



Headquarters
New Zealand Defence Force
Defence House
Private Bag 39997
Wellington Mail Centre
Lower Hutt 5045
New Zealand

OIA-2023-4762

15 September 2023

[Redacted]
[Redacted]

Dear [Redacted]

Further to the response to you of 21 July 2023, a total of 35 additional documents have been considered for release under the Official Information Act 1982 (OIA). Nine documents will be provided to you with some information withheld for the following reasons: where making the information available would be likely to prejudice the security and defence of New Zealand and/or the international relations of the Government of New Zealand in accordance with section 6(a) of the OIA; where the information has been provided on a basis of confidence and its unauthorised release would likely prejudice the entrusting of information to the Government of New Zealand in accordance with section 6(b) of the OIA; where making the information available would endanger the safety of any person in accordance with section 6(d) of the OIA; to maintain the effective conduct of public affairs through the free and frank expression of opinion in accordance with section 9(2)(g)(i) of the OIA. Twenty-four documents are withheld in full in accordance with sections 6(a) and 6(b) of the OIA.

Enclosed are copies of three documents ready for release. The remaining six documents will be released on finalisation before 29 September 2023. As a result of the size of some of these files, it is taking longer than anticipated to prepare digital copies for release.

You have the right, under section 28(3) of the OIA, to ask an Ombudsman to review this response to your request. Information about how to make a complaint is available at www.ombudsman.parliament.nz or freephone 0800 802 602.

Please note that responses to official information requests are proactively released where possible. This response to your request will be published shortly on the NZDF website, with your personal information removed.

Yours sincerely

AJ WOODS

Air Commodore
Chief of Staff HQNZDF

Enclosures:

1. Briefing Notes for Ariki 15
2. New Zealand Provincial Reconstruction Team – Strategic Guidance
3. Map of Bamyán and Adjacent Provinces at time of CRIB 6




New Zealand Provincial Reconstruction Team, Bamyan

BRIEFING NOTES FOR ARIKI 15 as @ 15 OCT 09

s. 9(2)(g)(i)

[Redacted], Chief of Staff NZ PRT




s. 6(a)

s. 6(a)

- 26 PRTs currently
- UN/RC boundaries different

Population and Ethnic Distribution

Total Popn (est 2006)
594,000



Legend

- All_Bamyan_Towns_and_Villages
- Bamyan_Provinal_District_Capital
- Provincial_Capital

WGS 1984

25 12.5 0 25 Kilometers

Created By GIS Op

UNCLAS



Background: What is a NZPRT?


All PRT are different in shape, size, composition and task with individual national approaches. They aim to bring a level of stability across a broad range of societal pillars. They are able to blend both military and civilian effects for the benefit of those whom they support. They are a finite organisation that have the ultimate aim of achieving a transition of authority as soon as practicable.



Please note: An NZPRT is not military off the shelf for the NZDF.



NZ PRT





NZ PRT Background

- **Jul 03:** NZ Cabinet approved deployment of 100 pers to lead BAMYAN PRT (TG CRIB).
- Intent to assist Interim Transitional Govt with reconstruction, facilitating HA and monitoring disarmament.
- **Dec 04:** Establishment increased to 122 with patrol to Dai Kundi Province.
- **Jun 05:** Reduced manning for winter rotations.
- **OP ARIKI:**
 - TG CRIB
 - KEA
 - MANAAKI
 - RUA
 - AFFIRM





What Has Govt Told the NZPRT to Do?

NZ Government Objectives Cabinet Minute (03) 23/3A dated 07 Jul 03

- Enhance security environment and promote reconstruction efforts.
- Monitor and assess reform through community engagement.
- Direct and indirect contribution to projects that improve living conditions.
- Assist the Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) to implement policy, thereby building a democratic and harmonious Afghanistan.



How Does the NZPRT Fit Into ISAF?

s. 6(a)

- PRT's are linked to the operation by integrating non lethal effects.



NZPRT Mission

NZPRT is to improve, by means of facilitation and support: governance, development, and security in Bamyan province in order to contribute to enduring stability.





NZPRT INTENT

Disrupt the insurgency by focussing on Lines of Operation:

- **Governance**
- **Development**
- **Security**

With enabling Lines of Operation:



- **Consent (including Information)**
- **Force Protection**



What Does NZPRT Look Like?




- NZPRT is 200+
- 25% Civilians incl contractors





Kiwi Base Popn 193



- NZDF
- NZPOL
- SAF
- US
- ISAF
- Foreign Contractors
- Local Employees
- Visitors





- NZPRT relies on the US to provide the enablers that allow the lines of operation to progress.
- NZPRT is a facilitator with limited military and civilian resources / capability.
- BUT with NZDF clearance we would integrate any capability that would forward the mission.

- US CERP s. 6(a), s. 6(b)(i)
- ADT
- US ACE
- US DOS
- Rule of Law
- HCT
- SECFOR s. 6(a), s. 6(b)(i)
- ISAF Media



Relationship Within Wider UNAMA / NGO Community

- **NZPRT has a supporting / advising role**
- **Mandated for in extremis support**
- **UNAMA has primacy as co-ordinating authority**
- **GoIRA have lead role in key issues – education / health / women's rights / disaster management. Just not effective**
- **UN / GoIRA (election commission) have a key role in the elections (August 2009)**




KIWI 2



Road 500m south of Do Abe at GR 42S VE 0802301839. Road is impassable for about 200m. The river broke its banks about 220930 May 09.



'Patrol Forward' Philosophy Incorporating Governance, Development and Security



3 x FPBs

Dismounted

KIWI PATROLS

Characteristics

- Mobile – 4x4. Some foot patrols.
- Flexible – Easily re-tasked.
- Independent - medical, comms.
- Vulnerable (Risk) – limited firepower, soft skinned vehicles.
- Limits - require consent.

Tasks (The Lines of Operation in Action)

- Community engagement.
- Support & train ANP.
- Mentor DSG/DCoP/NDS.
- Conduct public meetings (Shuras & Mullahs).
- Gather Information.
- Promote key messages (Information).
- Identify projects & monitor progress.
- Assess Quick Impact Project needs (with UN & NGOs).



(RESTRICTED)



KEY EVENTS INFLUENCING THE ENVIRONMENT

	FY10		2009				2010			
	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	
Seasons	SUMMER		FALL		WINTER			SPRING		
WX- Precip	Dry		Rain		Snow			Thunder Storms		
Grnd Mobility	Green		Yellow to Red							Green
Air Mobility	Green		Yellow to Red							Red
Narcotics	Harvest	Transport	Protect Poppy Crop					Plant		
Agricultural	Harvest		Transport							Plant
Enemy Activity	Red line graph showing activity levels over time									
Holidays	RAMADAN		Eid al-Fitr Massoud Day	Independence Day	Eid-al Adha			Liberation Day Roze-Maulud	Nauruz	
Events	Run-Off		GIRoA Transition		NLT 14NOV2009 FR BDE OPCON to CJTF 82			NATO Summit/ 60th Anniversary		
	COMISAF RIP/TOA limitation		PAK MIL Ops							
	K-G Pass Road Construction									
Force Transitions	s. 6(a), s. 6(b)(i)									

ICMAG Planning



Natural Resources


Park Opening
Demining UNESCO
Water Nat'l Study



Roads and Market Access

Construction Season
B/N Rd
Shatu Pass
Ghandak Highway
B/P Rd
HA Season
Passes Closed
Salang Tunnel Closing

Flood Season
Construction Season



Transparent and Accountable Governance

Dev Crit Conf
Bamyan ROL Office
PDP Strat Review
OCC-P
New ANP HQ

Dev Conf
FDD Shibar
NZ Options Paper

Dev Conf

Elections

Ramadan

Elections Rolloff

Eid Ul-Adha

District Elections


Mandate expires Sep 2010

s. 6(a)

AAF

Fighting Season

Fighting Season



JUN 09	JUL 09	AUG 09	SEP 09	OCT 09	NOV 09	DEC 09	JAN 10	FEB 10	MAR 10	APR 10	MAY 10	JUN 10
--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------




What is the Threat?

NZ PRT – Operating Context

- Considerable increase in threat groups activity in and around BAMYAN compared to all previous Crib deployments
- Nationwide spike in TB/INS acty
- Still low compared with remainder of RC East
- Environmental as well as kinetic threats




SIGACTS BAMYAN Province last 23 Apr – 10 Sep 09





Do Abe HoS Office IED damage




SAF atk on DO ABE ANP Sub-station



Blast damage Do Abe Coord Centre IED



IED Component recovered from GHANDAK



Night letter from Do Abe Coord centre IED



Current Security Situation


- Relatively calm overall, but INS active North/Eastern regions:
 - Increase in anti-CF and anti-GIRoA propaganda from GHANDAK.
 - INS groups operating from TALA-WA BARFEK and TIRGIRAN.
 - Vested criminal interests associated with coal mines and smuggling.
 - Ongoing land disputes.
 - Influence from s. 6(a) organisations.
 - Ongoing fallout over s. 6(a) detention and replacements.
 - IED emplacements and direct SAF attacks in KAHMARD and SHIBAR.
 - ‘indications’ of potential suicide bombings and complex attacks targeting NZPRT, ANSF and GIRoA.


- Election 09
 - Minimal INS effect in BAMYAN did not affect voting (ISH PESTA ANP CP and GHANDAK BHC).
 - Unconfirmed explosion – DO ABE / ISH PESTA

Security Outlook

- **ANP poor trained state, impaired by politics and corruption at the provincial level.**
- **Increase in “alternative” court systems due to corrupt rule of law processes.**
- **Likely lull in activity going into winter.**
- **Attacks like closer to population centres.**
- **Increase in anti-CF propaganda in the East.**
- **s. 6(a) influence increasing the West.**
- **Changes in provincial appointments may have a detrimental effect on security situation and/or the provision of a capable ANSF.**

Bamian Threat State









Cache Recoveries

- Handed in at rate of 1 per week
- Most likely for financial reward
- Various munitions and condition
- Mainly Shibar/Kahmard districts
- Some likely sourced from Baghlan



INFLUENCE IN BAMYAN PROVINCE



**FALLADI VILLAGE
MADRASSA**

This map shows the locations of the facilities that are known to be influenced s. 6(a)

These are primarily madrasas that are financially supported s. 6(a)

Additional information, to include coordinates is located in the notes pages. This map shows only the facilities we have MGRS grid locations for. There are undoubtedly many more facilities not depicted.

Legend

-  Mosque
-  Madrassa
-  Library
-  MSR
-  District Boundary




The Way Forward





Achieving effects: Security

<p>Previous PRTs:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NZPOL basic recruit trg • Limited Joint Patrolling • Irregular ANP 'paramilitary' training activities • Presence by Mil security patrols • Weapons recoveries <p>(DIAG)</p>	<p>CRIB 14:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EUPOL intro • Hi patrol tempo (+45%) • Constant presence (FPBs) • Deliberate Framework CONOPs to disrupt INS • X-Border ops • Greater emphasis on SA • FP Upgrade • ROL programme • USMP Immersion Trg • OCC-P & working with ANA • Targeting (Borhan detention) • New ANP HQ-P 	<p>Future Direction:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • RoL WG • Police Mentor Teams • Judiciary reform • Build courthouses and prisons • Increased EUPOL • Support CSTC-A FDD • TLSR • Reduced FP in lower risk areas • CIMIC teams
--	---	--





OP RAFIQ

s. 6(a), s. 6(b)(i)

- Enhance ANP to undertake independent ops
 - Establish OCC-P
 - Secure elections
- Maximize interagency Rule of Law (ROL) training
- Grow formal and informal justice systems to meet international standards
- Improve mobility and communications
- Provide infrastructure and resources
- Provide awards and recognition





ANP Training



- Vehicle Search
- IEDs
- Cordon and Search
- ROE
- Weapons handling
- Convoy drills
- Driving skills
- Joint patrols
- Cache recovery





Achieving effects: Governance

Previous PRTs:


- Support SWGs
- Engagement with key directors
- ‘Fighting’ corruption
- Civil Service training
- Technical advisers (USAID/NZAID)
- Mentoring district officials
- Capability building (individual skills)

CRIB 14:

- Promoting Afghan leadership
- Promoting greater transparency & info sharing
- Increase POLAD staff
- Rule of Law programme
- Governance CBWG
- Champion ASGP
- Coord & facilitation

Future Direction:

- Capacity building (institutions)
- District mentoring teams
- Trg for Line directors
- More TA
- Embed in Governor’s office
- ASGP and funding for TA, staff, operations
- School of Governance





Governance Capacity Building (1)

- **LGCD (USAID)** program previously supported 3 x TAs (Technical Advisors) - Economy, Education and DoWA.
- **CDP (USAID)** - Capacity Development Program now supports 1 x TA - DoWA Director. Governor Sarabi has requested filling 2nd position to work with PDC on PDP.
- CDP also conducts CSC-mandated workshops in Provincial training center (60 Bamyán officials trained Aug 09).
- **PPD (AKDN)** - District Capacity Development programme: 2 x workshops for DSGs (2008 local governance, 2009 conflict management). 3rd workshop planned for Oct 09. Local Governance study programme (Oct 08) for Gov's office and PC. Follow-up workshop planned Oct 09.
- **NZAID** funds 1 x TA Governor's office, and 1 x TA (part time consultant) for Bamyán University.
- **Afghan Sub-National Governance Program (UNDP)** to provide TA and training within IDLG structure (PG, DSG), supporting Provincial Strategic Planning (PSP) initiative, training of PC, and coordination with CBWG. (Bamyán office opening October 09)



Governor Habiba Sarabi

Effect:

Enhance the individual and institutional effectiveness and credibility of Provincial and District governance.

Stakeholders:

GIRoA:
CBWG

USAID: CDP

AKDN: PPD

UNDP: ASGP

Office
of the
Governor





Governance

Building (2)



District Centres



- UNAMA - workshops for senior officials, DSG workshops (above), disaster management workshops, District ERC chaired by DSG, technical support for Annual Reporting Conferences (2007 & 2008), SWG workshops, focus group workshop for PDP
- Performance-Based Governors' Fund (PBGF) s. 6(b)(i) operating and capacity budget for Governors (due Oct 09). USAID thru IDLG.
- District Centres – Nayak built previously by UN and needs work. All others provided by USAID/CERP.

Future Opportunities:

- Coordination with key governance stakeholders: ASGP, UNAMA, AKDN, CBWG
- Capacity building for in-coming PC members
- Participate in PSP process to evolve PDP into a strategic plan
- Transforming UNAMA project tracking database into strategic decision tool for SWGs
- Workshop on Sub-National Governance Strategy
- Joint visits to districts for governance assessments
- Strengthening Capacity Building Working Group (CBWG)
- UNAMA capacity assessment (when CAP finalized)

s. 6(d)



Training officials.



Achieving effects: Development

<p>Previous PRTs:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Project list • Infrastructure focus • PRT owned and delivered • Approx \$8M (2008) • Contract workshops 	<p>CRIB 14:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increased funding (s. 6(b)(i) CERP 2009) • More integrated (PRT-Inc) • Reinforced process • NZAID review & 3 year plan • Increased Afghan ownership (PDC etc) • Increased transparency • Closed off old projects • ANDS SWOT analysis • IC Outreach 	<p>Future Direction:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PDP Review - Strategic plans for major infrastructure (water, roads, power, industry) • Measure outcomes, not inputs (eg. ACSP) • Build capability, not just infrastructure • Increase civilianisation • Increase Afghanisation • More Engineering/QA • More International funding
--	--	--



Development Group Mission




- **The Development Group (DG) is responsible for the planning, coordination and execution of development activities in order to influence and complement the other key lines of operation, namely governance and security.**
- **Significant overlap between development and governance LOEs.**

Definition of Development




- **The provision and maintenance of infrastructural capacity across the sectors defined in the Interim Afghanistan National Development (I-ANDS), in conjunction with Government and Non Government Organisations (NGO's), and in accordance with the direction and prioritisation contained in the Bamyan Provincial Development Plan (PDP).**
- **Nurturing provincial and local capabilities for the sustained operation, maintenance and future development of infrastructure, facilities and basic services in conjunction with Government and NGO's.**

Current DG Team



Bamyan Issues



- **PRT Development effort to date (over 500 significant projects) has been spread across the full spectrum of sectors.**
- **Absence of large scale strategic development as the foundation for supporting other activities. Only exception to this has been CERP road funding.**
- s. 6(a)

- **Failure to reward peace and reinforce success.**

PRT Issues

- **Limited engineer resource to provide QA/QC on a large project programme scattered over a large geographical area. s. 6(a) working hours impact on this.**
- **Volume of effort required for QC is greater than for a comparable project programme in US/NZ due to limitations of local contractor QA systems. This exacerbates the engineer resource limitations.**
- **Engineer resource is the main limiting factor on the quality and quantity of the DG output.**
- **DG is not resourced for carrying out formal capacity building - we need capacity to build capacity.**
- **Development of formal capacity building is time and resource intensive.**



Bamyan Infrastructure & Natural Resources


Electricity Options:

- Feasibility study for Bamyan New Town Generators & Grid being undertaken by CJTF-82/CERP/USACE.
- Bamyan Bazaar (existing 132 kW and 480 kW gens). Funding being sought for operating budget (est up to \$5-10k/mnth depending on demand).
- GeOphyte option to wire up 4 central villages (underground cables & transformers) from Bazaar generators (est cost \$700k plus operating).
- Hajigak iron mine – potential coal fired power station.
- Hydro options Topchi (500kW:USAID) and Ghazak/Bulala (3-5mW:ADB).

Links with AFG Sector Master Plan: Nil. Bamyan does not feature on AFG national grid (NEPS) at present. Hence, further option would be transmission line to Charikar to join NEPs. With hydro, Bamyan could become net exporter.

Benefits/Opportunities: Key enabler for economic growth; Potential for fossil-fuel, geo-thermal, & hydro-electric power.

Issues/Threats: Bamyan needs to be incorporated into national grid. Present provision is small scale and piecemeal (MHP & generators). Generators are expensive to run and maintain – cannot self-sustain. Provincial strategy required (incl study of sustainable longer-term growth and options eg. solar, wind, gas).



Effect:

To provide electricity to meet central Bamyan's infrastructural needs and enable economic growth and development.



Bamyan's two generators are relatively new but have had no diesel for 9 months.

Key Stakeholders:

s. 6(d)


Kabul MoP&E
ADB



Electricity Project: Bamyan Bazaar

Summary:

- Two existing generators (132 kW and 480 kW)
- Large gen has not been used. Small gen worked 4hrs/night for 7 months.
- Residents paid towards use (approx \$500/mnth) but failed to meet operating costs (est at \$12k/mnth for small generator based on full load 8 hrs/day).
- Owned by Electricity Ministry and wired to bazaar.
- **Phase 1.** Subsidise operating costs for bazaar (approx \$5k/mnth) plus 2-yearly maintenance.
- **Phase 2.** Wire up 4 villages (underground cables & transformers). 1730 households @ 150w ea = 265kW. Residents pay own connection and meters. SOW completed by GeOphyte Engineering. Cost: US\$700k (+ operating costs \$200k/yr).
- **Future Outlook** – longer term possibility of generation from coal-fired plant at Hajigak, hydro, and/or transmission line to join NEP near Charikar.



Effects:

Provide electricity for Bamyan Bazaar to stimulate economic development. Option to extend to 4 central villages (over 1700 households).



Bamyan's two generators are relatively new but have had no diesel for 9 months.

Stakeholders:

s. 6(d)

s. 6(d)



Bamyan Infrastructure & Natural Resources

Roads Summary:

Recently completed:

- M1 to Ru Ye Sang (15.6km) & Madr to M1 (7.4 km).


Current projects:

- Parwan to Bamian sealed – Sections 6–8 (45 km).
- Panjaw to Waras resurface (21 km).
- Shatu Pass road gravel (30 km).
- Band e Amir Lake road gravel (12.3 km).
- Bamian New Town sealed (2km).

Links with AFG Road Sector Master Plan: Main E/W road (funded by Japan and CERP); Main N/S route (Bamian/Doshi funded by USAID; Bamyan/Kabul via Wardak (promised by Italy)).

Benefits/Opportunities: Key means of stimulating economic growth. Vital for growth of tourism sector, exploitation of natural resources (coal & iron ore) and access to markets for agricultural/handicraft produce.

Issues/Threats: Regional roads are poor but low priority for funding despite being key to development of districts.



Effects:

Stimulating economic growth and improving provision of basic services by providing good road links between Bamyan and the rest of Afghanistan and within the districts.



Opening Bamyan-Parwan Road project

Key Stakeholders:



- Govt of Japan
- Govt of Italy
- CERP
- USAID






Road Project: Bamyan Bazaar

Summary:

- The main road (1.8km) was paved by USAID in 2008.
- The sides (2.5m each side) were left as exposed gravel due to concerns over drainage.
- The Governor and residents see the project as a failure and want it sealed edge to edge.
- USACE have completed engineering assessment and SOW. Cost US\$700k.



The Bamyan Bazaar Road needs to be sealed edge to edge.

Effect:

To provide a good sealed surface along the main street of Bamyan, furthering economic progress.

Stakeholders:

s. 6(d)

s. 6(d)



Bamyan Education Sector



Summary

- **Situation:** Bow-wave of children coming through system nationally.
- **Infrastructure:** Nearly 300 schools in Bamyan. 49 do not have Tashkil (not paid). 92,000 students. Severe shortage of classrooms. Tents and private bldgs being used as temporary classrooms. Avge class size 78/room (lower than nat avge). Dble shift rate 20%. Teacher Training College and Faculty of Education facilities currently being built.
- **Human Capacity:** Severe shortage of trained teachers. Unable to staff new or additional facilities at present. s. 6(a)
- **Training:** Teaching courses run at Bamyan University; despite NZAID funding for 200 places the Univ has produced no teachers this year.
- **Strengths/Opportunities:** Number of schools is slowly increasing (17 new schools since 2007) as are graduates (higher number of females). Education is highly encouraged.
- **Weaknesses/Threats:** Shortage of trained teachers, classrooms and teaching materials. No of Females has increased but still under-represented in student (40%) and teaching populations.



Effects:


NZPRT aims to improve education through delivery of infrastructure and school supplies, and support to teacher training.

s. 6(d)

s. 6(d)

Girls being taught at school.

- Key Stakeholders:**
- s. 6(d)
- Bamyan University
 - Teachers Training College
 - UNICEF
 - AKDN
 - UNHABITAT





Bamyan Health Sector Summary:

- **Goals:** Improving overall health care provision in Bamyan. In particular, combating high child/maternal mortality and building human capacity before new infrastructure is provided.
- **Hospitals:** 1 x PH, 3 x DH, 54 x Clinics, 3 x Ambulances.
- **Human Capacity:** Barely adequate for existing facilities and more dentists, OBGYN and female doctors/staff required. No capacity to staff or resource new or expanded facilities.
- **Training:** Hospital and MoPH offer some trg but minimum attendance from districts. Need to expand support.
- **Strengths/Opportunities:** Well-educated and motivated committee with a strong desire to improve.
- **Weaknesses/Threats:** Lack of training in Health system, centralisation and lack of funding, poor resourcing overall.



Effects:

NZPRT seeks to improve health care provision across all 7 districts by providing infrastructure and training, and through liaison with Provincial Govt staff and NGOs.



BHC under construction in Sayghan.

Key Stakeholders:

s. 6(d)

ADRA (NGO - DoPH Contracted Healthcare provider Panjab & Waras Districts)

AADA (NGO - DoPH Contracted Healthcare provider)

AKDN (NGO - DoPH Contracted Healthcare provider for Provincial Hospital):

s. 6(d)



Bamyan Agriculture & RRD Sector

Summary:

- **Infrastructure:** Extensive irrigation networks but overall rural infrastructure is basic and patchy.
- **Human Capacity:** Strong, well motivated line directors.
- **Trg programmes:** Vet & other trg arranged by ADT and Univ.
- **Strengths/Opportunities:** Ag/livestock supports 86% of families in the province. Main crops are wheat and potatoes. Potato crop is renowned for high quality.
- **Weaknesses/Threats:** No permanent ADT (or civ equiv). Single growing season. Ag land is in short supply; much land is marginal due to terrain. Overgrazing, with knock-on environmental impacts is a major issue. Water (& thus food) insecurity is common. Most farming is low-tech subsistence.



Effects:

Improve agricultural yields and overall economic well being through provision of training, eqpt and infrastructure (especially irrigation).



Traditional farming in Bamyan

Key Stakeholders:

- s. 6(d)
- [Redacted]
- Bamyan University
- ADT
- Global Partners
- Solidarites
- AKDN

s. 6(d)



Bamyan Social Protection Sector

Summary:

- **Goals:** To support, protect and improve the quality of life of vulnerable members of society including women, children, the elderly, the disabled, the poor and returning refugees.
- **Infrastructure:** This sector is not as neatly defined as other sectors but its aims are often achieved by improvements in the provision of infrastructure/capacity in other sectors.
- **Human Capacity:** No personnel dedicated to the sector itself. Fragmented - personnel drawn from a range of ministries.
- **Training:** Very limited.
- **Strengths/Opportunities:** Should be easy to easy to gain NGO support given its nature but gains benefit from improvement in other sectors such as health and educ.
- **Weaknesses/Threats:** Lacks the clout and coordination of "single Ministry" sectors. Poorly resourced and supported.



Effects:

Achieve gains in the social protection sector through general improvements in the local economy and rule of law as well as through liaison with Provincial Govt staff and NGOs.



Bamyan Women's & Families Park.

Key Stakeholders:

s. 6(d)

UN HCR.

UN OCHA.


s. 6(d)



Bamyan Private Sector

Summary:

- **Goals:** Encourage economic development through private enterprise. SWG focus is on leveraging assistance from donors.
- **Infrastructure:** Very little exists to support private enterprise other than cottage industry and bazaar artisan workshops. Progress hindered by absence of supporting major infrastructure (cheap electricity, clean water, good roads).
- **Human Capacity:** SWG/chair could benefit from greater support. Plenty of ideas but no project closers.
- **Training:** Some artisan-level through NGOs but little SWG support at strategic level.
- **Strengths/Opportunities:** Natural resources (coal/iron ore) and cultural/environmental resources (tourism). Agriculture (potato processing). Good security, ready for development.
- **Weaknesses/Threats:** Lack of infrastructure to support development. Central govt control and risk of foreign exploitation of mining. Crime associated with private exploitation of coal. Banking limitations.



Effect:

NZPRT aims to promote private enterprise and economic growth through provision of supporting infrastructure and mentorship.



Cultural Tent at Band-e-Amir National Park


Key Stakeholders:

- s. 6(d)
- [Redacted]
- [Redacted]
- AKDN – Eco-Tourism
- ARZU
- Banks

s. 6(d)


Projects Completed Since 15 Apr 09

-- CERP Major projects	- 9
CERP Minor projects	- 10
-- NZAID Major projects	- 1
NZAID Minor projects	- 33 (+ 87 Well Maintenance Projects)
-- SAF Major projects	- 1
SAF Minor projects	- 2
-- USAID Major projects	- 0
USAID Minor projects	- 169 (Cash for work)
-- s. 6(a) projects	- 5
-- Total projects completed	- 230 (+ 87 Well Maintenance Projects)



Current & Planned Projects

--	CERP Major projects in planning		- 6
	CERP Major projects underway		- 12
--	CERP Minor projects in planning		- 8
	CERP Minor projects underway		- 0
--	NZAID Major projects in planning		- 2
	NZAID Major projects underway		- 4
--	NZAID Minor projects in planning		- 24 (+ 55 Well Maintenance Projects)
	NZAID Minor projects underway		- 17
--	SAF Major projects in planning		- 0
	SAF Major projects underway	- 1	
--	SAF Minor projects in planning		- 0
	SAF Minor projects underway	- 2	
--	USAID Major projects in planning		- 1
	USAID Major projects underway		- 2
--	USAID Minor projects in planning		- 0
	USAID Minor projects underway		- 78 (Cash for work)
--	s. 6(a) projects in planning		- 2
	projects underway	- 25	
--	Total projects in planning		- 43 (+ 55 Well Maintenance Projects)
--	Total Projects underway		- 141




PRT LARGE PROJECTS – UNDERWAY

CERP

SAF

NZAID

USAID



Doju Doshak Sub Clinic NZ

Kahmard

Do Abe Bridge CERP

Doshi-Bamyan Road US

Do Abe School CERP

District Court Building CERP

Yakawlang Sayghan

Parwan-Bamyan Road Sect 7 CERP

Band Amir Lake Road Ph 2 CERP

District Court Building CERP

Parwan-Bamyan Road Sect 8 CERP

Bamian

Sagdez School Roof CERP

Khawalkakrak Flood Protection NZ

Bamyan Teacher Trg Dormitory CERP

Bazaar Road CERP

Waras

PRT LARGE PROJECTS - PLANNED

Reinforce NZ PRT Principles

- **Promote Afghan Ownership**
- **Promote Afghan Leadership – lead from behind**
- **Reinforce ‘consent’ through words and deeds**
- **Manage expectations - under promise, and over deliver**
- **Complement, not duplicate**
- **Be transparent**
- **Think ‘long term’**





Measuring Success – what has been the impact of PRT on Bamiyan?

All About perception, consent and effects

Security

- Consent maintained or enhanced.
- Security situation maintained or improved.

Governance

- Key relationships enhanced.

Development

- Disaster Management Plan supported.
- 2009 development projects planned.
- Provincial Development Plan advanced.



NZPRT Best Practice (Feb 2009)

Align PRT activities with ANDS and PDP	Compliant
Strengthen Afghan owner of PRT activities	In Progress
More long term and sustainable activity	In Progress
Strengthen governance at provincial and district level	In Progress
Bolster compliant	Compliant
Strengthen PRT civilian component	Not compliant
Extended tour lengths	Not compliant
PRT Support for Disaster Relief Management	Compliant
Respect for Afghan culture and tradition	Compliant
Strengthen human rights awareness	Not compliant



Discussion



Released under the Official Information Act 1982

NZPRT – STRATEGIC GUIDANCE

BACKGROUND

In 2003 the NZPRT deployed to Bamyan Province. The Government has not declared an end state for the mission, nor is there an agreed campaign plan. The result is a lack of 'continuity of effort' exacerbated by short tour lengths of key personnel. A number of unknowns continue to plague the development of a strategic plan. These include the duration of the deployment and any proposal to change the size or capabilities of the contingent. NZ has been fortunate, though, in the willingness of the US to provide additional capabilities to the PRT, either on an enduring basis or as reinforcements for specific periods.

The purpose of this strategic plan is to provide direction for an enduring operation. It builds upon the Op Instruction but does not replace it. It

provides guidance on 'what' must be achieved and 'why', empowering commanders to decide 'how.'

MISSION

The NZPRT is to improve (by means of facilitation and support) governance, development and security in Bamyan Province in order to contribute to enduring stability.

GUIDING PRINCIPLES

The actions of the PRT are to take into account the following principles:

1. **Promote Afghan Ownership.** The PRT should not impose its solutions on the Afghan people.

The PRT is there to guide, mentor and support but ultimately the solutions to Afghan problems must come from the Afghan authorities or people.

2. **Promote Afghan Leadership.** The normal military adage of leadership from the front must be reversed and the PRT, regardless of its 'behind doors role' must seek ways to promote Afghan leadership and to develop the capability of the Provincial Authorities.

3. **Complement, not duplicate.** The PRT is not to establish a parallel administration or development agency. The Afghan scene is complex with many different actors or agencies trying to enhance the situation in Bamyan Province. The PRT's rotation policy means that PRT personnel are often the 'new comers'. This puts the onus on the PRT to engage with other actors or agencies to identify how the PRT can most add value and integrate its activities.

4. **Think 'long term'.** The PRT must deliver enduring solutions. This requires thinking beyond

Released under the Official Information Act 1982

the timeframe of individual rotations and developing initiatives that the PRT can sustain and ones that provide long-term solutions for the Province. 'Quick fixes,' although superficially attractive, should not be at the expense of long term solutions.

5. **Be transparent.** The PRT should be transparent, as far as possible, about its activities. Inevitably, information on some security related activities must be restricted to those who need to know. Transparency, in all other activities, will help build trust and Afghan ownership, and assist communication, co-operation and collaboration.

6. **Reinforce 'Consent'.** The consent of the population is an invaluable resource that underpins what the PRT does. It is a resource that must not be squandered. All activities must enhance consent and, regardless of short-term tactical gains, the PRT should not conduct activities that will knowingly diminish consent.

7. **Under promise and over deliver.** The PRT must manage the expectations of the Afghan officials and population. The PRT will be constantly asked to do projects. The PRT must be prepared to say 'no' and/or not raise expectations that it cannot achieve as this will eventually lead to an erosion of trust and ultimately consent.

CRITICAL SUCCESS FACTORS

How do we know if we have been successful? Insurgents exploit the disenfranchisement of the population and use this to justify violence to achieve political objectives. Social, cultural, religious, ethnic, economic, security and political factors are normally the root causes of insurgency. Within Afghanistan there is the additional dimension of the fierce resistance to any outside interference. The PRT, therefore, must tread lightly and be seen to be supporting

local leaders and respecting local culture and traditions. Success will be achieved when the population perceive that their concerns are being met, or at least actively addressed. The key to success, therefore, is to ensure that the performance of the Provincial Administration is capable of serving the population by addressing their basic needs, including the need for security. Or, in other words, success will have been achieved when the PRT is no longer needed.

TRANSITION

The endstate¹ is to create an effective provincial administration that enjoys a broad level of popular support and is capable of addressing the need of the population within a tolerable security environment.

¹ NB. The NZ Government has not declared a formal endstate.

Released under the Official Information Act 1982

It is axiomatic that, at some stage in the future, the Provincial Authorities must be able to function without the support of the PRT. The PRT, therefore, should work towards its own demise and transition strategy. It must create the conditions where it is no longer needed.

Transition is in two parts: one, the activities of the PRT and two, the size and composition of the force.

Activities should move along the spectrum of:

TRAIN – MENTOR – MONITOR – EXTRACT

The PRT, in conjunction with other organisations, must develop the human capacity to allow the Provincial Authorities to take full responsibility for the Province. Once trained, mentoring is required

to ensure that skills, practices and procedures are adhered to. Once this is achieved monitoring is required to ensure that they become embedded and that quality performance is maintained. Inevitably, activity will not take place in such a linear fashion and all aspects of the spectrum may be taking place simultaneously. The spectrum, though, indicates a general direction of progress.

At present, the PRT is primarily in a building capacity phase. There are a number of organisations doing this within Bamyán Province. The PRT emphasis is twofold, firstly building the capacity of the ANP² and secondly, raising the performance of the Provincial Administration, with a focus on the district level. The former acknowledges that the PRT will need to transfer

² NB. EUPOL (NZPOL) also has a part to play in developing the ANP.

full responsibility for security to the ANP. The latter acknowledges that the district administration is the prime interface between the people and the GoIRA and that other agencies are operating at the provincial level. Over time the PRT can transition from the building capacity phase to mentoring³, before moving to a monitoring phase.

Simultaneously, the opportunity to increase the civilian component of the PRT should be explored in order to provide relevant expertise and reinforce civilian leadership as an appropriate step towards normality. All PRTs have slightly different structures with differing levels of civilian components. For example the UK PRT in Helmand is civilian led (2* Civil Servant) and is staffed by civilian experts to lead the lines of effort, such as the rule of law, education etcetera.

³ This will allow the structure to transition to a structure based more on the OMLT model.

Released under the Official Information Act 1982

Of course, we need to recognise that each Province is different and has different requirements. In Helmand, for instance, the UK Task Force provides the security Line of Operation whereas in Bamyán the PRT is the only ISAF contingent.

As the security situation improves, or as the ANP become more capable of managing the security situation, the PRT can decrease its military component and increase the size of the civilian component⁴. The civilian component could also include appropriately qualified Afghans.

LINES OF OPERATION

There are three decisive lines of operation: Governance, Development and Security. All are

⁴ This assumes a whole of government approach.

inexorably intertwined. Security provides an environment conducive for development and governance success. Development assists legitimising the Provincial Authorities and supports security by demonstrating the benefits of GoIRA and by reducing the social and economic tensions that underpin the insurgency. Good governance addresses some underlying political concerns and without good governance, development is an illusion of progress for, in its absence, the benefits of development will be squandered.

1. Governance

Within Bamyán Province the current Provincial Administration is well led, by Afghan standards, and a framework of committees and decision-making forums are in place. Improvements in accountability, transparency, resource allocation and participation in decision-making are still

required. Expertise is low and the Province finds it difficult to attract and retain skilled civil servants. Corruption is endemic and undermines confidence.

Both NZAID and USAID are conducting training programmes to build capacity. Mentoring, either directly or through participation on key committees, especially at the district level, is the current focus for the PRT alongside monitoring corruption.

Obj 1.1 Encourage better planning, prioritisation and utilisation of resources:

- ◆ Support capability building initiatives
- ◆ Contribute to key committees and decision-making forums
- ◆ Encourage the integration of plans across departments
- ◆ Promote good practice processes and policies

Released under the Official Information Act 1982

Obj 1.2 Encourage accountability

- ◆ Promote consultation and transparency of decision-making
- ◆ Support the implementation of the IDLG sub-national governance policy
- ◆ Promote the role of the PC
- ◆ Support communication between the Provincial Administration and the population

Obj 1.3 Increase Support for GoIRA by enhancing its legitimacy

- ◆ Promote transparency of decision-making
- ◆ Monitor and report on alleged corruption
- ◆ Support Rule of Law initiatives
- ◆ Support democratic and electoral processes

2. Development

Years of underinvestment coupled with the ravages of instability have left the Province with a

poor infrastructure. The PDP provides the framework for addressing the Province's needs. The PDP suffers, however, from a number of shortcomings and is best viewed as a guide, not as a straightjacket. Within Bamyan there are a large number of other international organisations and development agencies. The PRT is not a development agency. Although much of its activities will overlap with development goals, the reason for conducting development is to assist in increasing stability by removing, or reducing, socio-economic grievances that could lead to support for AGE and to reinforce the legitimacy of GoIRA by demonstrating that it is more capable of meeting the population's needs than AGE.

Obj 2.1 Support social and economic development

- ◆ Contribute to the PDP SWGs or other relevant committees

- ◆ Encourage regular reviews of the PDP to ensure that prioritisation reflects changing needs and strategic goals
- ◆ Implement projects from the PDP, with priorities of infrastructure, health and education
- ◆ Increase Afghan ownership of the PRT's development programme
- ◆ Support capability building initiatives
- ◆ Support, as required, other initiatives to progress social and economic development

Obj 2.2 Increase support for GoIRA by showing that it is meeting the needs of the people

- ◆ Consult with local communities to identify their needs

Released under the Official Information Act 1982

- ◆ Utilise the Small Project Fund (NZAID) to meet local needs
- ◆ Promote the Provincial Administration's development successes
- ◆ Encourage Afghan leadership of the development programme
- ◆ Support, as appropriate, the PDMC to prepare, plan and implement responses to the winter, spring flooding or other humanitarian crises

3. Security

Security is a fundamental requirement for progress and for the PRT to extract itself from the Province. There no ANA based in Bamyan. The ANP is the primary agency responsible for security and the PRT must ensure that the ANP is capable of taking full responsibility for security, in conjunction with the NDS, without the PRT presence or support. The ANP are under resourced, under trained, under equipped and

poorly led. Significant training investment is required to raise standards. Although there are other agencies⁵ who have this responsibility Bamyan Province is a low priority and, thus, the PRT must, in conjunction with NZPOL, seek to address the ANP's shortcomings. Furthermore, a large proportion of the population does not trust the ANP. The lack of trust is exacerbated by corruption at all levels in the ANP.

Obj 3.1 Improve ANP Comd and Control

- ◆ Support ANP leadership training
- ◆ Support the establishment of the OCC(P)
- ◆ Support the enhancement of the ANP communications infrastructure

Obj 3.2 Increase ANSF ability to deny AGE freedom of manoeuvre

- ◆ Support ANP continuation training

⁵ E.g. CSTC-A, EUPOL

- ◆ Monitor performance at ANP checkpoints
- ◆ Conduct Joint Patrols with the ANP
- ◆ Support ANP operations
- ◆ Enhance identification of AGE activity, leading to more actionable intelligence

Obj 3.3 Encourage 'demilitarisation'

- ◆ Support the DIAG process
- ◆ Manage the Small Rewards Programme
- ◆ Encourage the population to hand is weapons or ammunition
- ◆ Support ANP operations to prevent arms smuggling or to locate caches

Obj 3.4 Reduce ANP corruption

- ◆ Monitor and report on alleged corruption
- ◆ Support ANP leadership training

Released under the Official Information Act 1982

ABBREVIATIONS

AGE: Anti Government Elements

ANA: Afghan National Army

ANSF: Afghan National Security Forces, Includes

ANP and NDS

ANP: Afghan National Police

GoIRA: Government of the Islamic Republic of
Afghanistan

IDLG: Independent Directorate of Local
Governance

NDS: National Department of Security

OCC(P): Operational Coordination Centre
(Provincial)


PDMC: Provincial Disaster Management
Committee

PDP: Provincial Development Plan

PC: Provincial Council

SWG: Sector Working Group

Released under the Official Information Act 1982



Released under the Official Information Act 1982

Released under the Official Information Act 1982

