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OIA-2023-4789

3 / August 2023

[REDACTED]@tvnz.co.nz

Dear [REDACTED]

I refer to your email of 3 August 2023 requesting, under the Official Information Act 1982 (OIA), the following information:

*Any post activity reports following the NZDF evacuation flights from Afghanistan in August 2021*

*If the reports prove to be too numerous to release – could I limit my request to those that specifically refer to the situation with any suspected unaccompanied minors.*

Enclosed are copies of the Joint Forces Task Unit (TU) and Royal New Zealand Air Force 40 Squadron Post Activity Reports (PAR) for the Non-combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) from Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA), Operation Kokako. Operational information providing detail on certain individuals, capability and/or information related to other nations is withheld in accordance with section 6(a) of the OIA. Information from other nations that was provided on a basis of confidence is also withheld in accordance with section 6(b)(i). Internal contact information for financial transactions and signatures are withheld in accordance with section 9(2)(k) of the OIA to avoid the misuse of this information. The names of those who prepared the reports are withheld in accordance with section 9(2)(g)(i) of the OIA. Contact details are withheld to protect privacy in accordance with section 9(2)(a) of the OIA.

The following terms may assist you with understanding the information:

AMAB – Al Minhad Air Base                      ADF – Australian Defence Force  
OGA – Other Government Agency            GoNZ – Government of New Zealand  
CJTG – Combined Joint Task Group        HRTU – High Readiness Task Unit  
MER – Middle East Region                  SNCO – Senior Non-Commissioned Officer  
JNCO – Junior Non-Commissioned Officer    FWTF – Fixed Wing Transport Force  
DJIATF – Deployable Joint Inter-Agency Task Force    EHC – Evacuee Handling Centre  
DETCO/DETCDR – Detachment Commander            AWO – Air Warfare Officer  
FE – Flight Engineer    ALM – Air Load Master                      MFC – Maintenance Flight Commander  
S&S – Safety and Surface                  ARM – Armament                                      FSS – Forward Support Section  
OLOC – Operational Level of Capability                  ORM – Operational Risk Management  
RMP – Risk Management Plan                  RTNZ – Return to New Zealand  
TCAS RA – Traffic Collision Avoidance System Resolution Advisory  
FARM – Flight Authorisation Risk Management

A Post Operation Report for Operation Kokako is available on the New Zealand Defence Force website.<sup>1</sup>

You have the right, under section 28(3) of the OIA, to ask an Ombudsman to review this response to your request. Information about how to make a complaint is available at [www.ombudsman.parliament.nz](http://www.ombudsman.parliament.nz) or freephone 0800 802 602.

Please note that responses to official information requests are proactively released where possible. This response to your request will be published shortly on the NZDF website, with your personal information removed.

Yours sincerely

**AJ WOODS**

Air Commodore

Chief of Staff HQNZDF

**Enclosures:**

1. TU 653.13.1 PAR
2. 40 Squadron PAR

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<sup>1</sup> <https://www.nzdf.mil.nz/assets/Uploads/DocumentLibrary/Operation-KOKAKO-Post-Operation-Report.PDF>

## Op KOKAKO OC TU 653.13.1 01/21

10 Sep 21

HQ JFNZ DO3-0050-03

### See Distribution

### POST ACTIVITY REPORT

#### Reference:

- A. HQ JFNZ OPORD 122/21: OP KOKAKO 01-21: Support to Afghanistan Non Combatant Evacuation of 18 Aug 21

#### Mission Background


1. FEs from 1 (NZ) Bde were mobilised at short notice as per Ref A to form TU 653.13.1 which was deployed to process evacuees through AMAB and on to NZ.

#### Executive Summary

2. The mission was overall a success with 387 persons evacuated from AFGHANISTAN. Noting the original mandate was for 100 evacuees, the CJTG over achieved noting that all increases to evacuee numbers were approved by MFAT. This was also the case for the ADF element that TU 653.13.1 integrated with, as their evacuation numbers increased from 400 to approximately 2600. TU 653.13.1 was involved in the processing of 26 out of 29 flights and supported the reception, processing and onwards movement of 2600 evacuees. While small in number TU 653.13.1 was able to have a disproportionately large effect due to our 'can do' attitude, better integration with OGA, ADF, and UK forces, and the ability to cover personnel gaps with other members of the CJTG.

3. Key events that demonstrated this were;

- a. TU 653.13.1 Main Body was effective in supporting evacuee processing within 8 hours of their arrival, which is a credit to the Comd on the ground, s.6(a). This also set the conditions for effective employment of OGA staff on arrival allowing them to reduce the burden of work on the ADF OGAs.

- b. s. 6(a)
- 

- c. OC TU 653.13.1 undertook deliberate mission creep to better understand the OGA requirements and their interface with the Aus OGAs. This enabled an in

depth HOTO OGAs to be effective on arrival and was handed over 72 hours after their arrival.

- d. The combined planning and then successful execution of two chartered ETIHAD flights to transport evacuees towards NEW ZEALAND by MFAT. This included the terminal operations which relied on Aus transport for evacuees, UK facilities including terminal lounge, ablutions, personnel and baggage scanning, MBIE biometric scanning and visa approval, MFAT plane chartering and charitable goods for the evacuees to look after the children in particular baby formula, nappies and toiletries, DA MER support for diplomatic clearances to get the ETIHAD flight onto AMAB, RNZAF ALT to guarantee due process and adherence to IATA, and additional CJTG personnel (Flight crew, supplementary flight crew, maintainers, SOTU) who were used to usher, attend to and process evacuees.

4. The biggest hindrance to TU 653.13.1 was the lack of personnel. The processing and terminal operations were identified to require more personnel than was sent which resulted in the requirement to centralise personnel from other FEs for activities such as the terminal operations so that concurrent processing could occur. Additional staff also had to be sought to cover the security for the holding camps. This should have been rectified with additional personnel from HRTU, however due to the short duration of the mission and lack of accommodation the decision was made not to request them.

5. The key enabler for mission success within TU 653.13.1 and the supporting elements was a common 'can do' attitude and shared culture focussing on getting the job done. This was apparent across CJTG 653.13 and all OGAs as a shared attitude. While resulting in some long hours and reduced rest, the shared culture underpinned our collective success. This culture needs to be maintained through good application of mission command and high trust levels between key leaders including but not limited to COMJFNZ, COMD CJTG, subordinate elements of CJTG, MFAT and MBIE.

## Observations

### S1 Administration

6. As part of pre deployment the flight check in information for TU 653.13.1 was sent to one person. Fortunately that person had retained their issue iPhone s. 6(a) and was able to check everyone in s. 6(a)

- a. Fix. If short notice check in details are to be sent to individual NZDF accounts then personnel must be able to access this info. s. 6(a)

- b. Improve. If OGAs are able to synchronise their deployment timings with NZDF, it would be beneficial to pull them into pre-deployment training and

administration. This would start the integration process earlier and allow all parties to make best use of transit time.

7. s. 6(a) staff provided real life support to TU 653.13.1 which would not have been able to deliver, had the s. 6(a) staff and facilities not been available. s. 6(a) provided vital personnel administration capabilities such as advance of pay and cash security.

a. Sustain. s. 6(a) should be sustained as part of NZDF's support to other missions.

8. TU 653.13.1 personnel were unable to drive vehicles off AMAB.

a. Fix. HRTU needs to have personnel, who are eligible, to have a current international drivers licence so there is a pool of personnel who can drive anywhere in the world. s. 9(2)(g)(i)

9. TU 653.13.1 required the ability to scan and print passport images at the EHC.

a. Fix. The HRTU deployment pack up needs to include approved CIS hardware to complete the scanning and printing requirement. It is untenable to rely on hardware or approved hardware being available in the AO. This hardware needs to be high speed and capacity to support the high volume of throughput in NEO operations s. 6(a)

10. TU 653.13.1 had no element to administer or track the evacuees and no pre-prepared / doctrinal process for evacuee tracking. Two personnel took time out from their normal duties to develop and maintain a process which was eventually handed over to the OGAs. This required the OGAs to load the data in their system manually instead maintaining a digital record. s. 6(a) TU 653.13.1 was not able to effectively support the reporting process to GoNZ about how many evacuees had been processed.

a. Fix. TU 653.13.1 required two OPSIS with means of developing and maintaining digital manifests, to enable 24 hour evacuee tracking, which would have greatly reduced the burden of manifest creation for MFAT and enabled reporting of evacuee numbers to GoNZ. These personnel will also need access to all coalition IT systems.

11. TU 653.13.1 lacked s. 6(a) specialist to effectively mobilise and then administer for the duration of the deployment. To rectify this, the CJTG Command Warrant Officer took over the role of J1.

- a. Fix. Sufficient specialist administrative staff are required to support short notice missions during pre deployment, deployment and post deployment. Ideally this would have included two administrative personnel per force element.

### S3 Operations

12. s. 6(a)

[Redacted]

s. 6(a), s. 6(b)(i)

[Redacted]

13. Due to the make up of TU 653.13.1 Evacuation Point (EP) operations had to rely on the air load team to run terminal operations, maintenance flight and aircrew for security and general work parties.

- a. Fix. Bring a task organised infantry platoon from HRTU with an attached section from terminal platoon (5MOV) to deliver effective EP operations.

14. TU 653.13.1 had female service personnel integrated in to the processing team to enable the search of women and children. Due to their background s. 6(a) they were able to debrief people when information was offered to them.

- a. Sustain. For short notice tasks HRTU needs to have deployable females competent in search and dealing with civilians. This requirement can either be resolved by attaching more female service personnel to HRTU in the current Taskorg (noting that these service personnel will be pulled from their primary role) or generating another FET for HTRU into the processing team.

15. Once the EHC achieved 24/7 operations, supplementary rations were provided s. 6(a) to support TU 653.13.1 personnel.

- a. Sustain. Additional rations to support late shift work and short notice / varied time tables guaranteed TU 653.13.1's ability to sustain high tempo operations for a longer duration.

16. The NZ INC approach has meant that the OGA, especially MFAT and MBIE looked at people with the skills and knowledge of the MER and pulled them out of posts from across the world. This has meant that personnel did not have to deal with jet lag and were able to start work on arrival.

- a. s. 9(2)(g)(i) [REDACTED]
- b. Sustain. Including OGAs in demobilisation planning also ensured they were able to return to NZ alongside NZDF pers, without which current border settings would have likely meant a lengthy delay in the UAE waiting for MIF allocation. This should be repeated for future operations.
- c. Improve. A deliberate Reception, Staging, Onward movement, Integration (RSOI) phase with a clear knowledge start state of the OGA personnel would enable effective handover of responsibility.

17. Integration between TU 653.13.1, coalition forces and the OGAs was effective.

- a. Sustain. Integration with coalition forces and OGAs. (ADF, UK forces, MBIE, MFAT and NZ Police). In future, forces deployed at short notice need integrate with coalition and OGAs as soon as possible. s. 9(2)(g)(i) [REDACTED]

18. The NZ "can do" mission focused culture was apparent in both NZDF and OGAs and saw measures such as trading control for velocity, rest for success, delegation of command authority and trust in command on the ground to achieve the mission.

- a. Sustain. Future high readiness forces need to leverage the inherent NZ culture to succeed with focus on integrating and getting the job done.

19. s. 9(2)(g)(i) [REDACTED]

- a. s. 9(2)(g)(i) [REDACTED]

#### S4 Logistics

20. 1 (NZ) Bde elements deployed without an NZ Flag, Kiwi caps, patches and UBA shirts. This meant TU 653.13.1 had to scrounge for these items prior to deployment. The in camp garrison shoe proved suitable for wearing while working in the EHC s. 6(a) [REDACTED]. All TU 653.13.1 personnel had to remove their MTP shirt while working in the heat at the EHC and most wore dri – fit under shirts rather than the issue cotton under shirt.

- a. Fix. HRTU needs a deployable SOE to be held at 1RNZIR CSS Company to include NZ Flag, Kiwi Caps and badges, hot weather socks, tropical boots and UBA shirts.

Non Goretex, hot weather shoes for the desert and dri – fit under shirts need to be issued for deployments to hot weather climates.

21. Personnel from 1 (NZ) Bde brought inappropriate kit for the MER as a result of not having any information on the operation.

- a. Improve. Personnel should be given a kit list prior to deployment for the area they are going to based on operations in the vicinity, ideally the SOE s. 6(a) would have been used for Op KOKAKO.

22. A SNCO caterer and two JNCO supply technicians were deployed from 1(NZ) Bde to support the real life support requirement s. 6(a). These persons were immensely helpful ensuring that evacuees were fed and that the Op KOKAKO team was supported.

- a. Sustain. Supplementary staff from 1 (NZ) Bde should always be sent to an existing operation when a surge team is deployed as required by the SNO on the ground.

23. TU 653.13.1 was reliant on s. 6(a) PPE to prevent COVID 19 transmission. s. 6(a)

- a. Improve. NZDF needs to resource itself with medical PPE as required by the situation either through our own means or through a contract.

24. On RTNZ, TU 653.13.1 was advised that each person had only been allocated 30kgs of baggage allowance, whereas each person had 40kgs baggage allowance on deployment. This appeared to be an administrative oversight and was rectified by a number of helpful airline staff at check in.

- a. Improve. Baggage allowances for RTNZ need to be the same as the baggage allowances for deployment.

## S5 Planning

25. s. 6(a)

- a. s. 6(a)



26. The NEO chain lacked interpreter support at all stages of the process. Ideally for OP KOKAKO TU 653.13.1 would have had seven interpreters. This will speed up the processing and will assist with our ability to provide duty of care of the evacuees.

- a. Improve. 1(NZ) Bde needs to have a variety of language specialists dispersed throughout the formation who can be called upon to deploy at short notice.
- b. Improve. MBIE manage EziSpeak, the AoG interpreter network. This should be leveraged in future to meet the requirement for interpreters.

27. Prior to RTNZ, TU653.13.1 went through a deliberate respite period in DUBAI. This allowed all pers a chance to relax as a group in an informal setting. This was also beneficial for cementing some of the professional relationships between NZDF and OGAs.


- a. Sustain. A short respite period (NMT 72 hours) needs to follow short notice, high tempo operations to allow personnel a chance to relax and mentally unwind prior to RTNZ.

#### S6 Communications


s.6(a)



a. s.6(a)



b. s.9(2)(a)



s.6(a)



a. s.6(a)

b. Improve. Get OGAs onto the common communication method early.

s.6(a), s.6(b)(i)

a. Fix. An AOG deployable UNCLASS network is highly desirable. Ideally the steady state of NZ AOG operations would be run on a common UNCLASS network. This will allow basic info sharing, printing, scanning, VTC etc.

s.6(a), s.6(b)(i)

## S7 Training

31. TU 653.13.1 had difficulties working through the language barrier with the evacuees. At one stage google translate was used to translate documents into common languages spoken by the evacuees, to allow the literate evacuees to read the documents prior to filling them out.

a. Improve. TU 653.13.1 would have benefitted from being able to used google translate and other applications to enable the processing chain. These need to be trained at whilst at 1 (NZ) Bde and the apps should be held on NZDF deployable devices.

32. s.6(a), s.6(b)(i)

a. Improve. HRTU need to complete these exercises when possible, noting the COVID 19 restrictions on overseas travel. This will maintain HRTU currency with ADF NEO doctrine and SOPs.

b. Fix. OGAs (MFAT, MBIE, MoD, MoH, NEMA and NZPOL as a minimum) need to attend these exercises to learn the NZDF and coalition way of business.

**Conclusion**

33. In conclusion, Op KOKAKO was an overall success and presented an opportunity to do good for a certain group of people as well as opportunities for NZDF learning and improvements. s. 6(a)

[Redacted]

. This PAR has been reviewed and had input from both MBIE and MFAT staff.

34. For your consideration

s.9(2)(k)

s.9(2)(g)(i)

MAJ

OC TU 653.13.1

**Distribution:**

**Internal:**

HQDJATF

File

**External:**

DA MER

s.6(a), s.6(b)(i)

HQ 1 BDE (NZ)

1 CSR

1 RNZIR

2 CSSB

SNO OP TIKI

s.6(a)

## 40 SQN – OP KOKAKO LESSONS LEARNED

15 SEP 21

### POST ACTIVITY REPORT

#### Introduction

1. NZ7005 and s. 6(a) FWTF contingent comprising of aircrew, maintenance, SECFOR, ALT, INT, CIS and DPA formed the TU Air component of OP KOKAKO. The personnel were selected from across all bases for their previous experience in the MEO in order to de-risk the short notice nature of the deployment. Personnel were initially established and prepared under the umbrella of a 40 SQN led detachment, but subsequently re-distributed once the ORBAT was finalised under DJIATF, EHC and OP TROY elements.
2. The actual 40 SQN personnel included 11 aircrew and 13 maintenance, which commenced travel to Al Minhad Air Base (AMAB) 18 AUG 21 via CIVAIR. This post activity report captures the lessons learned in order to assist future operations in the region.

#### Pre-deployment

3. Pre-deployment consisted of five major elements:
  - a. Personnel selection.
  - b. Personal administration.
  - c. Individual readiness.
  - d. Aircraft readiness.
  - e. Deployed spares and equipment.

Pre-deployment was conducted very rapidly; personnel were departing for theatre within 48 hours of official task notification.

4. **Personnel selection** - OP KOKAKO team make up consisted of:
  - a. DETCO – A/WGCDR (Pilot)
  - b. Captain – FLTLT
  - c. Co-pilot x 2 (TACTICS Officer)
  - d. AWO x 2 (MSN Planner)
  - e. FE x 2 (OPSO)
  - f. ALM x 3 (OPSO)
  - g. MFC - SQNLDR
  - h. Coordinator - F/S
  - i. ACFT TECH SGT x 2, CPL and LAC
  - j. AVTECH SGT, CPL and LAC
  - k. S&S SGT
  - l. ARM SGT
  - m. FSS CPL
  - n. CIS CPL

5. 40 SQN utilised an OLOC current/qualified aircrew which had recently returned from Ex GFE. Given the previous month training in USA, immediate turn around and expected deployment length, a number of CAT/Currency extensions required processing managed by SOFWT. The primary Pilot and Co-pilot had never operated in previous MEO but were overseen by the DETCO for the first mission.
6. In selection of the maintenance team previous experience in theatre was prioritised as well as engine running capability, authorisation levels and personnel compatibility being key factors in assembling an effective unit. Personnel selected for OP KOKAKO were exposed to high work tempo, close working and living conditions, and extreme temperatures; personnel compatibility is a key element for success. Additionally, every attempt is made to prevent personnel having multiple MIQF periods in a calendar year.
7. Due to the rapid nature of deploy and urgency of operation an additional AV SGT would have added redundancy, provided ability to run a duty crew and rectification shift (as well as two deployed maintainers) and reduced the requirement to waiver AVENGO 1 requirements.
8. All maint with the exception of the two on-board maintainers were sent before the deployed aircraft as an 'advanced party'. For short notice tasks to the Middle East it is recommended that the DEA, F/S, ACFTTECH SGT and ARM SGT are sent in advance to the aircraft to enable mission preparation. NOTE: The execution of the mission would have benefitted from the DETCDR being deployed on the same flight. Travel for advanced party was via civ air. Personnel were seated on business class on the trip over; this reduced the risk of COVID and also meant that the team arrived in a good state to begin work immediately (ideal for a time compressed operation).
9. s. 6(a)

**Recommendation:** 40 SQN Projects to work with Senior Base s. 6(a) to develop sustainable s. 6(a) support for 40 SQN.

10. **Personal Administration** - s. 9(2)(g)(i)

The following administration was required to be completed prior to departure:

- a. Obtain duplicate ID.
- b. QTY 3 sets of 4 hardcopy Passport photographs (in 3 different coloured and styles of civilian shirts, NO white shirts are to be worn) you are required to take the hard copies with you into theatre. Photographs must have a white background (not grey, blue, cream tint) – otherwise they are not acceptable for OP Troy requirements.
- c. International Driver Permits for nominated drivers.
- d. Family support plan in ESS.
- e. Medical assessment.
- f. DNA swab.
- g. MD430s for luggage.
- h. Obtain Travel Itinerary + NZDF International Travel Movement Letter.
- i. Letter with proof of COVID vaccine.

- j. Pre-departure COVID test letter (within 72hr of departure).
- k. Notify if you will be using your work credit card overseas to prevent getting blocked  
s. 9(2)(k)
- l. Electronic devices should go as unaccompanied baggage s. 6(a)
- m. s. 6(a)

**Recommendation:** J8 have been informed that the personnel requirements listed above should be the basis for a standard checklist provided by JFNZ for Middle East deployments.

11. PDT - A truncated PDT was conducted over one day to cover core requirements s. 6(a)

12. Uniform - 40 SQN needs to be prioritised issue of MTP uniform. The clothing store was able to obtain limited stock on the day of departure. MTP is the appropriate uniform for theatre; wearing brand new uniform in theatre is not recommended. It is also recommended that personnel:

- a. Deploy with tan t-shirts with Velcro where rank can be affixed.
- b. Are issued with standard MTPs and a couple of fire retardant sets are added to the pack-up; fire retardant MTPs are significantly hotter to wear and increase risk of heat stroke in Middle East.

**Recommendation:** 40 SQN MFC request to Clothing Committee for prioritisation of MTP rollout.

13. The limited time covering Pre-Deployment Training delivered minimal benefit. For a deployment of this urgency (deployment with 48 hrs) this time would have been better spent providing pers more time to sort admin and primary role issues and/or personal lives. It is recommended that in theatre future detachments should aim to have:

- a. s. 6(a)
- b. OP Troy should deliver a cultural brief on dealing/living in Middle East; s. 6(a)

14. s. 6(a)

15. **Aircraft Readiness** – There were four essential considerations for aircraft readiness prior to departure for OP Kokako.
  - a. OP Kokako role requirements.
  - b. Supplementary servicing requirements.
  - c. Review of scheduled maintenance and extant ADRs.
  - d. 35 day requirements.
  
16. OP Kokako role requirements:
  - a. Aircraft role preparation was conducted under SAP order 50208601 (MiLDs, CMDs, Safe Installation, armour fit-out). No rough prep was required.
  - b. s. 6(a)  
[REDACTED]
  - c. The aircraft was configured with a clean floor (for combat loading) and minimal sidewall seats for maximum utility (NEO specific); loadmasters determined configuration required.
  
17. Supplementary servicing. Supplementary desert servicing at NZAP 6211.006–5–1.1 and NZAP 6211.006–2–2 reviewed. Due short nature of deployment, limited additional content applied. For future deployments it is recommended that 40 SQN investigates if there is a less invasive (videoscope) option for inspecting the brush blocks as it is a task that carries potential for issues/delays.
  
18. ADRs / forecast completed. Aircraft FQI issue resulted in requirement for RMP entry for dipping tanks without fall arrest equipment (where this could not be achieved). s. 6(a)  
[REDACTED]
  
19. 35 day requirements. Due to short nature of deployment no 35 day servicing's were required. s. 6(a)  
[REDACTED]
  
20. **ORM** - 40 SQN and Base HQ developed the RMP with the limited information available regarding the tasking details. On review post flying operations, the only additional aspect which worthwhile of inclusion was the risk of high density traffic in uncontrolled airspace causing a lack of separation. The risk was realised after MSN 1 with a TCAS RA event. Mitigations were added to the FARM for the remaining flights.
  
21. **Orders and Directives** - CTU 653.13.2 COMJ CDR Directive and OPORD were received prior to departure. Various Annex were still to be issued but did not prohibit the Op from commencing or leave CTU lacking boundaries or CTG intent. ORBAT distribution provided significant context to the allocation of responsibilities once issued and streamlined work-streams.
  
22. **Deployed spares and equipment** – Pack-up to support OP Kokako was requisitioned from Exercise Shakeout. The following observations were made:
  - a. No personnel (Including supplier) were involved in building the pack-up. Pack-up was built for domestic exercise and was not tailored to desert environment. Additionally, the locations of items were not known resulting in in-theatre inefficiencies.
  - b. Admin pack-up was 60lbs worth of wasted space.
  - c. Only 1 of 4 Torque Testers required in pack-up.
  - d. Prop Main/Standby filters had expired.
  - e. More ICS leads required.

- f. Review of battery stock; more common sizes required.
- g. Hand sanitiser (<100ml bottles) required for PPE stock.

**Recommendation:** s. 6(a) to write a SOP capturing corporate knowledge for developing and using OP/EX pack-ups and to review/rationalise contents.

23. Due to the compressed nature of deploy and the inability to freight critical payload by other means a waiver from BCDR (CAM-D(AK) endorsed) for overweight take off for NZ7005 up to 168,000lb was obtained. NOTE: overweight operations is within the original type design (<175,000lbs max overload) s. 6(a), s. 6(b)(i) s. 6(a)

24. The following were ARM specific points:

- a. Lack of stock on base for countermeasures for short notice requirements lead to last minute documentation of class 1 DG – Liaise with 40 SQN to determine required on base stock holding.
- b. Qty 3 MARS-L serials did not match dispatch signal, only found once arrived in AMAB – Ensure 100% check completed by signal author prior to REDS packaging.
- c. s. 6(a)

### Mission Execution

25. **Command Discretion** – CTG and DETCDR TU Air command latitude and permissions were sufficient for the operation.

- a. OIP and pre-arranged approvals were adhered to and never constrained or delayed the efficient employment of TU Air assets.
- b. No formal reach back to JFNZ/HQ was required IOT execute the FWTF operation in the desired manner.

26. **Rate of Effort** – Although two aircrews were in the contingent, the reality was one crew was required for full time planning or individual redundancy. Therefore the practical rate of effort was one sortie/day for 5 days. 83.8 total flying hours were conducted with 24.3 operational over 3 sorties. s. 6(a)

27. **OP Troy** – Requests for information can be made through s. 6(a). OP Troy are an enabler to the mission; they will ensure you are accommodated and be your primary POC for dealing with the Host Nation. NOTE: Due to shared rooms make sure any snorers/smokers are separately accommodated.

28. **Kiwi Flight-line Facilities** - The Kiwi flight-line at AMAB is well appointed for deployed maintenance tasks. The facility includes a rec room (with drink fridge, zip, basic cutlery etc), a secure room for ARM/S&S, a large open workspace with five computers, a locker room with toilet/showers and a supply area with racking for parts. External to the main building are a number of shipping containers for storage. The aircon in the FOL container has been



problematic; consequently, the large amount of FOL previously stored has been made U/S. Units should self-deploy with all necessary FOL in the future.

29. GSE includes an air conditioning cart, ground power unit, aircraft tug (hired for duration of OP TEAL from Inchcape) and compressor wash cart. All critical GSE failed within first shift (AIRCON Cart, Tug and GPU). While it was all fixed by MEOMs or 40 MAINT it is recommended that the following options are considered:


- a. GSE Tech to routinely visit theatre to service equipment or be attached to OP Troy.
- b. GSE Tech deploy in advance to main body to service equipment (NOTE: due spare part lead times this carries some risk).
- c. Combine assets in pool with ADF for service by MEOMs via MPOU; draw down for use when deployed in Middle East.
- d. Develop MOU with MEOMs for routine service.

NOTE: 40 MAINT wrapped GSE in tarpaulins to prevent sand ingress (reason for aircon cart failure).

**Recommendation:** MFC40 to discuss options for future GSE management with OC MSS.


30. **ADF Support** – Previous MEO operations have integrate with JTF630 ATG (AMTG) to good effect. CTG was authorised to assign the TU as TACOM to the ADF for OP KOKAKO however the command was not exercised.

a. s. 6(a), s. 6(b)(i)




b. TU Air elected to work closely alongside ATG for SA but as independently as possible. ATO slots and PPR were organised directly through the CAOC via LO QATAR. A 3-ship ANZAC package was flown on mission 3 for tactical support.

c. s. 6(a)



d. s. 6(a), s. 6(b)(i)



31. **Host Nation Support** – OP Troy will guide personnel through the base, sort immigration and deal with general host nation support. MAINT will be required to deal directly with Fuel and Toilet Cart requirements. Current phone numbers are kept in the Kiwi Flight-line or can be obtained from the RAAF MAINT pers. It is recommended that fuel is booked the night before and a phone

call at the start of dispatch is made to follow up the next day s. 6(a)  
s. 6(a).

32. **Communications** – Effective comms were one of the biggest barriers to conduct of OP Kokako; the following observations were made:

s. 6(a)

33. **Logistics Support** – Pridems/ Roudems are raised by Supply Tech, and forwarded through LOGO onto JOINT. Options for part shipment include CIV freight, MAS and safe-hand. During COVID pandemic, a safe-hand will incur a two week isolation period for delivery person; every effort should be made to link up through Joint with any other movements in area. For safe-hand through DXB a letter from OP Troy stamped by the Host Nation will be required to clear customs.

34. **Local Purchase** – Priority Local purchase to be conducted by OP Kokako LOGO, via Work Credit Card. Any Non Aero Non Priority Local Purchased to be actioned by OP Troy.

35. **Deployable Joint Inter-Agency Task Force (DJIAF)** – DJIAF was fundamental to the overall success of OP KOKAKO. s. 6(a)

a. s. 6(a)

b. The decision to appoint an Air O6 lead DJIAF was key to the overall co-ordination and rapid execution of the mission. The command level was appropriate given the profile and outcomes of the decisions. Furthermore the NZDF SNO synced with both the ADF command structure and OGA representatives. s. 6(a)

c. From a FWTF perspective, the CTG and DJIAF lead having an AIR background made the C2 (post initial sort) seamless. This significantly simplified TU Air's area of responsibility

and focus. In the tactical space, the left and right of arc were well understood by both parties resulting in efficiencies and minimal time wasted.

- d. Opportunities exist to further educate and exercise DJIATF and FWTF in order to improve future integration. s. 6(a)
- e. The OP-ord was not able to be briefed to most members prior to deploy which would have provided C2 clarity.
- f. 40 SQN DETCDR deployed with aircraft arriving two days after advanced party due to competing priorities.

**Recommendation:** CO40/DJIATF look for opportunities to run a joint exercise.

**Recommendation:** CO40 to ensure DETCDR of operations deploys in advanced party for time critical operations.

36. **Manpower / AVENGO 1 Duty Hours** – AVENGO 1, Table 2 split shift policy applied. A waiver was obtained from DETCDR to extend shifts in exceptional circumstances IAW AVENGO 1 Para 1.5(f) for duration of OP Kokako. The operational imperative was to get people out of Afghanistan in the limited window; consequently the work shifts were long and split to achieve this. Additionally, there were non-aircraft (evacuation handling centre roles) to fill. The waiver was applied by exception and was monitored very carefully by F/S co-ord. As detailed previously having an additional SGT in the future would further mitigate this requirement as would provide sufficient personnel to run a separate duty crew.

37. AK 40 SQN MAINT SOP GEN-29 for heat management applies. Ice vests in theatre are reaching end of shelf life; recommend next deployed team investigate purchasing new inserts just in time.

### Re-deployment

38. The following observations apply to re-deploy:

- a. A full day to organise pack-up and clean the flight line post a/c maintenance was ideal especially considering the heat.
- b. s. 6(a)
- c. Respite was provide with 1 or 2 nights in Dubai at a hotel. This provided an opportunity to socially decompress down from a high intensity operation before being isolated in a MIQF. From a mental health perspective this delivered significant benefit.
- d. MIQF. Contact from unit was good. Exercise equipment and welfare packs are beneficial to mental health; recommend for the future.
- e. Pre-departure COVID test letter (within 72hr of departure) and proof of MIQF booking required for return to NZ.

### Conclusion

39. This PAR is intended to capture lessons learned from OP KOKAKO and make recommendations to assist in future 40 SQN deployments to the Middle East.

### Recommendation

40. It is recommended that:

- a. 40 SQN Projects to work with Senior Base s. 6(a) to develop sustainable s. 6(a) support for 40 SQN.
- b. J8 capture the personnel requirements detailed in paragraph 8 of this PAR as the basis for a standard checklist provided by JFNZ for Middle East deployments.
- c. MFC40 request to Clothing Committee for prioritisation of MTP rollout.
- d. s. 6(a) to write a SOP capturing corporate knowledge for developing and using OP/EX pack-ups and to review/rationalise contents.
- e. MFC40 to discuss options for future GSE management with OC MSS.
- f. s. 6(a)
- g.
- h. CO40/DJIATF look for opportunities to run a joint exercise (i.e. Skytrain etc).
- i. CO40 to ensure DETCDR of operations deploys in advanced party for time critical operations.

s. 9(2)(g)(i)

SQNLDR

XO 40

s. 9(2)(a)

15 Sep 21