



Headquarters  
New Zealand Defence Force  
Defence House  
Private Bag 39997  
Wellington Mail Centre  
Lower Hutt 5045  
New Zealand

OIA-2023-4762

28 September 2023



Dear [REDACTED]

Further to the response to you of 15 September 2023, enclosed are the remaining six documents. As previously advised, information is withheld in accordance with the following sections of the Official Information Act 1982 (OIA): section 6(a) of the OIA where making the information available would be likely to prejudice the security and defence of New Zealand and/or the international relations of the Government of New Zealand; section 6(b) of the OIA where the information has been provided on a basis of confidence and its unauthorised release would likely prejudice the entrusting of information to the Government of New Zealand; section 6(d) of the OIA where making the information available would endanger the safety of any person; section 9(2)(a) of the OIA to protect privacy; and section 9(2)(g)(i) of the OIA to maintain the effective conduct of public affairs through the free and frank expression of opinion.

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Please note that responses to official information requests are proactively released where possible. This response to your request will be published shortly on the NZDF website, with your personal information removed.

Yours sincerely

**AJ WOODS**

Air Commodore  
Chief of Staff HQNZDF

**Enclosures:**

1. NZSOF Brief on Afghanistan (AFG) Deployments: 06 September 2009 to 30 June 2014, dated 11 September 2014
2. Dot Point Brief – CRIB 13 Back brief, dated 22 August 2008
3. Ariki 15 Back brief to COMJFNZ
4. CRIB 17 Debrief
5. Dot Point Brief for Chief of Defence Force – Bamyán Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) Fact Finding Mission, dated 28 November 2013
6. LnO UNMACA

HQNZDF 3130/DSO/6

11 September 2014

Minister of Defence

**NZSOF BRIEF ON AFGHANISTAN (AFG) DEPLOYMENTS: 06  
SEPTEMBER 2009 to 30 JUNE 2014**

**Purpose**

1. The purpose of this note is to brief the Minister on the New Zealand Special Operations Forces (NZSOF) commitments to Afghanistan over the period 06 September 2009 to 30 June 2014, during which NZSOF conducted three deployments.

2. The three deployments were named OP WĀTEA, OP TIAKI <sup>s. 6(a)</sup>  
A brief description of each operation follows.

**OP WĀTEA (06 Sep 2009 – 14 April 2012)**

3. WĀTEA in Maori means "to free" or "make way". The Special Operations Task Force (SOTF) deployed on OP WĀTEA was initially comprised of up to 81 personnel (pers)<sup>1</sup>.

4. Initial deployment occurred on 06 September 2009, with operations commencing on 01 October 2009.

5. OP WĀTEA's key tasks were to:

- a. Undertake planning and operations in support of ISAF mission objectives in KABUL and adjacent provinces.
- b. Conduct military assistance, and support and influence tasks (including training and mentoring support) to the Afghan Ministry of the Interior (MOI) Crisis Response Unit (CRU).
- c. Undertake New Zealand national support tasks, including provision of support to New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) elements in AFG including liaison support to the New Zealand Provincial

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<sup>1</sup> This total included both New Zealand Special Air Service (NZSAS) soldiers and supporting personnel; there were some fluctuations in numbers due to pers rotations.

Reconstruction Team (NZPRT), VIP protection and hostage rescue as required.

6. SOTF operational planning was concentrated on identifying and isolating insurgent and Improvised Explosive Device (IED) threats to KABUL and the six provinces that surrounded it. Once targets were developed, Afghan authorities were informed and appropriate warrants and authorisations were issued to allow an Afghan-led operation to be mounted.

7. In an average week, the SOTF would usually conduct two to three operations alongside the CRU. All operations were authorised by the Afghan Ministry of the Interior (MOI). NZSAS trainers were embedded on a permanent basis with CRU, delivering structured training across the unit in addition to providing operational advice and assistance.

8. The initial deployment was scheduled to end on 31 March 2011, however it was extended on 01 February 2011 by the New Zealand Government but reduced to a smaller contingent of 35 pers. That extension remained until mid-April 2012 (the first NZSOF pers departed AFG on 14 Apr 12).

**OP TIAKI (31 August 2012 – 30 April 2013)**

9. TIAKI in Maori means "to protect". s. 6(a)


10. OP TIAKI's principal task was to provide support to OP CRIB (NZPRT) until the withdrawal of all CRIB elements. This included:

s. 6(a)

s. 6(a)

s. 6(a)


s. 6(a)



**General Comments**

16. DSO remains available to MINDEF to provide in-depth briefings in Wellington on any of these operations or questions arising from them. The Commanding Officer 1 NZSAS Regt will return to New Zealand on Sunday, 14 Sep 14 and is available in Auckland from the following day to brief the Minister as required.

s. 9(2)(g)(i)



3130/2/CRIB

## **DOT POINT BRIEF – CRIB 13 BACKBRIEF, 22 AUGUST 2008**

The following Dot Brief outlines Comd CRIB 13's backbrief to COMJFNZ and subsequent discussions of CIRB capability.

### **Introduction**

- The Comd Recon was successful and well hosted. There were no significant concerns. Having the JRT deploy with the recon was beneficial.
- This recon deployed earlier than previous recons and proved beneficial as this allowed the command team to prepare for PDT. Recommend the Comd Recon deploy as early as possible.

**J3 to action**

- Request DIRLAUTH for CRIB 12/ CRIB 13 to facilitate the RiP.

**COMJFNZ: Approved**

- The following are recommendations for future deployments:
  - Early deployment of specific appointments to improve continuity. These should include the S2, S5 and LNOs.
  - Comd Recon PDT Briefs: The briefs were a mixture of Comd level and individual briefs. Recommend the briefs are tailored to the Comd level.

**J7 to action**

### **PDT**

No significant changes are recommended for PDT. It is recommended that there is an increase in C-IED training. J3 outlined the changes to C-IED training being developed in conjunction with CATO and 1 EOD Sqn, with the intent to add this to PDT.

**J3 to confirm change**

### **Mission Analysis**

- Comd CRIB 13 outlined his mission analysis for mission success and outlined the principles for CRIB 13. Comd CRIB 13 discussed possible change to the NZ Police contingent command status. J3 outlined the current NZAID led review of NZ Police and commented that NZDF had still to see the report.

- Comd CRIB 13 outlined the three key lines of operations for CRIB 13.
- Governance. The location of FPB Romero was discussed, Comd CRIB 13 outlined that the FPB was not co-located near a DSG and recommended that the FPB should be relocated near SAIGHAN s. 6(a)

**COMJFNZ: Agree that CRIB 13 could review the location of FPB ROMERO and staff a recommendation to COMJFNZ.**

- Development. Recommend:
  - JFNZ consider the Engr mix within the patrols to allow for flexibility with conducting project review
  - Greater liaison with other Government agencies to ensure the All of Govt response for Bamyan is better understood. Request DIRLAUTH to liaise with MEA desk officer at MFAT.

**COMJFNZ: Approved**

Note: Liaison with MFAT to be arranged through J3/SCI Branch.

- Security. Comd CRIB 13 outlined his posture to Ensure flexibility in case of a situation change.
  - s. 6(a)
  - s. 6(a)
  - Enhancing relations with neighbouring PRT's was discussed.

**COMJFNZ. Encouraged CRIB to enhance relations with neighbouring PRT's including synchronised patrol activity. HQ JFNZ is to be given prior notice of any such initiatives. This includes mousetraps but with prior notice to this HQ. CRIB also needs to be aware of the developing situation with PRTs in relation to ISAF phase 4.**

- Contingency Funds. NZPRT contingency funds were discussed. J3 outlined the negotiations with NZAID in relation to flexibility. From records of historical expenditure, a review will identify what would likely to have not met NZAID criteria. A separate submission to HQ NZDF will then be made.

**J3 to action**

## Recommended Mission Statement

- Comd CRIB 13 outlined his mission statement for approval.

**COMJFNZ:** Approved

## Current Issues

- Comd CRIB 13 outlined the current issues for CRIB 13.
  - ORBAT. The current ORBAT was discussed. Comd CRIB 13 outlined his proposal to add one of the INTOPs to KT2.
  - Vehicles. The concerns with the patrol vehicles and the new contract was discussed.
  - Acting Rank. The concerns with the current discrepancies with Acting rank.

**COMJFNZ. As a rule, acting Rank should be effective from the start of PDT but there are some issues between services.**

**J1 to action**

- Financial Delegations. The current financial delegations we discussed. J3 outlined the current JFNZ review of all delegations in theatre.
  - TOE. The current TOE was discussed. J45 outlined the current JFNZ review of TOE.
  - ROE. The current ROE was discussed. J3 outlined the requirement for clarification and recommended a separate discussion with J09.
  - NZAID Process. The current NZAID process was discussed. J3 outlined the current JFNZ review of the process with NZAID, copy of the process map will be forwarded to the CRIB 13 S5.
  - Command Net. The requirement of a separate NZPRT command net was discussed. s. 6(a)
- Comd CRIB 13 concluded the backbrief.

**COMJFNZ. Commented on some of the CRIB C2 review transition issues which are inline with Comd CRIB 13 comments. Comments on NZINC were made. COMJFNZ outlined the ARIKI C2 Review and commented on the change in title to SNO which ill give a wider opportunity, but the C2 relationships were still being worked through. COMJFNZ outlined that the linkages were still being developed as part of the All of Government Afghanistan paper. COMJFNZ outlined his desire to ensure that there is the appropriate situational awareness and have the appropriate freedom of action.**

**Capability Review**

Capability review was conducted with TOE amendment requests tabled, then availability, supportability, financial implications and recommendations were discussed for COMFNZ's approval.

s. 6(a)





Afghanistan




The top section of the slide features a blue header with the word "Afghanistan" in white. Below the header, there are several logos and flags. On the left is the PRT logo for Bamyan province. In the center are the flags of New Zealand, the United States of America, and Singapore. On the right is the ISAF logo, which includes the acronym "ISAF" and the Pashto name "سولې او امنيتي ځواک".


New Zealand Provincial Reconstruction Team, Bamyan

**ARIKI 15**  
**BACK BRIEF TO COMJFNZ**

Afghanistan





## SCOPE





- **ARIKI 15 Concept of Operations**
- **Key issues by functional area**
- **Recommendations**


**Afghanistan**




## CURRENT SITUATION

- Elections
  - Change of President/Governor
- s. 6(a), s. 6(b)(i)  

- CERP Funding (US \$30 million) Roads
- s. 6(a)  

- Changing security situation
  - Enduring CONOPs


Afghanistan



## WHAT IS THE THREAT? NZ PRT – OPERATING CONTEXT



- Nationwide spike in TB/INS acty – IED
- Increase in threat groups activity in and around BAMYAN compared to previous CRIB deployments
- s. 6(d)
- Still low compared with remainder of RC East
- Non kinetic and kinetic threats
- Environmental threats



**Relatively calm overall, but INS active North/Eastern regions:**

Isolated changes in attitude of local population towards PRT.

s. 6(a)

Vested criminal interests associated with coal mines and smuggling.

Simmering cultural tensions and increasing numbers of ‘foreigners’.

Ongoing land disputes.


s. 6(a)

**INS from BAGHLAN Province attempting to gain a foothold in BAMYAN**

IED emplacements and direct SAF attacks s. 6(a)

‘indications’ of potential suicide bombings, rocket attacks and complex attacks targeting NZPRT, ANSF and GIRoA.

RELEASED UNDER THE OFFICIAL INFORMATION ACT 1982






## HQ JFNZ MISSION

- TG 653.01 (OP ARIKI) is to facilitate the long term development of peace and security in AFG and region and maintain a positive NZ profile IOT provide contributions to collective security operations, peacekeeping and peace enforcement conducted by the UN and other multi national coalitions.
- **Intent**
  - Provide effective and efficient FE to coalition forces in AFG that achieves the GONZ and coalition mission and objectives. Main Effort remains TU CRIB.


s. 6(a)




s. 6(a)



**Afghanistan**





## TG ARIKI 15/TU CRIB MISSION



TG ARIKI 15/TU CRIB 15 is to monitor, assess and assist civil, political and ANSF reform in BAMYAN province and facilitate reconstruction development and security IOT contribute to enduring stability.



**Afghanistan**



## NZPRT INTENT

Disrupt the insurgency by focussing on Lines of Operation:

- **Governance**
- **Development**
- **Security**

With enabling Lines of Operation:

- **Info Ops**
- **Force Protection**
- **Reputation**

**Execution.**

**Intent.**



**Purpose.**

Continue to develop ideas and achievements initiated in CRIB 14 lines of operation, in order to ensure a continuation of coordinated effort by TU CRIB rotations in the BAMYAN province. This will ensure the ongoing disruption of the insurgency whilst continuing to engage the population and Govt (co-op, assistance, mentorship) in order to build capacity and self determination. The Lines of Operation are:

Governance,  
Development, and  
Security.

With enabling Lines of Operation:

Info Ops (to support all lines of operation and maintain consent of local population),  
Force Protection, and  
Positive Reputation.


Afghanistan




## METHOD

- Provide mentoring, advice and example to allow transition to eventual handover of lines of operation to Provincial/ District Governors and District Chiefs of Police

**Method.** Provide mentoring, advice and example to allow transition to eventual handover of lines of operation to Provincial/ District Governors and District Chiefs of Police by:

- (1) Maintaining a constant and consistent joint ANP/CRIB security presence in the AO and isolate AGE from local population by denying freedom of movement and credibility as an alternate to GoIRA.
- (2) At the district level LNO/S5 Cell will take primacy for monitoring Governance and Development plans.
- (3) Security focus with ANP (District Chief of Police DCOP) and National Department of Security (NDS) to build district security legitimacy and capacity. Thereby setting the conditions for transfer of Lead Security Role (TLSR)
- (4) Maintain consent (through engagement and Info Ops) of population. s. 6(a)
- (5) Maintain force protection by local spt and engagement, enhanced physical force protection measures, enhanced situational awareness, constant reinforcement of TTP and the non establishment of set patterns for all FE.
- (6) SNO and LNO/S5 Cell are the focus of the PRT IOT deliver the primary Lines of Operation of Governance and Development. In conjunction Security Patrols deliver the Security Lines of Operation. All other PRT personnel are enablers to support and enhance effects.
- (7) All should be prep to deploy on governance, development and security tasks beyond their primary employment.



**Afghanistan**



## EFFECTS BY LINE OF OPERATION

- **Governance.**
  - Post election changes in BAMYAN Provincial Govt supported.
  - Effective engagement with new BAMYAN Governor maintained through ongoing formal and informal meetings and liaison.
  - 2010 local body elections supported (plan developed NLT than one month prior to the elections date TBC).
  - District Sub Governor (DSG) / District Chief of Police (DCOP) engaged and supported through liaison.
  - AGE prevented from gaining spt in SHIBAR District through reinforcement of spt to GoIRA.
  - Assistance initiatives from KABUL (HQ ISAF) and United States Department of State (USDOS) supported.
  - Identify needs, expectations and skills sets required for NZPOLAD.



Afghanistan



## EFFECTS BY LINE OF OPERATION

- **Development.**
  - Development needs identified and analysed.
  - Continue to improve co-ord and liaison with UNAMA and other non state organisations.
  - CERP funded road (BAMYAN – PARWAN) coordinated as a high pri for BAMYAN Governor.
  - Expectation of BAMIAN New Town and relocation of BAMIAN Airfield managed.
  - Development needs for PANJAB – WARAS Districts assessed and plan and projects developed.
  - AGE prevented from gaining spt in N-E through overt focused development.
  - AGE prevented from gaining spt in SHIBAR through overt focused development.



Afghanistan



## EFFECTS BY LINE OF OPERATION


- **Security.**
  - ANP legitimacy and capacity developed.
  - Joint ANP/CRIB patrols established.
  - s. 6(a) [REDACTED]
  - s. 6(a) [REDACTED]
  - Contribute to any decision on potential NZ force posture or changes.
  - Contribute to any decision on PRT transition.
  - TG ARIKI situational awareness enhanced.
  - Presence in the AO maintained.

Afghanistan




## ENDSTATE

- **TG ARIKI /TU CRIB Campaign End-state.** TU CRIB 15 as part of OP ARIKI will contribute towards the following end state conditions:
  - Provincial government capable of governing on behalf of the population through the effective use of District Sub Governors (DSG).
  - Provincial government recognised as legitimate by the population.
  - District Sub Governors and District Chiefs of Police (DCOP) receive popular support and effectively represent provincial governor.
  - Conditions set for Transfer of Lead Security Role (TLSR).
  - Provincial and District Chiefs of Police have effective capacity enabling the ANP to provide security throughout the BAMYAN Province.
  - Conditions set for PRT transition in accordance with HQ JFNZ direction.



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## SCHEME OF MANOUVRE



- **Decisive.** CRIB 15 as part of OP ARIKI will deliver a strengthened military observer capacity that is capable of monitoring and assessing civil political and ANSF reform through community engagement. Security will provide the freedom of action for the Civil Military Operations (CMO) in the PRT and is to be IAW HQ ISAF concepts. Development projects and effective liaison will create the conditions that will enable SNO and LNOs at Provincial and District level to address the conduct of governance and development lines of operation.
- **Shaping.** IO will be conducted to ensure a positive message for NZDF and US contributions and reduce potential friction points and threat IO. TU CRIB 15 operations will be based on attempting to meet the expectations of locals and promoting the theme of assisting not leading. **TU CRIB 15 will continue to develop initiatives and tasks implemented under TU CRIB 14 lines of operation whilst setting the agenda/conditions for PRT transition.**
- **Sustaining.** 1st, 2nd and 3rd line support to be coordinated through the NSE (TU 653.02.01). All other TG ARIKI functions and personnel are enablers to achieve TG ARIKI mission. Force Protection is to be maintained with regards to security, health and OSH measures. Training will be conducted throughout and will include testing of CP and patrol procedures. Balance is to be maintained within routine tasking to allow freedom of action. Welfare is to be afforded high priority and extend beyond the deployed personnel to include addressing NZ based (family issues) through the chain of command where required.

### Concept of Operations

- a. **Decisive.** CRIB 15 as part of OP ARIKI will deliver a strengthened military observer capacity that is capable of monitoring and assessing civil political and ANSF reform through community engagement. Security will provide the freedom of action for the Civil Military Operations (CMO) in the PRT and is to be IAW HQ ISAF concepts. Development projects and effective liaison will create the conditions that will enable SNO and LNOs at Provincial and District level to address the conduct of governance and development lines of operation.
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- d. **Main Effort:** Conduct of governance and development lines of operation.
- e. **Centre Of Gravity:** COG is local population support for lines of operation.

Afghanistan	
	<h2 style="margin: 0;">PHASES</h2> 
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Prelim Op – Recon, skills gap closure, pre deployment training, deployment and RiP: 30 June – 17 Oct.</li> <li>• Phase One – Conduct of operations in BAMYAN Province (Oct 09 to April 10).</li> <li>• Phase 2- RiP with CRIB 16 April 2010 dates TBC</li> </ul>	

**Prelim Op – Recon, skills gap closure, pre deployment training, deployment and RiP: 30 June – 17 Oct (TBC).** Prelim Op will be used to transition all personnel from DLOC to OLOC state.

**Phase One – Conduct of operations in BAMYAN Province (Oct 09 to April 10).** Note whilst this WNGO stipulates a finite time, the manner in which TU CRIB 15 conducts operations in the BAMYAN province will take a long term view in order to set the pre conditions that allow HQ JFNZ to transition the PRT. This transition will include the transfer of lead security and development roles to BAMYAN Provincial and District Governors and Chiefs of Police. Phase One includes the conduct of all lines of operation. On order be prepared to transition PRT IAW HQ JFNZ direction.

**ME for phase one;** the conduct of governance and development lines of operation switching to security and force protection if the threat dictates. The security line of operation will set the conditions for success.

**Phase 2- RiP with CRIB 16 April 2010 dates TBC.** Specific timings and tasks for this phase will be issued as a FRAGO, but will include the following:

Tactical handover to Crib 16.

Extract to Theatre Extraction Team (TET) Assembly Area.

Theatre Extraction Process (TEP).

Return to New Zealand (RTNZ).

Release of personnel to parent units.

Post tour personnel administration and reconstitution.

Equipment reconstitution.



**Afghanistan**



## ‘Patrol Forward’ Philosophy Incorporating Governance, Development and Security



**3 x FPBs**

**Dismounted**

## KIWI PATROLS

### Characteristics

- Mobile – 4x4. Some foot patrols.
- Flexible – Easily re-tasked.
- Independent - medical, comms.
- s. 6(a)
- Limits - require consent.

### Tasks (The Lines of Operation in Action)


- Community engagement.
- Support & train ANP.
- Mentor DSG/DCoP/NDS.
- Conduct public meetings (Shuras & Mullahs).
- Gather Information.
- Promote key messages (Information).
- Identify projects & monitor progress.
- Assess Quick Impact Project needs (with UN & NGOs).

## REINFORCE NZ PRT PRINCIPLES


- Promote Afghan Ownership
- Promote Afghan Leadership – lead from behind
- Reinforce 'consent' through words and deeds
- Manage expectations - under promise, and over deliver
- Complement, not duplicate
- Be transparent
- Think 'long term'



**Afghanistan**




## ISSUES/RECOMMENDATIONS




- **S1**
  - Establishment continuity (staggered deployment)
- **S2**
  - Tactical exploitation
  - ASIC Concept (TBC)
- **S3**
  - IO (Policy doctrine and trg)
  - Enduring CONOPS (COMJFNZ approve)
- **S4**
  - Strat Lift (utilise C130 for sustainment flight, contribute to coalition effort)
- **COMD NZPRT**
  - Establishment (Vetting of key staff, confirm posns and eligibility prior to deployment of comd recce)

s. 6(a)

**Afghanistan**




## ISSUES/RECOMMENDATIONS




- **S5**
  - Comd Recon  
(S5 to be permanent inclusion)
  - CIMIC Cse  
(Transition to NZ led; theatre specific)  
(increase pool of LNOs)
  - NZ AID  
(Direct link from Op ARIKI to NZ AID)
- **S6**
  - Band width capacity (SWAN/DIXs)  
(approve extra funding approx 16K)
- **S9**
- **COMD ARIKI**
  - Capacity Building  
(NZ inc approach; POLAD, agri advisor, engr capability – water, electrical, geothermal )
  - Capability  
(EOD team)
  - Transition  
(Plan for Sep 10)
  - Comd and control  
(Understanding at HQ JFNZ)

s. 6(a)

Afghanistan





## STRATEGIC RECOMMENDATIONS



- Comd ARIKI 15 inputs to the NZDF transition plan.
- Ambassador's position established in Kabul.
- POLAD position established in Bamyan Governor's office.
- COL (E) position established in the 3 Star ISAF Joint HQ.
- Increased Training Cell (TE RUA).
- Sequential FE contribution.

Afghanistan



# Discussion



Slide 1






## Scope

- Pers
- Int
- Ops
- CSS
- CIMIC
- Trg
- Summary



Slide 3





Slide 5



## Intelligence

- **Success:**
  - Embedded Int Ops with ptls
  - Fusion
- **Challenge:**
  - Lines of reporting
  - Tac vs Strat



Slide 7



## Operations

- **Success:**
  - Realignment of KT ops to NE of AO
  - Effect achieved
  - MAF integration
  - EUPOL
- **Challenge:**
  - TASKORG
  - Div Bdy
  - Avn spt
  - Low pri

## Logistics

- Success:
  - LAV integration
  - MAF & EUPOL
- Challenge:
  - LAV integration
  - Supply chain issues (UAV, LAV)
  - Mid tour resup flight
  - Supply chain should integrate into ISAF/NATO, incl for spec equip
  - RIP





Slide 10




## CIMIC

- Success:
  - ‘Aggressive’ CIMIC
- Challenge:
  - CIMIC cse & perception in NZ
  - CIMIC as a part of COIN



Slide 12



Slide 13

## Information Operations

- Success:
  - RIAB
  - Perceptions in NE of AO
- Challenge:
  - 'One size' of TF/CF IO product



Slide 14




## Communications

- **Success:**
  - s. 6(a)
  - Migration to CENTRIX
- **Challenge:**
  - Refresh
  - Reach-back: welfare phones, internet, secure voice
  - s. 6(a)



Slide 16



## Training

- **Success:**
  - Rapid adjustment in theatre to equip
- **Challenge:**
  - Wide range of theatre specific equip, unfamiliar to NZ pers
  - CTC
  - PDT compliance orientated
  - s. 6(a)





Slide 18



## Future

- Transition – Strategic Plan
- National End State?
- Whole of Govt approach fully endorsed



Slide 20

## Questions



Slide 21



DOT-POINT BRIEF FOR CDF 

## BAMYAN UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE (UXO) FACT FINDING MISSION

## Background

- Following several reports indicating potential UXO issues on former NZDF field firing ranges in Bamyan, a subject matter expert s. 9(2)(g)(i) was deployed to Afghanistan 15-28 Aug 13 to investigate the issues.
- s. 9(2)(g)(i) report:
  - addresses the alleged injuries and fatalities associated with Bamyan ranges since the end of the PRT mission;
  - highlights a series of issues related to the base closedown processes; and
  - shows the policies existing when we withdrew from Bamyan and those in place (and being defined) now.
- This DPB presents options for NZ in regards to remediation of Bamyan firing ranges.

## Findings

- s. 9(2)(g)(i) found no basis in fact to support the initial reports of injuries and fatalities from UXO related incidents in Bamyan after the departure of the NZDF PRT.
- He did find a report of two injuries suffered by civilians in Bamyan in February 2013 that may be attributed to a UXO removed from a range used previously by the PRT. This event was not reported to NZDF until after the departure of the PRT from Bamyan.
- There is clearly a significant UXO issue in Afghanistan as a whole. Bamyan, whilst perhaps not amongst the worst affected areas, is impacted by this very serious public safety issue.
- The NZDF has legal responsibilities in respect of the UXO remaining in areas formerly under its control under Protocol V to the Conventional Weapons Convention on Explosive Remnants of War, as reflected in DFO 04/2007.
- Some of the items of ordnance located by the Mine Action Coordination Centre – Afghanistan (MACCA) in Bamyan, on the former range used by the NZDF adjacent to Kiwi Base (Beersheba Range) are of a type used by our forces. The photographs included in the report clearly show ammunition types in use by the NZDF. Definitive 'ownership' will never be able to be established given the nature of the myriad of conflicts in the region, coupled with the nature/common origin of

the munitions used by a wide range of combatants.

- As Bamyān was amongst the first provinces to transition, the NZDF conducted its closedown operations before the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) developed definitive guidance. In the absence of ISAF mandated closedown procedures, each nation relied on their own national policy.<sup>1</sup>
  - Limited direction on land and facility handback was provided to the CRIB TET.<sup>2</sup> NZDF policies for base closedown (and by association range clearance/deactivation) and handover to local authorities were based on normal NZDF procedures. For example, NZDF range clearance processes were used, including marking and disposing of any blinds, and a visual clearance undertaken.
  - When judged by the standards of the time, the NZDF's closedown of Kiwi Base and the Beersheba Range largely met the NATO requirements. Nonetheless, these closedown standards may not satisfy the future ISAF standards about to be published.
  - The documentation on the closedown of Kiwi Base does not meet the new ISAF SOPs, however the shortcomings are either easily addressed or are not significant. Furthermore, it appears the documented closedown of the five FOBs does not meet the new ISAF SOPs. s. 6(a)
- Regardless, the information held by the NZDF in relation to these closures should be forwarded to HQ ISAF.
- Whilst much of the interest in this issue was generated out of the MACCA clearance activities on Beersheba Range there are several other less often used NZDF field firing ranges that have been made known to ISAF but not to MACCA.

### Current Situation

- The NZDF is able to state that the reports related to UXO injuries and fatalities in Bamyān post CRIB are untrue. The NZDF is unable to verify the claim that two civilians were injured on an NZDF range in February 2013, when the PRT was still in Bamyān. These injuries were not investigated by NZDF at the time as they were not reported until after our withdrawal from Bamyān.
- Whilst the PRT removed significant UXO (much belonging to previous users and combatants) from the area, the NZDF ranges in Bamyān may contain UXO and therefore remain a hazard.
- NZ cannot presently give a categorical assurance that all UXOs of NZ origin have been cleared from Bamyān or indeed elsewhere in Afghanistan where we have operated. We can however meet our international obligations through providing our

<sup>1</sup> s. 9(2)(g)(i) participated in several workshops related to the development of these SOPs during his fact finding visit.

<sup>2</sup> Included in COMJFNZ OPDIR 258/12 of 19 Dec 12 (OP CRIB Materiel Extraction) that was issued to amplify and augment OPINST 172/12: TU 653.1.1 (OP CRIB) – TET of 21 Sep 12.

closure documentation, and where proven necessary, through further activity.

- MACCA, ISAF, UNAMA and other stakeholders have been very positively disposed towards the NZDF to date, due in part to our proactive engagement. Follow up action needs to occur to maintain NZ credibility with these organisations.

**Conclusion**

- The NZDF's base and range closedowns in Bamyán were completed in accordance with NZDF procedures. The range closedown standards may not satisfy the future ISAF standards that are about to be published. Some further reporting and clearance work may be required to satisfy ISAF and MACCA. Regardless, the information held by the NZDF in relation to these range closures (and two insurgent fire fight locations) should be forwarded to HQ ISAF.
- A new HQ JFNZ Theatre Extraction Process SOP has been completed and includes full detail on land, facility and live-firing range clearance processes and certification considerations.
- A 'NZ Inc' approach on the Bamyán UXO issue is required due to political and international sensitivities. This will provide a measured and controlled approach to first ascertain and then meet our international obligations.

**Recommendations**

- It is recommended that you:
- **NOTE** I have produced policies and SOPs for withdrawal and closure of bases, ranges and facilities.
- **DIRECT** SCI BR to engage with MFAT in coordinating a 'NZ Inc' approach on the Banyan UXO issue over the longer term, and provide progress reports to you on a three monthly basis.
- **AGREE** my intention to provide clearance documents, range location and usage, and two insurgent fire fight locations to HQ ISAF (noting this might be passed to MACCA).
- **AUTHORISE** me to lead any activity within Bamyán (after gaining financial authority) that is identified through the NZ Inc approach.

*Noted*

*SCI BR to action this*

*Agreed*

*Approved in principle. Actual lead may be dependent on circumstances*

*[Signature]*  
*K Short 4/12/13*

**K.R. SHORT**  
AVM  
COMJFNZ

**s. 6(a)**



**LnO UNMACA**



s. 6(a)



NEW ZEALAND





## Mines: Current Situation



Total known area contaminated by landmines: 842 km<sup>2</sup>


Total remaining High Priority area to be cleared: 410 km<sup>2</sup>


Also, 450 km<sup>2</sup> of battle area contaminated with UXO


### Breakdown of High Priority land:

- Agricultural: 183 km<sup>2</sup>
- Residential/commercial: 20 km<sup>2</sup>
- Irrigation/canals: 5 km<sup>2</sup>
- Roads: 39 km<sup>2</sup>
- Grazing: 163 km<sup>2</sup>










## Implementing Partners






<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Afghan Red Crescent Society (ARCS)</li> <li>* Agency for Rehabilitation and Energy Conservation in Afghanistan (AREA)</li> <li>* Ansar Relief Institute (ARI)</li> <li>* Afghan Technical Consultants (ATC)</li> <li>* Demining Agency for Afghanistan (DAFA)</li> <li>* MECHEM</li> <li>* Mine Clearance Planning Agency (MCPA)</li> <li>* Mine Detection and Dog Centre (MDC)</li> <li>* Monitoring, Evaluation and Training Agency (META)</li> <li>* Organization for Mine Clearance and Afghan Rehabilitation (OMAR)</li> <li>* Association for Aid and Relief</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* British Broadcasting Programme – Afghan Education Programme (BBC-AEP)</li> <li>* Demining Agency for Afghanistan (DAFA)</li> <li>* Danish Demining Group (DDG)</li> <li>* Halo Trust (HT)</li> <li>* Handicap International Belgium (HIB)</li> <li>* International Committee of Red Cross and Red Crescent (ICRC)</li> <li>* INTERSOS</li> <li>* MAG</li> <li>* MECHEM</li> <li>* Mine Clearance Planning Agency (MCPA)</li> <li>* Mine Detection and Dog Centre (MDC)</li> <li>* Monitoring, Evaluation and Training Agency (META)</li> <li>* RONCO</li> <li>* S3AG</li> </ul>
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
## ERW Programme




- **Current Situation**
- **The Threat**
- **Overview of ERW Programme**
- **ISAF Support to ERW**




- Rough estimate of 75,000 to 150,000 tonnes of ERW in AFG.
- No reliable database or catalogue of ANA holdings
- Limited knowledge of what other government agencies hold or require



- Generally poor security on ANA Ammo Depots – getting worse as ERW programme progresses- “victims of our own success”
- No database or catalogue of unsecured Munitions Depots not under the control of the military





- The DIAG and ERW programmes are results of DDR
- Currently, little co-ordination between the two programmes is evident
- Both of these programmes need to be run in parallel to maximise use of limited resources



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## SITUATION

**Estimated 75,000 to 150,000 Tonnes of ERW**

**Consists of**

<i>Procurement</i>	<b>Small Arms Ammunition</b> <span style="background-color: red; color: white; font-size: small;">Recovery</span> <b>ANA</b> Requirements	<b>Anti-Tank Mines</b>  <i>To be Destroyed</i>	<b>Abandoned Ordinance</b>
	<b>Unused Ordinance</b>	<b>Anti-Personnel Mines</b>	<b>Unexploded Ordinance</b>



## THE THREAT



- Insurgents take control of large stocks of ammo.
- Large scale theft /sale - by demobilized AMF troops and civilians for sale/ use.
- Continuing source of raw material for IEDs.
- Caches for future operations against ANA / Coalition / ISAF.



## OVERVIEW




- DDR concentrated only on weapon collection
  - Focus to remove combatants from communities
- ERW and DIAG are by-products of DDR
  - Both are being co-ordinated independently of each other
    - Separate lead nations
  - Both are competing for similar resources
    - ANBP is lead agency
- DIAG and ERW run in parallel to each other
  - They are mutually supporting for security and stability
  - Both need to be sub-pillars to SSR





## Key Points




- Reference: HQ ISAF SOP 10351.
- MoD has authority
- ANBP is the lead coordinating agency (on behalf of MoD).
- Implementing Partners:
  - Halo Trust
  - Dyna Corps (recently replaced RONCO)
- 6 x Ammunition Survey Teams, which include:
  - ANBP rep
  - MoD reps
  - Ammo Techs





## Current Issues

- Construction of Ammo Storage Points.
- Security at Ammo Storage Points.
- SOP at Ammo Storage Points, including:
  - Access registers
  - Ammo Inventories
  - Inspections
- Facilities and equipment at Ammo Storage Points.
- Training of ANA/ANP/MOI ammo techs.



Current activities are not clearly split by phase.

During the Phase I (survey) component, significant movement and destruction of ammunition is occurring.


The survey being conducted is too detailed. What is required is a picture of the issue so that priorities can be set to enable regions to be dealt with that have the greatest risk for ammunition loss. Instead, a detailed mosaic of each region is being painted, taking too much time and ammunition continues to be stolen.



No immediate response group is available for rapid response to areas of concern (I.e. Baghdis and Badakshan).

This asset requires independent transportation assets (cargo and personnel), EOD personnel and equipment, funding and MOD representatives, including Guard Force. This asset, similar to the RONCO Heavy Hitter Squad can deploy to areas of concern and conduct the collection, transportation and destruction of ammunition as required.

The entire ANBP organisation is focused on the survey phase. Nothing has been conducted by means of establishing a plan for phase II, identifying the requirements, including assets, time and budget. This is extremely evident in the way that the plan for Panjshir Valley has been developed.

A detailed plan for Phase II is required now for all to 'buy-in' to and enable the IC to identify with for donor funding.





- Policy (IAW HQ ISAF SOP10351):
  - ANBP is the lead agency – ISAF provide support within means.
  - ISAF should not act independently unless there is an immediate and direct force protection threat.
  - Possible areas of ISAF Support:
    - Security of ammo caches.
    - Transportation of ammo
    - Assistance with destruction of ammunition.
    - Coordination of cache clearance operations with ANBP.

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