approximately 4000 square kms of ocean. The total population in the area of operations was estimated to be 10,000. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) was the lead agency for the operations and provided personnel for attachment to the NZDF Task Unit (TU) together with an NZ Ministry of Health Medical Assistance Team (NZMAT) and NZ Fire Service Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) team.

The achievements of this mission were significant: provision of 53,000 litres of bottled water, over 63,000 kgs of food and more than 200 tonnes of construction aid material and water tanks. The NZDF TU repaired 12 schools and eight medical centres/aid posts, one of which was rebuilt completely. Other tasks included the repair of four village water reticulation systems and clearing 11km of roads/tracks of debris to restore lines of communication and supply around the area.

Key Lessons:

- Notice to Move (NTM) timelines for individual units varied with some teams struggling to organise personnel, equipment and pack-ups within directed timeframes. Key insight was an awareness of the amount of preparation and coordination required in mobilisation of personnel and equipment, including the short notice effects and implications of planning changes is needed. It remains a command management issue to ensure that the NTM is understood and requirements met.

- MFAT and OGA reps arrived at Devonport Naval Base (DNB) unexpectedly and with no passenger manifest, expecting to be embarked in HMNZS Canterbury (CAN) for passage to Vanuatu. There was also an expectation by some OGA's that the NZDF would provide real life support (RLS) and other resources such as fuel and transport as they did not come prepared with their own.

- MFAT sponsored stores were conveyed to DNB at the last possible moment, resulting in quayside congestion and the loading team working a 36 hour continuous shift to embark the cargo in order to meet the given sailing time. There was a lack of MFAT liaison and information concerning the nature of the cargo being transported.

- During the preparation phase, FE were mission focussed and worked long hours without rest, raising the issue of fatigue management. Nominated drivers need to have at least 24 hours' notice when required to deploy from Linton to DNB in order to manage the requirements of driving hours and mandated rest periods. With planning there are usually enough driver hours to get from Linton and onto the ship, but with little to spare.

- Personnel embarked in CAN discovered via news sources and social media she was to be deployed, including the departure timings. It was stated that the Commanding Officer CAN

should have been notified through official channels prior to the public release so personnel could inform families of their imminent departure themselves.

- Interaction with the HN varied between government officials and local islanders. The HN government does not operate in the same way as the GoNZ and will have different priorities. There was a tendency for local officials to channel support to their own areas of interest first, with a perceived lack of a higher level national plan that the NZDF could work to. Deployed Commanders should be prepared for HN officials to attempt to take 'ownership' of any offers of aid, but be mindful that it is their country.

- Tourism is a vital element of the local economy in Vanuatu and the country continued to depend on the arrival of tourists even during the recovery from TC PAM. There is only one main wharf at Port Vila capable of taking large vessels; CAN was required to vacate this wharf whenever a cruise ship came into port.

Tropical Cyclone Winston – Fiji (2016)

Just 12 months on from Vanuatu, another Category 5 tropical cyclone struck Fiji on 20 Feb 16 causing widespread damage and the loss of 44 lives. The geographical focus area for this response was very different to the previous year as the capital of Suva managed to dodge the worst of the storm, but many outer islands were badly affected. The area of operations allocated to the NZDF was some 130 miles east of Suva on the island of Vanua Balavu, which presented its own challenges in conducting operations as there were no suitable ports or berths available; all operations were conducted either underway or at anchor.

Key Lessons:

- The MFAT LOs in CAN proved very beneficial and were easy to work with. However, all MFAT personnel were rotated every two weeks with minimal hand over, which resulted in time being spent by CAN integrating the new team.

- There was a clear reliance on the NZDF to move everything into theatre, but the needs of OGAs tended to be prioritised ahead of the HADR TU with OGA personnel and equipment sent ashore first and availability of seats on reconnaissance flights given to OGAs ahead of the NZDF support elements.

- There is a lack of understanding by MFAT and OGAs as to how the NZDF works and the availability and limitation of their assets. There was limited understanding by all OGAs of the logistical implications arising as a result of short notice planning changes, particularly if the landing craft or helicopter assets had already been loaded.

- HN air assets require approval for use by the Operational Airworthiness Authority to ensure they meet the requirements of Defence Force Order (DFO) 36. This means that local service providers are unlikely to be used for Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC) resulting in an NZDF platform required to be on standby at all times, limiting the availability of assets for other potential tasks.

- For TC PAM, the lack of chart data and inaccuracies of navigation charts made it difficult to identify suitable landing points for landing craft prior to operation; it was recommended that an Advance Force (ADVFOR) is deployed for future missions of this nature. This lesson was validated in 2016 where it was widely considered that the deployment of ADVFOR was instrumental to the successful and timely deployment of CAN. ADVFOR deployed four days prior to CAN departure and was able to focus on surveying the designated AO in preparation for CAN arrival.

- C2 was a key area of interest during TC PAM and the response to TC WINSTON provided an excellent opportunity to assess progress on lessons learned. It was clear that the deployment to Fiji was an HQ JFNZ priority at the start of the operation; this was reflected in improved orders and directions in comparison to those issued for TC PAM.

- The pre-clearance of vehicles and equipment by Ministry of Primary Industries (MPI) personnel in theatre, prior to the loading of CAN, has been proven to be very effective at reducing time on return to NZ. Vehicles were cleaned and inspected over a two-day period and the use of a centralised cleaning area sped up the re-embarkation process for NZDF vehicles.

- Commanders were aware of amphibious doctrine, but it was not generally used and personnel simply got on with the task. The 2012 HADR Aide Memoire publication was briefly referred to but was found to be too Christchurch Earthquake centric and did not provide much relevant information to assist with TC PAM or TC WINSTON. This publication is as a result of this observation – lesson learnt.

Kaikoura Quake (2017)

OP AWHINA was activated following a 7.8 magnitude earthquake northeast of Culverton in the South Island of NZ just after midnight on 14 Nov 16. An AoG response was led by CDEM and local CDEM groups. The first military response was by NZDF air assets conducting reconnaissance flights shortly after first light to gather imagery of main transport links and damage to the local area. It was clear that the Kaikoura area was cut off from all road and rail access and initial response was only possible by sea and helicopter assets.

It was perhaps fortuitous that the International Fleet Review was underway in Auckland as a major event of Op Neptune, the 75th anniversary of the Royal New Zealand Navy. Three naval units from Australia, the USA and Canada were despatched to assist, alongside four RNZN platforms. The heavy-lift organic helicopter capabilities of the international platforms proved to be crucial in transferring provisions and stores ashore.

Key Lessons:

- The quake had severely affected the Kaikoura coastline where in some places, the seabed and foreshore had been raised in excess of four metres. HMNZS Wellington was deployed to conduct a rapid environmental assessment (REA) of the area to allow safe operation of landing craft and ships boats. However, the ship received minimal information with regard to the impact of the earthquake on the area during the period from being re-tasked until arrival in the AO, a total of 54 hours.

- There was some pressure for the results of the REA to be released to outside agencies. Survey data of the nature gathered during this type of activity is not suitable for commercial purposes due to errors in accuracy induced by requirements for rapid collection, processing and report production. The possible use of potentially inaccurate information for commercial purposes, if released to civil users and organisations, creates risk of damage to vessels,

environment and human life and may expose the NZDF, RNZN and the officer-in-charge of survey ops to both legal and reputational risk.

- Working parties ashore were not provided with adequate messages to give to affected locals/victims. It was recommended that consideration should be given to educating working parties with media messages and important confidence-building messages for the local community.

- A Maritime Helicopter Element Coordinator (HEC) was essential to the success of the Maritime Rotary Wing employment and should be considered as part of the initial planning considerations for an HADR response. It was recommended that a dedicated HEC is identified to deploy with the Commander Joint Task Force team in the event maritime helicopters are involved in the response.

- There were numerous requests for NZDF assets to support commercial entities particularly during the early stages of the response. Perhaps the most illustrative event was a request to 'airlift' a stock of newly manufactured car trailers out of Kaikoura to ensure the business owner was not impacted. NZDF assets are deployed to conduct specific tasks that meet with both real life support and legal requirements. If the movement of trailers was undertaken then the stream of requests likely to follow would inevitably lead to denial in some cases, which presents an unnecessary reputational risk that is easily avoided.

Lessons Learned

The extracts listed above are a small example of some of the issues arising from an event, but aptly demonstrates the uniqueness of every response. There will always be lessons to be learned and HADR responses are no different from operational missions or exercises. It is important to raise the issues and observations from future events as the outcomes will continue to refine policy, doctrine, operating procedures and training.

Chapter Two

OPERATIONAL RESPONSES

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OPERATIONAL RESPONSES

In New Zealand, all spheres of government acknowledge that the impact of some emergencies could be particularly severe or widespread and exceed the capability of a single local authority to manage.

National and International Response

At the national level, there are a range of plans and committees to coordinate effort, including the management of social, economic, environmental, and other likely consequences, thus ensuring a consistent national approach to communications. The plans are supported by national legislation that assigns responsibilities of both central government and the local authorities.

In the international arena, New Zealand is increasingly being invited to form strategic partnerships to mitigate or reduce the impact of emergencies globally, as well as in New Zealand's region of interest.

When a humanitarian crisis occurs, a combination of factors will influence the New Zealand Government's decision regarding what, if any, military assistance should be offered. MROs should support the mitigation of the impact of the crisis until such time that the affected region, foreign or domestic, is able to take full control of the subsequent recovery effort. The specific requirements for NZDF support will be situation dependent and will be determined by a number of factors, including:

- Type and scale of the disaster and the humanitarian needs it creates.
- Location of the crisis.
- Impact of the crisis on the affected nation or region's coping mechanisms.
- Civil contributions to an international relief effort.
- The assessed shortfall between the humanitarian response and the affected persons' needs.
- Whether the affected nation has requested military assistance.
- Whether the New Zealand Government directs military assistance to the affected local authority with response efforts.
- The availability of NZDF assets that are not engaged in higher priority tasks, and how quickly and easily those assets can reach the crisis site.
- National interests.
- Diplomatic and historical relations with the affected foreign nation.
- Media coverage of the crisis and the public pressure it generates.

NZDF Response

The general legal basis for provision of NZDF support is in accordance with Section 9 of the Defence Act 1990. It enables the NZDF to be used in New Zealand or elsewhere: to perform any public service and provide assistance to the civil power in time of emergency. The Civil Defence Emergency Management Act (2000) is the legal authority for the declaration of an emergency requiring National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) measures.

The NZDF's provision of assistance to a Civil Defence emergency within New Zealand is encompassed under a New Zealand joint service plan. NZDF elements are effective when used in support of humanitarian crises because of a number of attributes. These are:

- Timeliness.
- Appropriateness and competence.
- Efficiency.
- Absorptive capacity.
- Self-deploy.
- Sustainability.
- Operate in adverse conditions.
- Coordination.
- Costs.

Provision of military assistance to the civil power is through the use of specialised capabilities or equipment in situations that are beyond the capacity of the civil power to deal with, and where the NZDF is able to provide unique capabilities that are not available elsewhere. Specifically, responses to AoG efforts in times of emergency is to maintain supplies and services essential to the life, health and safety of the community, and to save lives and mitigate the impacts of a natural disaster or major emergency whilst maintaining public safety.

When a humanitarian crisis occurs, certain assets are needed urgently in the early stages of an operation. If they do not arrive and become operational within a matter of hours or at most days, the opportunity to use them effectively is missed. Other force elements may not be required until a later stage of the operation, but in some circumstances timeliness is perhaps the overriding reason for deploying NZDF force elements.

Military assets are typically on permanent standby, available in large numbers and ready to deploy at short notice, which means they can reach the scene quickly. Units deployed in support of disaster relief operations will usually do so as part of a wider national AoG contribution, but remain under military command.

Role of DJIATF

The Deployable Joint Inter-Agency Task Force (DJIATF) was established under the operational command of COMJFNZ in 2012, and has continued to evolve in the wake of HADR operations and exercises in recent years. It is the standing, deployable C2 element for the NZDF and its mission statement is to:

> *Provide a scalable operational level Command and Control capability for the conduct of joint, inter-agency and multinational operations and training activities in order to contribute to the security of New Zealand and its interests.*

HQ DJIATF is postured to conduct the deployment of individuals - small teams with specialist skills, planners or military liaison officers - to civilian organisations. It is also established to deploy a tailored operational level HQ in either a 'light' or 'comprehensive' configuration. Personnel posted to the HQ are subject matter experts (SMEs) in Command, Personnel, Health, Intelligence, Operations, Logistics, Planning and Communications.

Upon activation of the military, a reconnaissance of the disaster area provides specific information to assess the scale of the situation. This includes identifying the military capabilities required to minimise further suffering, loss of life, destruction of property, degradation to the environment, and provision of disaster relief.

HQ DJIATF Assessment Teams

In broad terms, the deployment of an Initial Assessment Team (IAT) is designed for pre-event reconnaissance; the Joint Command and Reconnaissance Team (JCART) is designed to conduct post-event activities and generally deploys ahead of the Light Task Group (TG).

IAT. The IAT is a small, task organised team comprising of four personnel that deploys at the invitation of the lead agency, usually prior to any event that may require a GoNZ response, although it can also deploy post-event just as effectively. It is commanded by a MAJ(E), with the remainder of the team comprising a Logistics, Intelligence and an Environmental/Health specialist. The IAT is responsible for providing advice on what effects can be achieved, coupled with military planning to the NZ lead agency (often the New Zealand High Commission), but is on hand to respond to Requests for Information (RFIs) that assists with informing planning at the joint operational level.

JCART. HQ DJIATF has the capacity to form one JCART, which is intended to deploy on command after an event. The JCART is effectively a tool of HQ JFNZ for the development of situational awareness through the conduct of reconaissance and liaison in theatre. The JCART role is to provide expert advice on contingency planning and operational issues, including force composition, logistics, C2, and communications. Comprising of up to 12 personnel it will form the nucleus of the Light HQ should it subsequently deploy.

Light TG. The Light TG will form the HQ of any deployed operational level NZDF force elements deployed from the low to mid-range of the spectrum of operations, from domestic disaster relief through to non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO). The Light TG is likely to be supplemented with LO's from other government agencies OGA's.

National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan

The National CDEM Plan details the guiding principles and roles and responsibilities across the '4Rs' at the national level so that all agencies and associated groups are unified in their approach.

Reduction – identifying and analysing long-term risks to human life and property from hazards; taking steps to eliminate these risks if practicable, and, if not, reducing the magnitude of their impact and the likelihood of their occurring.

Readiness – developing operational systems and capabilities before a civil defence emergency happens: including self-help and response programmes for the general public, and specific programmes for the emergency services, lifeline utilities and other agencies.

Response – actions taken immediately before, during or directly after a civil defence emergency to save lives and protect property, and to help communities recover.

Recovery – the coordinated efforts and processes to bring about the immediate, medium-term, and long-term holistic regeneration of a community following a civil defence emergency.

The 4Rs have been aligned to military phases and expanded to provide detail on expected actions.

Activity	**Military Phases**
Reduction	Nil
Readiness	Nil
Response	Phase 1 – Reconnaissance / Activation / Mobilisation
	Phase 2 – Deployment of Military Response
	Phase 3 – Sustain
Recovery	Phase 4 - Redeployment

Reduction

The Strategic Commitments and Engagement (SCE) Branch in HQ NZDF provides liaison assistance with scenario and response development to help identify potential limitations in AoG infrastructure. This is in conjunction with the exercise programme produced by the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC) for AoG agencies and authorities. Discussions and briefings should include capabilities of military assets in order that non-military planners understand how they can be used to generate an effect.

Readiness

The National CDEM Plan defines the NZDF to undertake the following to ensure that it is sufficiently prepared to respond to an emergency:

- Manage business continuity plans at levels that are necessary to ensure that defence functions can continue during and after an emergency;
- Maintain contingency plans for response to an emergency;
- Conduct internal training and participate in exercises at the national level to maintain response proficiency; and
- Participate in planning and training session with the NEMA and NEMA groups.

Response

Military Phase 1. The principal activity (or main effort) is to gain an early accurate appreciation of the disaster. As a general rule, the military would seek to conduct this as a collaborative effort with the lead agency and use information gained to inform decision making. However, circumstances at the time may lead to military activation and mobilization being initiated based on best available information, and a more complete reconnaissance and assessment being carried out some days later.

Liaison officers may be deployed to the National Crisis Management Centre (NCMC), a National Control Centre (NCC), regional Emergency Control Centre (ECC), and a local Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) as required. This is to primarily advise on potential support operations by the NZDF and provide updates on progress of any tasking already being conducted. It should be emphasised that LOs are not authorised to accept tasks, but will relay them to their higher HQ for necessary direction and approval.

Military Phase 2. The size and scope of a military response will be driven by the outcomes of the reconnaissance and assessment conducted in Military Phase 1. Given the potential impact of time imperatives it is likely that military aircraft, if available and providing suitable airfields remain operational, will be used to deploy immediate response groups; heavy lift may be conducted with sealift assets. One of the key factors during this phase is to maintain close liaison with the lead agency to ensure unity of effort, coordinated response, and civil-military cooperation.

Military Phase 3. Provision of support to sustain the contribution by military, and OGA when directed, will be influenced by the extent to which local authorities and community support systems have been disrupted and will be decided by Government. If this phase becomes protracted, military staff rotations could occur to manage personnel fatigue and ensure continuous engagement in the disaster relief operation. As soon as local authorities and community support systems have been sufficiently restored, the military would commence transfer of responsibility in preparation for the recovery phase.

Recovery

Military Phase 4. The withdrawal and redeployment of the military back to home locations for reconstitution and reassignment to military operations is the recognised recovery phase of a response. The Government may decide that some niche military capabilities remain in the disaster area for an extended period in the event OGA and NGO systems require extended military capability presence to ensure delivery of essential services.

Response Challenges

The greatest challenge to military planners in responding to an event is to achieve rapid projection into the disaster area and balance that with an evolving mix of steady state requirements, surge demands, and political credibility considerations. In doing so, the military must maintain the flexibility to adapt existing support plans to meet the specific requirements of an HADR response. This approach recognises that each crisis presents its own demanding sets of shifting priorities and objectives; any crisis management organisation must therefore be designed to meet essential criteria.

Chapter Three

MILITARY PLANNING

Chapter Three:

MILITARY PLANNING

The NZDF planning for all types of humanitarian operations is conducted in the same way as that for other military operations. However, planning for disaster relief operations differs in that it is supported by a number of New Zealand Government plans, NZDF policies and joint service plans. Where humanitarian action support to international crises is necessary, a comprehensive multi-agency planned and coordinated approach is essential. The strategic goals or operating procedures of all concerned will not be identical or even compatible, but collaboration and planning contributes to success in a complex operational environment. This will better enable key organisations to orchestrate the total humanitarian effort.

Levels of Military Planning

There are three levels of planning: Strategic (divided into National and Military Strategic), Operational and Tactical. The planning process involves a detailed situational assessment of the political, cultural, economic, military, geographical, security, environmental and health factors in the crisis area.

National Strategic Planning. This refers to the macro-level, political dimension of planning that mobilises the instruments of national power to meet the government's objectives. It is concerned with political independence, national sovereignty and security, and the pursuit of wider national interests. National strategy is the collective responsibility of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, articulated through the DPMC.

Military Strategic Planning. The military strategic level is responsible for the military aspects of planning and for directing military effort. This includes outlining the military strategic end-state and a broad concept of how it will be achieved, in order to support the national strategic end-state. This level is the domain of CDF, through HQ NZDF.

Operational Planning. Operations and missions are planned, mounted and commanded at the operational level. Operational planning is the link between the military strategic and tactical levels through the translation of military strategy into operational objectives, tasks and end-states. COMJFNZ is responsible for operational planning within the NZDF, which is generally led by the Joint Planning Branch (J5) supported by the rest of HQ JFNZ. This level of planning includes the preparation, deployment, conduct, sustainment and recovery of force elements. Operational planning, informed by strategic guidance, includes both deliberate and immediate planning.

The military has the capacity to deliver a range of services and capabilities in support of a disaster event response effort concurrent with training programmes to maintain a Directed Level of Capability (DLOC) for military operational deployment. Acknowledging all emergencies will vary in nature, severity, geographical space and response, the main NZDF deliverables related to HADR are:

- Search and rescue and recovery.
- Assistance to law enforcement operations.
- Assistance to NEMA.
- Cordon duties i.e. controlling access to an incident scene.
- Assistance to Fire Emergency New Zealand (FENZ).
- Aeromedical evacuation and medical rescue at sea.
- Mitigation of the effects of adverse weather conditions.
- Response to maritime incidents and marine pollution.
- Mass evacuation of persons from high-risk environments.
- Response to major bio-security incidents.
- Response to pandemic crises.
- AoG contingency planning activities.
- Multi-agency training activities.

Availability of NZDF assets will be determined by NZDF commitments to other Government directed outputs at the time e.g. Output 5.1 Operationally Deployed Forces. In the event an emergency is declared as severe, Government will decide whether to redirect NZDF assets and resources away from such outputs to support the emergency.

Factors Influencing Planning

It is recognised that factors to be considered when planning an HADR response are both wide-ranging and situation dependent. However, there are a number of factors that tend to be common to all situations as outlined below.

Activity	**Consideration**
Terminology	The language of disasters and incidents is different from everyday military terminology and it is important that the military understands civilian language used by the HADR community it interacts with. Equally, military personnel should avoid overuse of acronyms and terminology that civilian personnel will not understand.
C2 and support arrangements with other agencies	NZDF elements deployed on HADR operations do so in a supporting role, but remain under military control, direction and command. Military task elements will usually be tasked 'in direct support' of the responding agencies to deliver the required effect.

	Regardless of the NZDF support arrangements, the supported agencies have no authority to task and/or re-assign military forces.
Collaborative Planning	By virtue of its sheer size, array of capabilities, ease of manoeuvrability, and trained personnel expected to take the initiative, the military presence can be intimidating for some organisations not used to working with it. Allow time for mutual understanding and familiarity to develop. The military should maintain an awareness that it is not perceived as a dominating presence or overstepping its 'support role'. Understand the varied roles, function and culture of each agency. Some NGOs may prefer to remain independent and could be reluctant to establish formal links with the military. Reaction to an HADR event is usually based on responders having an existing deliberate plan; the NZDF has CONPLANs. Be mindful that other agencies may not have such well-defined processes, guidelines or as much planning experience as their military counterparts; it is likely they will have a very different planning approach. Collaboration between the NZDF and other agencies is an ongoing programme of meetings and activities. SCE Branch is the primary NZDF point of contact supported by HQ JFNZ, particularly in the lead up to the South West Pacific cyclone season.
Disaster Needs Assessment (DNA) (*See Chapter 9)*	On occasion, the type of aid or assistance provided may be inappropriate because it has been rushed into the affected area (often at the behest of politicians or senior commanders) without consideration for the needs of the affected population. It can rapidly exceed the actual requirements, placing an increased and unnecessary burden on remaining infrastructure and logistics resources. A detailed DNA, completed in conjunction with the lead agency, will inform and validate the planning process. Chapter Nine provides details of what to include in a DNA, and a blank pro-forma.
Liaison Officers	Lessons from Christchurch reveal that not all nominated LOs exhibited the necessary authority and confidence in order to

	meet the context and scale of the operation and tasks to be conducted. LOs have no authority to task NZDF assets; their role is to coordinate task requests and facilitate information flow.
Information Management	The importance of sharing information between NZDF, OGAs and NGOs is essential to achieve unity of effort and strengthening multi-agency engagement. The management of information flow should be considered as a capability function, a key part of the overall operation. Timely processing of the up, down and lateral information flow is crucial to quality decision making across the HADR community.
Situational Awareness	The first hours of any disaster will result in a loss of situational awareness for all organisations. In a major emergency, HQ NZDF and HQ JFNZ will likely orient faster than local or even national organisations. Gaining and sharing tactical level information as soon as possible is vital to all those mounting a response. Be aware that staff caught in the disaster zone will be primarily concerned for the welfare of family, relatives, property, pets and other personal matters. This will likely impact their capacity to contribute initially to the situational awareness picture. The HADR community can be greatly assisted by communicating the military role and possible action plan. It is important to make absolutely clear that any military response options are no more than that; force elements or assets have not been committed, but may be available.
Health Staff Limitations	In general, NZDF medical staff do not provide non-emergency health care to civilians unless in exceptional circumstances; this would require the authorisation of a medical practitioner (doctor) either through direct supervision or a written indemnity order on each occasion. The exception is when immediate actions are required to save life. This limitation must be clearly articulated during planning for an HADR response in order to manage expectations of OGA/NGOs.

Self-Sustainment	The disaster area infrastructure and/or services may be very limited or non-existent due to loss or failure. The military response must be capable of supporting and sustaining itself for at least 72 hours. There have been previous expectations from OGA personnel moving into theatre by military means that they would also be fully supported by the military. This has to be determined prior to deployment so that OGAs are fully aware they may be responsible for real life support of their own people.
Task Transition	Withdrawal of military forces at the earliest breakpoint sends a positive signal that the community is recovering and civil authorities have taken back control; life is returning to some semblance of normality including local businesses and services. Military planners and LOs must be cognisant of avoiding tasks that could be carried out by a civilian contractor or business as it may be viewed as taking away work from those who need it. The local authority or lead agency should be on hand to front any claims of the military 'staying too long', which has been experienced previously. Informing the locals of the military intent in the early stages of the operation will alleviate any misunderstanding or inflated expectations of the military response.

Capability and Tasking

Military capabilities and broad tasking areas are reflected in the table below and can be applied to both domestic and offshore efforts.

Capability	Tasks/Equipment
Liaison Officers	Establish and maintain liaison with the lead agency. Assist with planning and coordinate military interface. Self-sufficient in transport, communications, logistic support, rationing and accommodation.
Engineers – USAR	Thermal imagery. Breathing apparatus. Hydraulic equipment and air lifting bags. Rope rescue equipment. Ventilation equipment. Floodlighting.

Engineers – General	Hazard removal, road clearance, water and sewage system repair.
Engineers – Chemical and Biological	Chemical protection and decontamination equipment.
Engineers - Fire	Fire appliances. Identification and fire risk mitigation. Augmentation of local fire services.
Logistics - Mobile Kitchen, Shower and Laundry	Mobile field catering equipment. Shower and laundry facilities for deployed personnel.
Logistics - Repair	First line, unit grade repair capability including specialist equipment.
Logistics - Ground Transport	4x4 rough terrain capable vehicles. Water and fuel tankers.
Logistics - Mortuary	Limited mortuary support to an NZ Police led operation.
Logistics – Emergency Accommodation	Tented accommodation primarily for NZDF personnel but also in support of other agencies.
Logistics – Movement Operators /Air Movements	Augmenting OGAs for evacuation of affected population. Support specialists for freight terminal operations. Aircraft loading of stores and equipment.
Naval Platforms	Sealift of freight, vehicles, equipment, and emergency stores. Organic helicopter operations. Maritime patrols and security operations. Rapid environmental assessment (REA) of shoreline approaches.
Fixed Wing Aircraft and Helicopters	Personnel and freight movements. Aero medical evacuation. Surveillance, reconnaissance and SAR.

HSS - Health Reconnaissance and Liaison	Planning, clinical and health support in identification of health threats, risks, capability gaps and needs. Embedded liaison personnel in OGAs/NGOs as required.
HSS – Disaster Victim Identification (DVI)	Limited DVI capability to assist NZ Police in identification of deceased persons.
HSS – Casualty Management	Treatment options including medics, doctors, nurses, resuscitation, surgical support, diagnostic support, and post-operative care. Support to Aero Medical Evacuation (AME).
HSS - Health Protection	Environmental analysis, including water and air testing. Support to OGAs and NGOs.
Personnel Services - Psychologists	Conduct of critical incident stress management and advice on coping with the psychological impact of disasters. Primary focus is NZDF personnel, and other agencies when directed.
Personnel Services – Chaplaincy Services	Spiritual support to both NZDF personnel and disaster victims. Augmentation of disaster area chaplaincy services.

Chapter Four

DOMESTIC OPERATIONS

Chapter Four:

DOMESTIC OPERATIONS

Background

NEMA is the Government lead for emergency management and the legal authority for the declaration of an emergency requiring the implementation of NEMA measures. Such declarations may be made at the national or local level and in anticipation of, or during, an emergency event.[2] The National CDEM Plan provides detail of the AoG response to a national disaster.

The NZDF is a supporting agency within an AoG response to an emergency or crisis. At the local level (camps and bases), Commanders are authorised to deploy LOs and Response Groups to support local lead agencies. When the scale of the event determines that the emergency is at regional or national level status, the NZDF will likely deploy national level contingency capabilities to support the lead agency.

The operational effectiveness of the NZDF relies on clear command and control lines, timeliness of response and effective reporting mechanisms. Prior engagement, interaction and training between NZDF and OGA response elements at the local, regional and national level will enhance effectiveness during times of crisis.

CIMS

The Coordinated Incident Management System (CIMS) was first introduced in 1998 with all major agencies and organisations represented as part of the CIMS Steering Group. The system is based on those used in North America and Australia. It is a framework of consistent principles, structures, functions, processes and terminology that agencies apply in an emergency response. The framework is modular and scalable at any level from single agency to a larger multi-agency response.

CIMS can be applied to non-emergency scenarios but is more often applied during emergencies. An emergency is defined as a situation that poses an immediate risk to life, health, property, or the environment that requires a coordinated response. The components of emergency management are referred to as the 4R's (s*ee Chapter Two – National CDEM Plan*).

CIMS works on the principle that common structures, roles and responsibilities make it possible for agencies to work effectively alongside each other. The system employs common terminology in order to improve communications between organisations, and allows faster and more effective responses. The NEMA community uses CIMS as a management protocol with a set of rules that is common to all emergency service providers. It ensures that when they work together, they share a standardised management structure, a standardised set of management principles, and a standardised system of information management.

[2] NZ Joint Service Plan 101 – Issue 6

CIMS Functions

Any response to an incident will involve analysis of information and tasks to be conducted. In order to divide analysis and tasking into logical blocks, the military uses the continental staff system; (J1 – Personnel; J2 – Intelligence; J3- Operations; etc.). CIMS utilises a similar system and divides tasks and responsibilities into seven core functions.



It is important to recognise that all CIMS functions are considered regardless of whether the incident is minor or major. It is entirely feasible for a single person in charge to cover these functions as they can be amended or reduced to suit the needs of a given scenario. The colour of each function above is representative of what you would expect to see on vests, nametags or armbands worn by civilian personnel working in coordination centres at local, regional and national levels. The NZDF is a signatory to CIMS and NZDF staff involved in a response are expected to understand how CIMS functions. However, CIMS is not a part of any core training in the NZDF and delivery is through external providers; this means very limited numbers of personnel are formally trained in CIMS.

The responsibilities for each function are:

Control. Coordinates and controls the response.

Intelligence. Collects and analyses information and intelligence related to context, impact and consequences; also distributes intelligence outputs.

Planning. Leads planning for response activities and resource needs.

Operations. Provides detailed direction, coordination and supervision of response elements on behalf of the Control function.

Logistics. Provides personnel, equipment, supplies, facilities and services to support response activities.

Public Information Management (PIM). Develops and delivers messages to the public, directly and through the media, and liaises with the community if required.

Welfare. Coordinates the delivery of emergency welfare services and resources to affected individuals, families and communities.

CIMS is considered a valuable tool as it can be used effectively to manage a wide range of incidents that are not normally associated with HADR, including:

- Biosecurity incursions.
- Environmental incidents.
- Fire.
- Food safety incidents.
- Hazardous substance incidents.
- Marine mammal stranding's.
- Mass maritime arrivals.
- Multiple or mass casualties.
- Natural hazard incidents.
- Communicable disease outbreaks and pandemics.
- Planned events e.g. celebrations, parades, concerts, official visits.
- Public disorder.
- Public health and medical emergencies.
- Search and rescue.
- Transportation accidents.
- Technological failures.

Coordination Centres

The lead agency has the primary mandate for managing the response to an emergency or crisis, and will assign Controller(s) in order to direct and manage response activities from designated coordination centres.

Emergency Operations Centre (EOC). A local level response centre that is usually activated for the purpose of multi-agency or multi-incident coordination. It is staffed and managed by the lead agency and supplemented by personnel from other agencies.

Emergency Coordination Centre (ECC). A regional level response centre that is activated to direct, coordinate and support incidents with regional or national implications, or when a response requires wider coordination.

National Coordination Centre (NCC). A national level response centre that directs priorities, sets national objectives and manages national level coordination. Support agency NCC's maintain command of their own agency operations, ECC's maintain control of regional level response and EOC's maintain control of local level response.

National Crisis Management Centre (NCMC). A permanent, generic national coordination facility for use by any national lead agency. It is intended to coordinate AoG responses. The NCMC is known as *'The Bunker'* and is located on the lower ground floor of the Parliament building – the Beehive - in Wellington.

Response Levels

The level of response will also determine which coordination centre is most appropriate and is categorised into three broad areas.

Local. Limited in either geographic scope or damage which can be dealt with using local resources controlled from an EOC.

Regional. An event that spans several local areas requiring that the regional level response is managed by an ECC in order to coordinate the assignment of resources to support one or more EOC.

National. An event that demands a national level of response that will be coordinated from an agency specific NCC. For complex situations, or those carrying significant national security risk, the NCMC will be stood up to coordinate the strategic AoG response.

Initiation of a Military Response

In the event of a domestic disaster or emergency of national significance, a Government agency will be appointed through the Domestic and External Security Group (DESG) as lead authority to coordinate an AoG emergency and disaster response. Requests for NZDF support may be made through the Officials Committee for Domestic and External Security Coordination (ODESC), of which the Chief of Defence Force and Secretary of Defence are members, or direct from OGAs to NZDF.

The ODESC system is used by central government in the oversight and governance of national security issues, including during significant crises or security events where consequences of national significance warrant the co-ordination of AoG planning and prioritisation. The ODESC system is a group of senior officials, chaired by the chief executive of the DPMC, which supports Ministers in developing high-level strategic direction, policy and priorities, and in authorising additional resources to deal with crises.



Emergencies meriting an AoG response may require activation of the NCMC by ODESC, which is normally on the recommendation of the responsible lead agency. The nature of the emergency determines the mode of activation as described below.

Monitor. Standby mode with minimal staffing. Monitor and assess impending or actual threats and events that may lead to a local emergency.

Engage. Partial activation mode with increased staffing. In addition to 'Monitor' activities, collect, analyse and disseminate information on emergencies, report and deliver advice to GoNZ, and provide a public information service. The HQ JFNZ Other Government Agencies Liaison Officer (OGA LO) could be expected to be part of the increased staffing at this stage onwards.

Assist. Fully operational mode with partial to full staffing. In addition to 'Engage' activities, process or coordinate requests for support from regional and local organisations.

Direct. Full activation mode with full staffing. Controls and directs the overall response whilst continuing to carry out the functions of the other modes.

Stand Down. Inactive. NCMC has reverted to pre-activation status.

Chapter Five

CONPLAN AWHINA

Chapter Five:

CONPLAN AWHINA

Background

AWHINA is the operation identifier for the provision of NZDF assistance to GoNZ in times of domestic emergency through the deployment of specialist skills, capabilities or personnel resources in support of a lead government agency. The GoNZ intent is to ensure the maintenance of security, protection of New Zealanders, and return to stability as soon as possible. The people of New Zealand must have the confidence that the National Security System can respond effectively to any challenge that arises.

NZ Joint Service Plan (JSP) AWHINA is issued by the authority of CDF and provides overarching details of NZDF support to OGAs and departments within New Zealand. The JSP also directs tasks for COMJFNZ, Service Chiefs and HQ NZDF, and C2 responsibilities.

> On command, the NZDF is to provide timely and coordinated support to the lead agency during an emergency or crisis in order to contribute to an effective GoNZ response and assist in the recovery of the affected area.
>
> Mission Statement: NZJSP 101 – PLAN AWHINA

CONPLAN AWHINA is compiled and maintained by HQ JFNZ and addresses the provision of operational-level NZDF assistance to the civil powers in times of domestic emergency. It contains direction and tasking for units and branches across the NZDF, task organisation, CIS concept, health support, personnel administration, preparations and training. CONPLAN AWHINA is reviewed annually to ensure procedures and assets intended for use during a response remain current.

Threat

New Zealand's geographical location makes it naturally vulnerable to a variety of events, including severe weather, flooding, earthquakes, tsunami and volcanic eruption. While the most common natural disaster risks to NZ are normally localised in their impact, such as flooding, some events potentially have a wider regional effect or national impact as demonstrated by the Christchurch and Kaikoura earthquakes.

There are some threats that may require an alternate OGA than NEMA to be the lead agency. These include such events as hazardous substance spills, biological threats, biosecurity outbreaks, major infrastructure failure, search and rescue operations, and transport accidents including maritime incidents.

CONPLAN AWHINA assumes that a localised or national event has not rendered HQ JFNZ inoperable, and normal C2 provided by the HQ remains extant. In the event of a major incident significantly

reducing the capacity of HQ JFNZ and HQ NZDF, CONPLAN CAPITAL CONTINUITY will be activated. This is the plan to relocate personnel to an alternate HQ therefore the implementation of some aspects of CONPLAN AWHINA may be delayed as a consequence.

CDF Intent

Purpose. To support the lead agency in reducing the impact of an event through the provision of an adaptive, flexible and agile NZDF to GoNZ.

Method. Maintain assigned NZDF elements at ordered states of readiness. Establish liaison mechanisms with agencies and conduct a timely and appropriate response to any request for assistance during an emergency or crisis.

Endstate. NZDF capability has supported the lead agency in responding to the event, the conditions have been set for relevant agencies to transition to recovery, and all NZDF force elements have redeployed to home locations.

COMJFNZ Intent

Purpose. To minimise further devastation and loss of life in the event of a disaster in NZ by providing specialist NZDF capabilities to support the emergency management lead agency. To foster an habitual working relationship between NZDF command elements and local, regional and national NEMA and OGA authorities.

Method. Establish local and regional relationships between designated Base/Camp Commanders and their respective NEMA agencies, and maintain those liaison relationships over time to enable NZDF responsiveness. In the event of an emergency developing, seek to rapidly establish situational awareness through LOs and be postured to respond rapidly and appropriately to any request received from the lead agency. Depending on the severity of the event, deliver graduated and tailored FEs to reinforce the initial response force. This may include specialised ground personnel and the employment of maritime or air assets. NZDF will seek to transition response tasks back to the appropriate civilian provider as soon as possible.

Key Effects. There are four key effects that any response is seeking to achieve:

- ‘Forward leaning’ through effective liaison and early engagement;
- Graduated response through local to regional activities;
- Effective assessment of likely tasks beyond local and regional capacity to inform follow on planning; and
- Where required, centralised coordination with decentralised execution of strategic/national assets.

Endstate. Further devastation and loss of life is minimised, provision of disaster response tasks transitioned to civilian agencies, deployed personnel returned to unit, and the NZDF’s reputation as a *Force for NZ* is enhanced.

NZDF Readiness States

There are three standardised readiness states in order to provide for common actions across the CONPLAN structure as follows:

- **AWHINA AMBER.** Implementation of the full range of actions required by the plan is possible, and preliminary actions may be taken. SCE Branch will authenticate activation and maintain situational awareness of potential requests with the lead agency. A warning order for potential support and deployment of LOs would be issued. COMJFNZ would reduce the notice to move time of FE as appropriate.
- **AWHINA RED.** NZDF assistance to a government agency has been authorised. In addition to AWHINA AMBER, FE will be allocated to COMJFNZ if required following approval from CDF. HQJFNZ CONPLAN AWHINA would be activated and LOs would be established within Emergency Centres.
- **AWHINA GREEN.** Support to a lead agency is to conclude and forces are to resume pre-activation activities. NZDF assistance may continue but will require additional authorisation and direction from CDF. Unless otherwise directed, NZDF FE can return to units and conduct demobilisation activities.

NZDF Response Groups

CONPLAN AWHINA directs all Component Forces to be prepared to provide support to NEMA agencies. Mobilisation of personnel and assets is a scalable response where one of the following designated Response Groups will be deployed:

- **Local Emergency Response Group (LERG).** A 25 person group, with provision to increase to 50 personnel that can deploy using organic land transport without prior approval from HQ JFNZ. All NZDF camps, bases and units identify, and are prepared to deploy a LERG, and the Base/Camp Commanders form working relationships with local and regional NEMA and OGA lead authorities in preparation for any response to an event. Base/Camp Commanders immediately notify HQ JFNZ if a LERG is activated; this will enable HQ JFNZ to develop Regional or National response options should such a course of action be necessary.
- **Regional Emergency Response Group (RERG).** A task organised group of up to 100 personnel, authorised by COMJFNZ, to provide a military response to a state of regional or national emergency that may require the deployment of national assets.
- **National Emergency Response Group (NERG).** A response directed by GoNZ that may require all available NZDF resources and the deployment of DJIATF. A disaster of national scale may require the suspension of other activities as it will become the NZDF main effort in order to meet government direction.

Where the NZDF holds a unique capability, such as airborne surveillance, it may be deployed initially, and prior to any formal request, to enable a local, regional and national response. If the scale of the emergency is severe, the CDF may order the recovery of some elements from operational tasking – strategic lift assets and specialist equipment – to assist.

Risk

COMJFNZ maintains a default risk appetite for AWHINA operations of CAUTIOUS.[3] A more permissive or restrictive risk level may be adopted depending on the type of operation being undertaken and will be managed on a case-by-case basis.

Health and Safety

CONPLAN AWHINA is exempt from the Health and Safety Act through CDF declaration and/or GoNZ declaration and authorisation. Although exempt, the requirement to promote the intent of the Act remains. There is no standing approval or sanction for CONPLAN AWHINA to deviate from NZDF policy regarding health and safety and no person is authorised to accept an unnecessary risk (a risk that is not related to the operational mission).

Liaison Officers

The focus on LOs in CONPLAN AWHINA is of particular importance as they are an integral part of the establishment and maintenance of key working relationships between military and civilian organisations. Formations and bases have assigned responsibilities and are directed to ensure that their LOs establish and maintain contact with respective regional, district and local NEMA groups within their area(s) of responsibility.

The number of LOs required to support an operation will vary dependant on the severity of the disaster. Early contact with NEMA groups is imperative with a view to deploying immediately when a local EOC has been activated, regardless of whether the NZDF is likely to be used or not. This action meets with the 'forward leaning' characteristic of CDF's intent.

Training. The responsibility for training regional LOs lies with formation and base HQ's to ensure familiarity with the requirements of CONPLAN AWHINA and particularly:

- CIMS.
- Capabilities that may be available at local and regional level.
- LO duties and responsibilities.
- C2 arrangements.
- Writing and submitting reports and returns.

LO Responsibilities. It is very important for NEMA groups to understand that LOs have no authority to task NZDF assets; their remit is to coordinate task requests and facilitate information flow. There are three main responsibilities of an LO.

[3] COMJFNZ Minute 008/2020: HQ JFNZ Application of Risk Management, of 31 Jul 20.

- **Monitor.** LOs are to monitor operations of their parent unit and those of the supported unit/agency in order to understand how they influence each other. LOs must know the current planned operations, understand pertinent staff issues and clearly understand their commander's intent.
- **Coordinate.** LOs help synchronise current operations and future planning between their unit and supported unit/agency through a process of coordination with other LOs and agencies. Successful coordination requires a collaborative process that enhances communications and information exchange.
- **Advise.** The supported unit/agency will expect their allocated LO to be an expert on their own unit capabilities, including current and planned dispositions. The LO needs to be fully conversant with available plans and provide timely and relevant information.

The graphic below indicates the areas of responsibility for formations and bases. The reach of Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) may appear to be somewhat dislocated, but this reflects the capability of Territorial Forces to provide response options in some districts.



NZDF Civilians

NZDF civilians are required to obtain medical clearance to deploy on operations, exercises or duty visits overseas through the completion of Form MD1170. The form states that: '*Personnel involved with NZDF military operations or exercises including adventure training or expeditions, may be exposed to unfamiliar environments and activities. For health and safety reasons, personnel intending to participate must meet a minimum standard of physical, medical, and psychological health. Although the NZDF will take appropriate procedures to minimise hazards and risks to health and safety, personnel need to be able to grip, reach, pull, push, lift, carry, squat, climb, and jump in order to participate safely in activities. Participants may be required to wear, or use and operate safety equipment.'*

The recommendation as to the fitness or otherwise of an individual for a proposed NZDF activity is made to the Commander responsible for that activity and is by default carrying any associated risk. There are some exceptions to this policy for deployment to support AWHINA, but this will be determined on an individual case-by-case basis.

Evacuation of Civilians

During the evacuation of non-NZDF civilians from Kaikoura following the 2016 earthquake, some, but not all, were asked to sign an MD1170 for the short passage to Lyttleton having been embarked in CAN. This was deemed impractical, but there were no guidelines to say that the MD1170 was not required.

Revised NZDF Health Policy[4] now states that *'AWHINA activities are exempt from all requirements associated with the three levels of risk. Deployed medical elements are to make tactical decisions on how best to manage the transportation of civilians, without unnecessarily burdensome administrative direction.'*

This policy is intended to allow for civilians to be carried in NZDF ships, aircraft and vehicles, when operating under an emergency contingency plan, without the need to complete Form MD1170. Drivers of vehicles used for evacuation of civilians must hold the appropriate class of driver licence and, if applicable, a Defence Driving Permit.

[4] Joint Operational Health Group – Civilian Medical Requirements for Participation in NZDF Activities, Version 1, dated 24 August 2017.

Chapter Six

OFFSHORE OPERATIONS

Chapter Six:

OFFSHORE OPERATIONS

Pacific Island countries are particularly vulnerable to an array of natural hazards that can result in disasters that devastate lives and livelihoods, destroy environmental assets, severely impact economies and wipe out years of development progress. Many small islands in the South Pacific are at greater risk with the impact of climate change and increased urbanisation. Given New Zealand's strong cultural and political ties, the geographical proximity of Pacific Island countries in the south-west area are the primary focus of Government humanitarian assistance and investments in disaster reduction.

New Zealand provides international humanitarian assistance in response to requests from affected country Governments and supports the efforts of a coordinated international response system. The National Controller (MFAT Wellington) leads and coordinates New Zealand's whole-of-government response to an overseas natural disaster. The MFAT Post Head of Mission (HoM) is responsible for all New Zealand deployed capabilities and personnel. The HoM is the senior NZ official in-country and even where there is no in-country or accredited Post, MFAT retains the role of lead agency.

Offshore Deployment Organisations

There are a number of organisations that may be involved in offshore deployment. It is important to understand the role of each within the scope of HADR and that deployment of a particular organisation will be based on Government needs of the affected country.

MFAT. The lead agency that coordinates and oversees the response for the NZ Government. A pool of staff are on stand-by for rapid deployment in support of NZ Diplomatic posts in the field. Staff have experience in humanitarian responses, including coordination of the NZ Government's deployable technical teams – e.g. NZMAT, USAR, logistics coordination, needs assessment and information management. Staff can be deployed from NZ within 24 hours.

NEMA. The central government agency that may act as a support agency by coordinating the NEMA response to any overseas emergency managed by another lead agency. Specialists can be deployed to work with the National Disaster Management Office with expertise in fields including disaster management, planning, coordination and operations support, needs assessment and monitoring. At the request of the Government of the Affected Country (GoAC), Rapid Response Team members can be deployed within 24 hours of an approved request for up to three weeks duration.

Ministry of Health. The Ministry of Health may deploy personnel through the NZ Medical Assessment Team (NZMAT) to support the medical system of an affected country. NZMAT is registered with the World Health Organisation as a Type-1 outpatient mobile and fixed Emergency Medical Team which can manage: triage, basic first aid and life support, stabilisation and referral, initial wound care, fracture management, out-patient care,

emergency obstetric care, out-patient paediatric care for injuries and endemic diseases, out-patient minor chronic disease and out-patient medical consumables and pharmaceuticals for the declared out-patient capacity.

Fire and Emergency NZ. FENZ may deploy a USAR team to assist in: rapid damage assessment, provision of engineering advice for building integrity, locating and extricating of individuals in collapsed structures, initial medical stabilisation of trapped individuals, identification and advice on management and disposal of hazardous materials, desalination for the production of potable water, and restoration of water services (pumps and reticulation systems). USAR teams are structured to operate in-country on a 24/7 basis and can operate from a central location or as a mobile team.

NZ Police. May be deployed to provide assistance with SAR, DVI, and security. Specialists can be deployed to work with local Police in scene examination, DVI and body recovery. Capability to deploy a Police Supporting Unit to provide a public order policing response to actual or anticipated public order situations that risk overwhelming the local police ability to maintain the security of their population, or respond to violence or civil unrest.

Ministry for Primary Industries. MPI may be requested to provide bio-security screening for deployed teams, particularly when returning to NZ.

NZ Customs Service. Responsible for the security of NZ's borders, Customs will administer entry requirements for teams involved in overseas HADR responses.

Deployment Phases

Offshore deployments usually follow four distinct phases:

- Preparation.
- Alert.
- Deployment.
- Demobilisation.

Preparation. MFAT notifies supporting agencies of a disaster, or potential disaster, which is the trigger to start gathering intelligence, obtain a country risk assessment, and scope possible response capabilities and options. MFAT may convene an emergency task force or planning group, and start developing the response Action Plan.

Agencies contribute to these preparation elements and keep MFAT informed of their response capabilities, especially any changes in conditions that may affect their ability to deploy as this may have a direct influence on how the Action Plan is developed.

Alert. When an event has occurred, MFAT will coordinate a response and consider recommending a deployment. MFAT has two levels of alert:

- Alert Level 1 is a standby state identifying that tasking may be issued to bring capability to an enhanced notice to move.

- Alert Level 2 is an enhanced 'notice to move' that identifies relevant agencies have prepared a deployment proposal, endorsed by the MFAT Controller, and MFAT is planning/preparing a recommendation for the Minister.

Deployment. Ministerial approval has been given to deploy and MFAT provides tasking to agencies covering the scope of the deployment.

Demobilisation. Commences when the deployed elements prepare to return to NZ having been released from the agreed tasking. The withdrawal of teams from the field is generally conducted as quickly as possible.

Initial Assessment Team

The IAT is an inter-agency rapid response group of personnel deployed to the affected country to provide support to the HoM, gather critical information on the ground of the event's impact, and inform response options for the NZ Government.

It is during Alert Level 2 that the MFAT Controller will determine the need to deploy an IAT. However, if the scale of an event is likely to be significant, and to ensure timeliness of assessment and provision of information about the area(s) likely to be affected, the MFAT Controller may authorise the deployment of the IAT in advance of an event. MFAT have two designated deployment teams:[5]

IAT-1 – may be authorised to pre-deploy to a location in advance of an event when it appears likely a country will be affected. They must be self-sustainable including a stand-alone communications facility. Likely composition would be:

MFAT (1-2 reps)
NZDF (up to 4 reps) (HQ DJIATF IAT)
FENZ (1-2 reps)

IAT-2 – may be authorised to deploy to the affected country immediately to develop a package of support for the NZ Government's offer of assistance. Likely composition would be:

MFAT (up to 3 reps)
NZDF (up to 12 reps) (HQ DJIATF JCART)
FENZ (2 reps)
Ministry of Health (MoH) (2 reps)
NZ Police (1 rep)

[5] NZ Foreign Affairs and Trade – Offshore Deployment Guidelines 2016

NZDF assistance to a Pacific Relief activity will be conducted as part of a wider AoG effort. Personnel will not deploy as an independent team outside of MFAT control as they would have no jurisdiction or authority to deal with the HoM in country.

Reporting

The military element of either IAT will be directed to raise situation reports (SITREPs) to HQ JFNZ on a frequent basis; during the initial stages of a response this could be up to three times a day. This flow of information is critical to ensure the appropriate supplies and equipment are being prepared for deployment and to provide commanders with timely data to inform specialist personnel requirements.

The HoM also develops a consolidated report which supports the MFAT Emergency Control Centre (ECC) and agencies' ongoing response activities, which includes:

- A high-level summary based on initial impact assessment
- Key data/information from each agency on their specialist technical areas
- Priority areas for support and options, including initial response options and forward planning
- Risks, constraints and potential mitigation actions for each of these options.

Movement of Stores

The bulk of stores and equipment is likely to be moved to the theatre of operations utilising CAN, but planning must account for the time it takes to transport the intended cargo to the dockside, loading and storing of the ship including real life support stores, and passage time to the affected country. Sea passage to the Cook Islands from Devonport for example will take 9-10 days; factor in a minimum of 4-5 days to load the ship and the result is that it will take circa two weeks before arrival on station from the time preparations got underway to deploy.

Advance Forces

HMNZS Wellington (WGN) was deployed five days after Tropical Cyclone Winston hit Fiji in 2016 despite a formal request for assistance from the Fijian Government yet to be received. The intent was to pre-position WGN along the track to Fiji in order to have more time to conduct a rapid environmental assessment of the area. This is particularly useful in poorly charted areas where CAN may be expected to operate her landing craft and establishing a beach head to conduct logistics over the shore operations.

Chapter Seven

CONPLAN PACIFIC RELIEF

Chapter Seven:

CONPLAN PACIFIC RELIEF

The aim of any HADR response by NZ agencies will be to save lives, alleviate suffering, foster recovery, and promote stability. How this is achieved will vary and includes the provision of financial assistance, supply and delivery of aid, assisting the evacuation of local populations, provision of logistics support and repairing essential infrastructure.

The NZDF operational name for HADR operations in the South Pacific is PACIFIC RELIEF (PACREL). The HQJFNZ CONPLAN used to initiate a response contains operational level guidance on pre-deployment/activation planning and provision of post activation assistance to the government of the affected Pacific island country.

Area of Operations

The South Pacific is a sparsely populated region where significant sea gaps separate small populations of low income island states that will likely require external assistance in the event of a significant disaster. The PACREL area of operation (AO) extends from Papua New Guinea in the North West, Federated States of Micronesia to Kiribati in the North, French Polynesia in the South East, Tonga in the central South and New Caledonia in the South West.

Threat

There is a wide spectrum of environmental threats, both natural and man-made, the consequences of which may result in the activation of PACREL. Significant climatic events and the effects of seismic/volcanic activity are often the prime sources of natural disaster, but there will also be circumstances where crises arise from environmental threats such as drought or famine. This would result in a more deliberate response by the GoNZ and may include the NZDF, particularly where infrastructure is inadequate or access especially difficult. Events the NZDF must be prepared to respond to include, but are not limited to:

- Cyclone.
- Earthquake.
- Tsunami.
- Flooding (e.g. excess rainfall, tidal effect, rising sea levels, dam burst).
- Drought or water shortage/stress.
- Volcanic eruption.
- Major passenger disaster (ferry sinking or aircraft accident).

Operational Limitations

The role of the NZDF is limited to that agreed by the GoNZ in consultation with the GoAC. This limitation excludes the deployment of the pre-event IAT and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capability. The IAT can prepare for deployment if an event is likely to result in a request for GoNZ assistance; HQ DJIATF will normally be the initial responding FE and deploy as part of the IAT *(See Chapter Two)*. No other NZDF assets will be deployed without the formal permission of the GoAC, which will normally be provided through MFAT.

The NZDF has a 'forward leaning approach' to the way in which military supports HADR events. This is achieved by maintaining close working relationships through regional and national disaster planning training and exercises. Proactive contact and support is provided by HQ JFNZ J3 Staff to MFAT when disasters are forecast or, in the event of a sudden disaster, the offer to immediately deploy the NZDF IAT is normally made. This is intended to provide confidence and support, and to manage expectations by MFAT and the affected country, but deployment of the IAT does not signal that a full NZDF response is forthcoming.

The NZDF should be employed as a last resort and on the basis that suitable and sufficient civilian capability is not available in the time required to meet critical humanitarian needs. All NZDF assistance will be provided from in-service equipment and capabilities likely to be available to MFAT and GoAC are:

- Surveillance efforts in support of disaster assessments and analysis.
- Communications support to the NZ HoM.
- Distribution of emergency relief stores.
- Provision of health support such as environmental health advice and water purification.
- Engineering support to 'make safe' vertical and horizontal repair and clearance.
- Logistics support for response teams.

Military Response Options

There are three levels of MRO that can be used:

Light. This is likely to consist of reconnaissance (P3K2), NZDF/DJIATF contribution to an IAT (HQ DJIATF staff and SME) and possible initial air supply of immediate humanitarian aid needs.

Medium. An air bridge moving military personnel (Light HADR TG), equipment and HADR stores.

Heavy. Possible deployment of a Commander Joint Task Force, Joint National Support Element, ADFOR, sealift including rotary wing assets, ISR, HADR TG with associated equipment and stores. This option could also incorporate an air bridge.

Mission Execution

The purpose of PACREL is the efficient deployment and sustainment of an HADR response to provide appropriate assistance commensurate with the level of the disaster whilst continuing to build capacity and resilience in the affected country. To achieve this, there are a number of methodical processes undertaken as follows:

- Early assessment to determine the HADR effect required through liaison with OGA and HoM, the deployment of IAT-1 and reconnaissance and surveillance assessments, and deployment of a JCART as part of IAT-2.
- Liaison with international partners, OGAs, NGOs and IAT to determine the requirement and identify where NZDF effort can be used to best effect.
- Preparation and deployment of an NZDF response FE within appropriate timelines, including ADFOR with enablers.
- Sustainment of any deployed FE using logistics components staged from outside of the disaster area.
- Handover of HADR effects to GoAC on transition from response to recovery phase.
- Withdrawal of deployed forces on order and posture for future tasks in NZ.

Mission Phases

Preliminary Phase – Maintenance of Readiness and Awareness

- SCE liaise with MFAT, OGAs, and NGOs to maintain situational awareness. Delivery of briefs in off-season periods, particularly on NZDF capabilities and responses, is crucial especially as personnel in MFAT and other agencies tend to rotate more frequently than NZDF personnel.

Phase One – Activation/ Mobilisation/Reconnaissance

- If disaster relief is required, HoM relays the GoAC request for assistance and provides MFAT with an assessment including recommendations on types of assistance. CDF activates NZJSP 102 PLAN PACIFIC RELIEF.
- COMJFNZ will authorise deployment of IAT-1 to assist the HoM in the initial assessment of the situation, identify the requirement for the JCART to deploy as part of IAT-2, and the likely NZDF HADR follow-on force composition.
- LO would deploy to MFAT upon notification of an NZDF response being required. This duty is conducted by MAJ(E) personnel from HQ JFNZ who will operate from the MFAT ECC in Wellington.
- Prepositioning of NZDF and/or MFAT HADR stores and equipment, e.g. movement to the mounting base or loading on to an offshore patrol vessel and/or CAN. Unless otherwise directed, RNZAF Base Auckland will be the Mounting Base and the Mounting HQ will remain as HQ JFNZ.
- Early liaison is authorised between HQ JFNZ and HQ JOC to determine opportunity to deliver a combined immediate support response.

- MFAT will establish GoNZ shaping and influencing initiatives with GoAC to gain a request for assistance and legal authority to deploy. The HoM will advise should the evacuation of NZ citizens and other approved foreign nationals appear desirable or essential.
- NZDF ISR assets may be tasked to provide situational awareness.
- ADFOR may be required to conduct surveys of beach landing sites, port facilities, or navigational approaches. If not part of ADFOR, this capability could form part of the JCART.
- This phase concludes when the HADR needs of the affected country has been identified and liaison links established.

Phase Two – Deployment of Military Response

- On receipt of CDF direction, HQ JFNZ will deploy the required FE to deliver the NZDF's HADR effect. Key tasks may include:
    - Immediate deployment of NH-90 by best means;
    - Provision of appropriate military support to minimise loss of life or injury, and support the welfare of the affected population; or
    - On-going liaison with the affected country to ensure unity of effort, coordinated response, and civil-military cooperation.
- This phase concludes when HADR effect is delivered, meeting the GoNZ intent.

Phase Three – Sustain

- Maintenance of lines of communication to sustain the NZDF contribution.
- The duration of NZDF commitment will be influenced by the extent to which local authorities and community support systems have been disrupted, and will be decided by GoNZ.
- As soon as local authorities and community support systems have been sufficiently restored, the NZDF would seek transfer of responsibility to recover FE.
- If sustainment is protracted, NZDF personnel and assets will be rotated in order to ensure continuous engagement in the HADR effort.
- This phase concludes when the NZDF HADR effort has transitioned to appropriate agencies.

Phase Four – Redeployment of FE

- This involves the withdrawal and RTNZ of deployed FE. Some niche military capabilities may remain in the disaster area for an extended period in the event OGA and NGO systems require extended military capability presence to ensure delivery of essential services.
- Withdrawal will likely include provision for the return to NZ of non-NZDF personnel and equipment.
- Compliance with bio-hazard requirements will see the forward deployment of MPI to enable in-country clearance of equipment to enable efficient return to NZ.
- This phase concludes when all NZDF personnel and equipment have returned to NZ, reconstituted, forces are postured for other operations and after action reviews and reports are complete.

Mission Termination

PACREL response FE's will start redeployment when one or more of the following conditions are met:

- On direction of GoNZ.
- At the request or direction of the GoAC.
- GoNZ is able to conduct HADR operations independent of NZDF support.
- The HADR effect provided by the NZDF has been transitioned to an appropriate agency.

Chapter Eight

HUMANITARIAN CRISES FACTORS

HUMANITARIAN CRISES FACTORS

Every HADR event will identify vulnerabilities, effects and the onset of post-crisis needs.[6] The NZDF may be involved in all of these areas and the following table identifies a range of those factors. It is not a composite list but is intended to provide guidance for planners when working up a response to a crisis.

Event	Factors Contributing to Vulnerability	Typical Adverse Effects	Typical needs post-crisis onset
Flood	Locations of settlements on floodplains. Lack of awareness of flooding hazard. Non-resistant buildings and foundations. High risk infrastructure elements. Unprotected food stocks, livestock and warehoused and standing crops	Casualties and public health – loss of life, but relatively few serious injuries. Secondary threats of communicable and vector diseases such as malaria, diarrhoea, cholera, and viral infections due to contaminated water supplies or breakdown in sanitary conditions. Physical damage – structures damaged and/or washed away, impacted by floating debris and collapsing. Landslides from saturated soils. Water supplies – contamination of wells, water supplies, and ground water. Crops and food supply – loss of harvests, food stocks, and livestock. Reduced ability to travel and trade.	Search and rescue. Health care assistance. Damage needs and assessment survey. Emergency provision of food, water, sanitation and shelter. Evacuation and relocation to safe havens. Water purification. Repair and reconstruction of essential services. Epidemiological surveillance and vector control. Assistance with transport and road/rail/port repairs. Animal husbandry and veterinarian services.

[6] NZDDP 3.20 – Humanitarian Operations

Tropical Cyclone	Settlements located in low-lying coastal and adjacent areas. Poor communications or warning system. Lightweight structures, old construction, poor quality masonry. Infrastructure elements, fishing boats and maritime industries.	Casualties and public health – death or injuries caused by flying debris or floods. Secondary threats of communicable and vector diseases such as malaria, diarrhoea, cholera, and viral infections due to contaminated water supplies or breakdown in sanitary conditions. Physical damage – structures lost and damaged by wind force, flooding, storm surge and landslide. Water supply – ground water may be contaminated. Crops and food supplies – loss of standing crops, harvests, food stocks, and tree plantations.	Search and rescue. Health care assistance. Damage needs and assessment survey. Emergency provision of food, water, sanitation and shelter. Evacuation and relocation to safe havens. Water purification. Repair and reconstruction of essential services. Epidemiological surveillance and vector control.
Bushfire	Location of bushfire-prone areas. Bushfire threat tends to be seasonal. Speed of onset will vary depending on the weather conditions. Evacuation of communities may be dangerous in the face of a major fire front. Ongoing risk that may not diminish after the fire.	Casualties and public health – loss of life, effects of burns and smoke inhalation. Physical damage – destruction of buildings, infrastructure, environment and livestock. Crops and food supplies – loss of harvests, food stocks, and livestock.	Search and rescue. Health care assistance. Damage needs and assessment survey. Provision of fire-fighting resources. Provision of fire spotting transportation. Emergency provision of food, water, sanitation, and shelter.

			Evacuation and relocation to safe havens. Water purification. Repair and reconstruction of essential services.
Earthquake	Location of settlements in seismic areas. Rigid structures not resistant to ground motion. Dense collections of buildings with high occupancy. Ongoing aftershocks or earthquakes. Tsunami triggered by the earthquake.	Casualties and public health – high death toll, particularly near epicentre or in highly populated areas. Fracture and crush injuries most widespread problem. Secondary threats of communicable and vector diseases such as malaria, diarrhoea, cholera and viral infections. Physical damage to key structures and infrastructure. Water supply – severe problems likely due to damage to water systems.	Search and rescue. Health care assistance. Damage needs and assessment survey. Emergency provision of food, water, sanitation and shelter. Evacuation, relocation and emergency shelter to safe havens. Water purification. Repair and reconstruction of essential services. Identify secondary hazards including toxic industrial materials.
Tsunami	Location of settlements in low-lying coastal regions. Lack of tsunami-resistant buildings. Lack of timely warning systems and evacuation plans.	Deaths principally by drowning and injuries from debris. Physical damage – resulting from the initial force of water and follow-on flooding.	Search and rescue. Health care assistance. Damage needs and assessment survey. Emergency provision of food, water, sanitation and shelter.

	Lack of public awareness of destructive forces of tsunamis. Port and maritime infrastructure.	Contamination by salt water, debris and/or sewerage may make water non-potable. Crops and food – loss of harvest, food stocks, livestock, farm implements, and fishing boats. Land may be rendered infertile due to salt water incursion.	Evacuation and relocation to safe havens. Water purification. Repair and reconstruction of essential services. Identify secondary hazards including toxic industrial materials. Epidemiological surveillance and vector control.
Drought/ Famine	Location in an arid area where dry conditions are increased by drought. Subsistence farming. Lack of seed reserves. Lack of agricultural inputs to improve yields. Area dependent on rainfall weather system. Area of low soil moisture retention. Lack of resources to cope with drought. Population unbalance.	Casualties and public health – deaths principally from deterioration of nutritional status. Secondary threat of disease. Water supply – reduction or loss of drinking water sources. Crops and food supplies – reduced income of farmers, reduction of spending on agriculture, increase in price of staple foods, loss of livestock. Mass population movement. Increased dependence on aid programs.	Measures for maintaining food security and distribution. Health care assistance. Damage needs and assessment survey. Emergency provision of food, water, sanitation and shelter. Evacuation and relocation to safe havens. Epidemiological surveillance.
Disease/ Pandemic	Contaminated water and food supplies.	Casualties and public health – deaths principally from contagion.	Health care assistance. Damage needs and assessment survey.

	Inadequate sewage disposal facilities. Poor personal hygiene. Concentration of displaced persons in poor living conditions. Pathogens spread by weather systems. Contaminated flood waters. Inadequate or breakdown of vaccination programmes. Inadequate or breakdown of infectious disease surveillance and detection. Inadequate or breakdown in vector control. Global migration.	Increased stress on health facilities. Water supplies: reduction or loss of drinking water sources if determined to be source of contagion. Crops and food supplies: reduced work capacity, reduced income of farmers and loss of livestock/food supplies if determined to be source of contagion. Secondary threat of food shortages. Mass population movement.	Emergency provision of food, water, sanitation, and shelter. Evacuation and relocation to safe havens. Water purification. Epidemiological surveillance and vector control. Reduced capacity to rebuild/recover. Ongoing development issues.
Volcanic Eruption	Settlements on the flanks of volcanoes or potential path of lava flows. Structures with roof designs not resistant to ash accumulation. Presence of combustible materials. Lack of evacuation plan or warning systems.	Death from pyroclastic, mud and lava flows, and toxic gases. Injuries from falling rocks, burns; breathing difficulties from gas or ash. Complete destruction of everything in path of pyroclastic, mud and lava flows, including livestock and crops.	Search and rescue. Health assistance, particularly breathing and respiratory related issues. Damage needs and assessment survey. Emergency provision of food, water, sanitation, and shelter.

		Collapse of structures under weight of wet ash, flooding, blockage of roads or communication system. Grazing lands may be contaminated. Mass population movement.	Evacuation and relocation to safe havens. Repair and reconstruction of essential services. Identify secondary hazards including toxic industrial materials.

Chapter Nine

DISASTER NEEDS ASSESSMENT



Chapter Nine:

DISASTER NEEDS ASSESSMENT

There are a wide range of formats used by OGA and NGO communities to capture the basic facts of the disaster that has taken place, the impacts and effects, and immediate needs; this is commonly referred to as a Disaster Needs Assessment (DNA).

The following notes provide a guide of what content should be recorded that is most applicable to military planning; a blank DNA form is listed at the end of this chapter.

Section 1 - Disaster

- 1B - Indicate the date and time of the disaster, or 'dates' if there were multiple significant events in succession (e.g. earthquake aftershocks).
- 1C - Provide a brief descriptive summary of the disaster. What were its characteristics (magnitude, wind speed, etc.)? How severe is the damage? What is the extent of disaster losses and what are the likely short-term and long-term needs. How many people are affected and how widespread is the problem?
- 1D - Describe the geographical range involved, including specific areas affected by secondary disasters (e.g. storm surge, landslides, flooding). Names of affected districts, cities, towns, villages, etc. are useful.

Section 2 – Disaster Impacts/Effects

- 2A - Indicate the estimated number of people that have been affected, the source of this information, and approximate percentage of the overall population affected in this area. Demographic details of the affected population is always useful and should be included if known.
- 2B - Indicate the amount of physical damage to business, government or private property buildings (except for homes) if possible.
- 2C - Indicate the amount and extent of physical and financial damage to crops and livestock.
- 2D – If emergency relief supplies have to be brought in, it is important to indicate the condition of the transport networks/modes, and locations of existing or potential 'choke points'.
- 2E – Does the weather/climate affect aviation and air movement, maritime operations, vehicular movement, relief agencies ability to establish themselves, operations in general?

Section 3 – Local Authority Response

- 3D - Indicate if additional security such as cordons, access control, preventing of looting etc. will be required and the general locations of these elements.

- 3E - Indicate what transport and storage facilities can be made available for immediate use in transporting and storing emergency relief supplies. Consider the possibility of inbound relief operations overwhelming local infrastructure capacity.

Section 4 – Immediate Needs

- 4B **-** Describe the needs for shelter, water, sanitation, food, household supplies (clothes, blankets, cooking utensils, cooking fuel, etc.) and health (medical supplies, equipment, facilities). Quantify and qualify the targeted needs (for example, 110 adults and 200 children need food and water for at least the next 20 days.)

Section 5 – Longer Term Needs

- 5A – Serious problems or needs that may arise in the coming months resulting from the disaster and potential future events should be anticipated where possible i.e. winter or rainy season approaching.

Section 6 - Lead Agency

- 6B - Indicate what actions the lead agency are planning to respond to the disaster.
- 6C – Although difficult to establish in the early stages, an indication of how long the lead agency expects to be implementing a disaster response operation is useful.
- 6E – An early indication of what materiel and personnel support resources will/may be required to support the emergency relief operation will greatly assist further planning.
- 6F - Note the requirement to analyse these tasks before committing resources. Liaison officers are to manage expectations appropriately.

Section 7 – Timelines

- What are some known, possible, and recommended key timelines that would guide the development and deployment of a military HADR response?

Section 8 – Additional Information

- Add any important information not reflected in above sections of this form. This might include political context, history of disasters, response in the area, previous lessons, etc.

DISASTER NEEDS ASSESSMENT FORM

PREPARED BY:	LOCATION:	
YOUR ORGANISATION:	INCIDENT DATE:	REPORT DATE:

1. DISASTER

A. Type of Disaster:

Cyclone	Earthquake	Flood	Landslide
Drought	Tsunami	Volcanic Eruption	
Chemical Explosion or Spill		Other (specify)	

B. When did the disaster occur?

C. Briefly describe the disaster:

D. Precise geographic areas and locations impacted (districts, regions, towns?)

2. DISASTER IMPACTS/EFFECTS

A. How many people are affected and what percentage of the overall population is this number?

B. What is the physical damage to other property, buildings and infrastructure in the affected area?

C. What is the physical damage to crops and livestock?

D. What is the availability, condition of: roads, bridges, airports, ports, railways, water, gas, electricity, line/mobile/internet communications networks?

E. What is the impact of weather and climate?

3. LOCAL AUTHORITY RESPONSE

A. What resources and capacities do local civil authorities have for responding to this disaster, and how might these resources be used?

LOCAL CAPACITY OR RESOURCE	SUGGESTIONS FOR USE

B. What have local and regional councils done so far in response?

C. To what extent are the civil authorities coping?

D. What impact has the disaster had in terms of law and order issues?

E. What capacity does the emergency/disaster stricken area have to support an HADR response?

4. IMMEDIATE NEEDS

A. Has a detailed immediate needs assessment been carried out and who conducted it?

B. What is needed immediately and who will supply it?

ITEM:		TO BE SUPPLIED BY:		
DESCRIPTION	**QTY**	**OGA**	**NGO**	**OTHER**

5. LONGER-TERM NEEDS

A. What will be needed in the longer term (after the first month) and who will supply it?

ITEM:		TO BE SUPPLIED BY:		
DESCRIPTION	**QTY**	**OGA**	**NGO**	**OTHER**

6. LEAD AGENCY

A. Who will be the lead agency?

B. Give a brief description of what the lead agency proposes to do.

C. What is the proposed duration of the operation?

D. Which other government agencies will support the HADR operation?

E. What resources will be required and who will provide it?

F. For what specific effects tasks does the lead agency require NZDF support?

G. What force elements (FE) are required to facilitate these effects and what unit(s) can provide them?

Effect	FE required	FE availability	Unit

7. TIMELINES

8. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS, REQUESTS, OR INFORMATION

Chapter Ten

GENERIC PLANNING QUESTIONS

Chapter Ten:

GENERIC PLANNING QUESTIONS

This chapter contains a series of generic questions that have been formulated from experience and lessons for use as an aide to the planning and conduct of an HADR response. Every disaster and emergency event will have its own set of specific assistance and relief requirements and as such, these lists are not considered as definitive.

Situation

What is the nature of the emergency?

On what is it based (substantive or anecdotal)?

What information gaps are there?

Are the intelligence capabilities acting in support of disaster response structured to process the information that is collected, including fusion of multiple sources of information?

Is there the ability to exploit information in order to build reports and products to support the disaster response planning process?

Are the response mechanisms coping with the impact of the emergency?

What is the state of civilian administration and infrastructure?

To what extent are the civil authorities coping?

What are the apparent capability and capacity gaps?

Who will be the lead agency?

What is the lead agency response?

To what degree have lead agency contingency plans been implemented?

When will the lead agency hold its situation, scoping, and coordination briefing?

What military capabilities are required?

Are there any NZDF assets in the immediate vicinity and if so, what capabilities can they provide?

Should military liaison officers be deployed? (Nominations, locations, period/timeline, justification).

Mission

What is the military mission?

What effects are the military required to achieve?

What is the mission accomplishment, transition and termination strategy?

Does the military role define mission success in meeting the expected end state?

Response

What are the aims of the lead agency?

What other agencies are responding?

What is their capability and level of response?

What coordination mechanisms and hierarchy are in place?

What control centres / operations rooms have been established?

Are there any identifiable capability gaps?

What are the lead agency response priorities?

Are other nation's military assets deploying to assist and what assets are they providing?

To what extent will other nation's capabilities compliment or duplicate an NZDF response?

What facilities and support requirements are being provided for those assets?

What support is available to NZDF forces by the host nation?

Is there an existing military base in the vicinity of the disaster area?

Are land/air/sea lines of communication open?

Have potential Air/Sea points of embarkation/debarkation been affected to the extent that they cannot be used effectively?

Timeline

What are the necessary timelines to meet emergency response and lead agency requirements?

Note: This may be addressed in the Warning Order or OPORD and there will be occasions when NZDF assets could be rapidly deployed or pre-positioned for tasking. (P3K ISR role worked well for both Fiji and Kaikoura responses.)

Are there any constraints on assets being deployed that will affect other NZDF missions or tasking?

C2 and Coordination

What are the command, control and coordination arrangements?

Does the NZDF have a clear mandate that specifies all conditions and parameters for the operation?

Have command relationships been defined, agreed and promulgated?

What inter-agency coordination is required?

What key OGAs, NGOs, civil and international agencies will be operating in the area and how will they affect military operations, if at all?

Are there any existing MOU's between military and supporting agencies?

Have C2 arrangements been made that permits and facilitates coordination with OGAs and NGOs?

What communications systems are contributing agencies using?

Do all levels of the chain of military command understand the civil-military relationship?

Who decides how differences of opinion arising during civil-military coordination are resolved?

Have any restrictions or constraints been imposed on military commanders?

Information Sharing

Who will decide what kind of information should/could be shared, with whom and when?

When and how should information be verified by military and other agencies receiving it?

How is critical or sensitive information defined and what rules are there for distribution?

What data and communication systems are available that allow sharing between military, local authorities, OGAs and NGOs?

What communication plan is in place to allow information flow between the deployed HQ and FEs involved in the response?

Liaison Officers

Has the LO been briefed on the Commander's intent, including CONOPS, unit locations, military activities, etc.

Is the LO fully conversant with the current status, organisation and tasks of the unit/agency to which they are being deployed?

Are communications and computer systems established that will give the LO appropriate links into military networks?

What accommodation and domestic provisions (meals, medical, transport) are available to the LO?

Is there any requirement for personal protection equipment such as high visibility vest, hardhat, ear defenders and face mask to be provided to the LO?

Is there any requirement to provide credentials for identification and appropriate security clearances to gain entry to the supported agency?

Force Protection

Has an overall risk assessment been conducted?

Is there a military responsibility for providing force protection to OGAs, NGOs and contractors?

Within the context of the emergency or disaster, what are the legal, cultural or political requirements that impose force protection constraints?

Are there any national standards/caveats that may impose limitations of how the military force conducts business?

How, when and where might force protection requirements change during the operation?

Does the military force have the ability/capability to assess the intent of individuals potentially imposing a threat and what arrangements can be put in place to address this?

What needs to be protected and to what level (communications systems, stores areas, personnel health, reputation, etc.)?

Personnel Support

Personnel:

Has a DNA been completed and does it assist in guiding personnel selection and skill set requirements?

Has liaison been established with the lead agency, OGAs and NGOs that may help shape the NZDF concept for personnel support?

What NZDF welfare support is available to NZDF personnel?

Rotation and Strength Management:

What is the minimum period all deploying personnel will need to be self-sufficient?

Are Reserve force personnel required and what periods of notice need to be given?

Is there any visibility of specialist trade skills held by Reserve Force personnel?

Consider viewing Reserve Force commitment (even if from another region of NZ) from a more strategic perspective. It would be a measureable value of the Reserve Force key stakeholders and will:

- *be seen as a positive return on investment*
- *contribute to winning employer support of their employees who are Reservists*
- *enhances wider public support not only of the Reserves but NZDF as a whole*
- *bring skills to enhance the NZDF pool of needed to meet NEMA objectives.*

Has a viable personnel tracking system been established with dedicated personnel to administer it throughout the duration of the crisis?

What is the rotation plan for the NZDF contingent and FEs?

Does the personnel information management plan account for any personnel status reports including: authorised, assigned, and deployed strengths, critical personnel shortages, casualty accounting, and personnel requisitions?

Is there a need to stagger personnel rotation and replacement to maintain skill sets and expertise in the area of operations?

Where and when will personnel reception centres be established to control and account for the flow of personnel into and out of the area of operations?

Who will be responsible for the administration of all inbound and outbound personnel?

What are the implications of deploying civilian staff in support of these activities?

Chaplaincy:

Is there a plan in place to provide chaplain support?

Psychologists:

Will military psychologists be deployed and who will lead the response?

What are the coordination mechanisms, hierarchy and responsibilities of the psychology response?

What are the liaison/reporting requirements between Commanders and co-ordinating psychologists?

How will requests from other agencies for psychological support be managed?

Health Support

General:

What Health Service Support (HSS) capabilities are being requested?

Has consideration been given to an HSS representative being included as part of the reconnaissance and assessment team?

Has a coordinated health services plan been established?

Has an HSS threat assessment been conducted and what are the Force protection implications?

Are there any HSS capabilities that may be required to meet force protection requirements (e.g. clinical psychology)?

Where are our medical/health services capabilities located?

What resources are needed to deploy HSS resources into the AO and how long will it take?

Can HSS provide any augmentation to OGA and NGO health service delivery?

Has a health risk analysis for NZDF personnel been conducted to determine likely health threats (e.g. asbestos, chemical spill exposure)?

Is there appropriate transport assets (air, road, sea) to permit the rapid and safe evacuation of civilians – adults and children – and those with varying levels of medical support?

What are the sanitising and cleaning arrangements for equipment and vehicles?

Health Protection

What are the potential health risks to the deploying forces?

What medical support is necessary for own forces?

What requirement is there for immunizations that may be time critical to administer?

Are there any risks from unexploded ordnance, gas leaks, infrastructure failures, etc.?

Are our personnel qualified to meet NZ environmental health certification requirements? *(It is of note that personnel qualified to undertake/perform environmental health services for the NZDF overseas maybe required to meet more stringent criteria when performing the same functions in NZ).*

Has an assessment of current environmental conditions – water and soil contamination, epidemiological surveys, and diseases risk - been completed and has that data been shared with agencies?

Are there any issues with providing support to mortuary operations if requested?

Logistics

General:

Has consideration been given for a logistic services specialist to be included as part of the reconnaissance and assessment team?

Has a DNA been completed and how does it assist in guiding personnel selection to address skill set requirements?

Has liaison been established with the lead and other agencies to help shape the NZDF concept for logistic support?

What military logistic capabilities are required and are they considered sufficient to meet the task?

What facilities, structures, services are available in the AO and are any resources required to supplement them?

What is the logistic requirement to support a deployed military force and what further capacity will be available to support a civil defence request?

Has any sort of timeframe been established for how long military logistic support might be expected?

What capacity is there to support the surge of further personnel, equipment and stores into the AO if required?

Transport and Movement Control:

What are the movement control processes at loading and unloading points?

What modes of military transport are available to resupply the force?

Are there any limitations in terms of capacity, load types, time/duration of availability?

What sea ports, airports, roads, rail routes and terminals are available?

Will any of these be congested by a departing populace or unavailable due to damage sustained in the disaster?

Is there any need to investigate commercial transport support – air cargo, sealift, etc.?

How will military transportation services be tasked in support of OGAs and NGOs?

What is the availability of suitable transport assets to undertake civil defence tasks such as evacuation of people and possibly animals, if directed to do so?

Legal

Planning:

Does the lead agency have their own specialist legal advisers?

How will the necessary legal support to the deployed Joint Task Force Commander/HQ be provided?

Establish a legal chain of command/responsibility, and a Chief Legal Advisor, as necessary.

Is there any leasing or use of real estate that may be subject to legal process?

Is there a claims process in place with the lead agency to provide for any claims against the NZDF?

What are the implications of NZDF hosting any allied military elements deployed to NZ to assist with an HADR operation?

Are there any legal limitations that impede the hiring of locally employed civilians?

Are there any legal implications that need to be addressed for the loan or lease of military equipment to civilians or OGAs if approved?

What legal support, if any, is required to be provided to the NZDF DVI and mortuary task elements?

Have arrangements been made with NZ Police to capture and manage any public allegations relating to misconduct by military personnel?

Law Enforcement:

What is the legal basis under which the military force will provide assistance in a law enforcement role?

Are personnel involved in the HADR response required to have powers of arrest, search, etc.?

Are the standard Rules of Conduct (RoC) sufficient for the specific operation and if not, have the necessary amendments been approved?

Have personnel been briefed on the RoC and associated factors - use of force, powers of entry, arrest etc. - relevant to the requests for assistance and likely duties?

Media and Public Information

General:

Has a coordinated media plan been established and what overarching public affairs goals are intended?

Has a public affairs LO been appointed?

Who is the official spokesperson for the NZDF and who will approve NZDF media releases?

Who is the lead agency point of contact for media matters?

Will civilian media representatives be embedded with the military?

Does the media plan cover the procedures for release of information concerning the military force and what military information is releasable to the media?

Is there any intent for the use or avoidance of social media by military personnel whilst deployed on operations and what rules/guidelines are in place to manage this?

How will public appearances be coordinated to ensure the military gains credibility for its part in the operation, whilst also being mindful of sensitivities and fostering continued good working relationships with lead and other supporting agencies?

Have any official responses been raised to media questions and what measures have been taken to review and update them?

Is there a plan in place to cover controversial issues that may have the potential for negative impact on the military?

How can incorrect perceptions and conclusions regarding the nature and purpose of the military mission be prevented?

Are there any potentially negative impacts of a sizeable military contingent entering a devastated area and what mitigation measures are in place?

Planning Factors:

A Media Team should deploy with the initial response team into the disaster area where possible. Composition should be a Senior Military Media Adviser and a photographer/videographer, co-located with the deployed FE HQ.

A series of key messages need to be developed for use by NZDF personnel on the ground.

Analysis of lessons and reports from previous HADR operations indicates that media coverage is likely to fall into the following phases:

Phase 1 – Emotive Phase: (Days 1-7) Initial Impact, Disaster Scope.

Initial disaster reports/stories on the ground, shock and emotive stories, initial aid relief arriving in country. Other stories included the homeless, deaths, initial aid provision including water, sanitation, body recovery, environmental health etc. From an NZDF perspective, how fast did we respond, who did we deploy initially, what other agencies are we working with, aerial imagery, video interviews etc.?

Phase 2 – Blame Phase: (Days 8 – 14) Rebuild, Recovery.

Mainstream media normally exhaust the Phase 1 stories and start to look for different angles. Rebuild, recovery and blame assignment for why actions were taken or not. Are there any potentially negative NZDF actions during Phase 1 that could come to light during Phase 2?

Phase 3 – Recovery Phase: (Day 15 plus) Long Term Rebuild.

What is the NZDF exit strategy? How long will NZDF assets remain in support?

Disaster Victim Identification and Mortuary Affairs

The NZDF has no recognised DVI or mortuary capability that can deploy to a disaster area. There is some very basic mortuary affairs training carried out by some personnel, but any DVI qualified staff are an exception. A DVI/Mortuary facility will normally be established by NZ Police as the lead authority in these areas. The following checklist should be considered in the context of this information.

DVI:

Who is nominated as the lead agency for DVI matters?

What other agencies are involved - NZ Police, victim support, funeral directors, USAR, coronial services, Ministry of Health, overseas DVI elements?

Will the NZDF be augmenting the DVI lead agency and if so, what are the management arrangements and division of responsibilities?

Where will the field DVI facility be established?

If this is an NZDF establishment, have all arrangements been made for access by other agencies as required?

Are any essential services and improvements needed to establish the DVI facility in an NZDF establishment: tradesmen, power generation, waste disposal, site security, staff facilities, religious services, psychologists, messing, accommodation, recreational/breakout areas, computer services, communications?

Mortuary Affairs:

Who is nominated as the lead agency for mortuary affairs?

What are the linkages with a qualified undertaker, mortuary service and any NZDF involvement?

What are the military, NZ Police, civilian contractor, interface arrangements?

Where will the temporary mortuary be established?

If this is an NZDF establishment, have all arrangements been made for access by other agencies as required?

Who is responsible for adequately resourcing the military temporary mortuary facility: body bags, refrigeration, appropriate transport to evacuate remains?

Is there any requirement to contract additional services such as refrigeration and transportation?

What are the protective clothing laundry requirements?

What are the waste disposal arrangements?

What religious faith issues need consideration/addressing?

What are the implications should this facility be required to remain operational for an extended period?

How will the DVI/Mortuary elements communicate with tasking agencies and command elements?

Security Cordon Operations

This task should not be confused with Force Protection. An enduring feature of the Christchurch Quake was NZDF personnel manning the security cordon around the Christchurch CBD (Red Zone) for some 18 months after it was first established. The cordon was manned by regular force personnel during the first 6 months, but for the remaining time, the Reserve Forces stepped up to cover the task. Every HADR situation requires a somewhat unique approach and the following

checklist is based on a domestic situation requiring a security cordon arrangement, the scenario in which the NZDF is most likely to be involved.

Planning Considerations:

Support Role. In a cordon or public security operation, the NZDF is deployed in support of NZ Police unless otherwise directed. This was highlighted during the Christchurch Quake as no special powers were afforded to the NZDF carrying out cordon duties; NZDF personnel were acting under the supervision of a police officer. By NZ law if a police officer directs you to assist him or her then you are obliged by law to do so and for this reason, a police officer was stationed at every check point where military personnel were engaged in cordon and security tasks in Christchurch. A clear division of responsibility between the police and military at all levels must be addressed and clarified during planning.

Early Liaison And Reconnaissance. Liaison/reconnaissance teams should be deployed early in order to establish the scope of the task in conjunction with NZ Police.

Co-located Headquarters. The establishment of a military liaison team with the NZ Police Command HQ to coordinate and facilitate appropriate C2 over the military cordon forces cannot be over emphasised. Co-location improves information sharing, situational awareness and task transition planning. Co-location of military and supported agency representatives at each successive level down to cordon checkpoints should also be pursued as far as staff availability permits.

Communications. Effective communication networks are required if cordon operations are to be effective. The network requirements include cordon team internal communications and external links to the NZ Police HQ.

Rules of Conduct. Legal briefs must be given to all members of the cordon force to ensure they understand their legal obligations and what they can and cannot do. Legal officers may need to move around the cordon and brief NZDF personnel in the first 24 hours especially if the deployment of NZDF personnel has been so rapid that such briefings could not be completed beforehand.

Tactical Commanders. There is a clear need for commanders to be thoroughly briefed on the situation and be strategically positioned with their NZ Police counter parts to ensure effective cordon C2. Commanders should be prepared to provide advice and assistance to NZ Police when developing cordon routine and operations, and must be proactive in supervising, briefing and arranging timely logistic support of their assigned personnel.

Shifts/Rosters. The number of personnel assigned to the cordon task will directly influence the duration and number of rostered shifts. Planners should note that shifts of long duration are considered as standard for the military; OGAs involved in the cordon operation are unlikely to be able to sustain or match a similar presence. The cordon sector military commander should anticipate there will be periods when on-site advice and assistance from some OGAs may not be so readily available.

Long Duration/Reservists. Cordon security operations can be protracted ranging from days to months. Military planners must make early and long term contingency plans in anticipation of this. If there is an intent to utilise the sustained support of Reserve Forces, employer engagement must be made early with a view to providing reasonable notice for the release of their employees.

Transportation. The requirement for and use of military vehicles needs to be addressed in cordon planning. Any limitations as to who can and cannot be transported - OGAs, apprehended persons, injured persons - must also be clarified.

Surveillance Equipment/Capabilities. The NZDF may be required to assist NZ Police by providing surveillance assets that cover 'gaps' or detect any penetration of the cordon perimeter. This must be addressed in cordon planning and include legal aspects that may have second or third order effects in relation to the law and prosecution.

Hygiene. The early deployment of Porta-Loos to cordon control points and other strategic sites should be addressed with urgency not only because of basic hygiene needs, but to prevent negative media attention arising from military staff being forced to use 'make-shift' arrangements.

Catering. The logistics of providing meals to personnel involved in cordon operations must be carefully planned, including delivery arrangements, and cordon on-site facilities provided for. The impact on morale from shortcomings in these arrangements should not be overlooked or underestimated.

Accommodation. Accommodation facilities that include laundry and drying room facilities, access to equipment exchange stores, welfare telephone and internet services are all crucial aspects to be addressed in the cordon support services plan.

Task Transition

General:

If a DNA assessment has been completed, does it assist in identifying potential transition points?

Has liaison been established with the lead agency to develop the transition plan, conditions, and sign-over?

Is the transfer to be to another military force, or OGA/NGOs?

What plans does the lead agency have if the military is required to withdraw and deploy to another mission or location after the start of the HADR operation?

What factors are in place to ensure that the community in the AO will not become dependent on the military to the extent it would be difficult to operate without it?

Is the transition plan written in a way that will be easily understood and acted upon by non-military follow-on agencies?

Does the transition plan take account of the follow-on agencies organisational structure and management capacity?

Has a date/time been agreed when NZDF forces can be withdrawn and are any force elements required to remain behind?

Does a transition working group need to be established?

Is there a requirement for additional LOs to help facilitate the transition and transfer?

Are any additional resources anticipated during the transition and transfer?

Are there any key events forecast to occur during transition and how will they impact the transition/transfer?

What are the reconstitution plans for equipment being withdrawn and/or handed over?

How will transfer be acknowledged and formally recorded?