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OIA-2023-4880

18th January 2024

Dear Oscar Francis

I refer to your email of 1 December 2023 requesting, under the Official Information Act 1982 (OIA), the following information:

Copies of any lessons learned, post activity reports, EARLLS items, reviews, or similar documents generated for Exercise Torokiki. Copies of emails about Exercise Torokiki, regarding outcomes, making observations / reflections, raising concerns, or highlighting problems / areas for future improvement.

I refer you to previous decisions concerning your requests for lessons learned and observations from exercises and operations; these provide specific information on tactics, techniques and procedures used by the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) for their improvement. For this reason, observations and lessons learnt from Exercise Torokiki are withheld in accordance with section 6(a) of the OIA. The Post Activity Report for Exercise Torokiki is enclosed at Enclosure 1. Where indicated, names are withheld in accordance with section 6(a) of the OIA given the nature of their role, or section 9(2)(a) to protect privacy. Contact details and signatures are withheld in accordance with section 9(2)(k) to avoid the malicious or inappropriate use of staff information, such as phishing, scams or unsolicited advertising.

Your request for emails *regarding outcomes, making observations / reflections, raising concerns, or highlighting problems / areas for future improvement* is refused in accordance with section 18(f) of the OIA as was explained in the response to you of 13 February 2023.

You have the right, under section 28(3) of the OIA, to ask an Ombudsman to review this response to your request. Information about how to make a complaint is available at www.ombudsman.parliament.nz or freephone 0800 802 602.

Please note that responses to official information requests are proactively released where possible. This response to your request will be published shortly on the NZDF website, with your personal information removed.

Yours sincerely

AJ WOODS
Air Commodore
Chief of Staff HQNZDF

Enclosure:

1. Exercise Torokiki Post Activity Report

Queen Alexandra's Mounted Rifles
Commanding Officer's MINUTE 16/2023

01 May 23

D0-0146/19

See Distribution

POST ACTIVITY REPORT (PAR): EXERCISE TOROKIKI 2022 (TK22)

Reference

- A. EXINST 240/22: Exercise TOROKIKI 2022 (TK22)

Introduction

1. Ex TK22 was conducted OTP 21 – 28 Nov 22. Ref A specifies the mission and intent of the exercise and this PAR will evaluate if the mission and intent was achieved, as well as highlighting those lessons identified during both the planning, and conduct, of the activity.
2. This PAR will encompass both the planned concept for the Waiouru Military Training Area exercise, and the subsequent amended activity conducted at Linton Military Camp. This is necessary given the depth of planning that was conducted to stage the exercise in Waiouru, and the subsequent lessons identified from this process.

Exercise Mission and Intent

3. **Mission.** The Land Component will conduct Ex TK22 IVO Linton Camp (LMC) and Raumai Air Weapons Range (RAWR) OTP 22-27 November IOF all personnel to concentrate and reconnect with soldiering, and our purpose as war-fighters.
4. **Intent.**
 - a. **Purpose.** To set the conditions for regeneration by 'reconnecting' Army through reinforcing the tenets, character, and core combat skills demanded of the New Zealand Soldier.
 - b. **Method.** Army will concentrate at LMC, with initial focus on our war-fighting ethos and our cultural foundation of Ngati Tumatauenga. An individual training component will provide personnel with a short, but high-tempo, exposure to individual combat competencies through safe, effective, and enjoyable training.
 - c. **Endstate.** A Land Component connected, focussed, and ready to regenerate Land Combat Capability.
5. **Exercise Format.** The overall structure of Ex TK22 was:

- a. **Preliminary Phase:** Planning, Force Preparation, and Deployment to LMC.
- b. **Phase One:** Reconnection with combat as core business through Ngati Tu, Whakapapa, and the combat mind-set.
- c. **Phase Two:** Re-engagement with core combat skills (shoot, move, medicate, communicate). This Phase included:
 - i. Conduct of a 'Longest Day' activity planned and executed by 1st (NZ) Bde units;
 - ii. Conduct of a Close Combat Shooting and Helicopter co-operation activity at Raumai Air Weapons Range. This training was planned and led by NZCTC; and
 - iii. A simulation and capability display activity planned and led by HQ TRADOC S7 Branch.
- d. **Phase Three:** Immediate reorganisation of personnel and equipment and conduct of a family-friendly concert including the NZ Army Band and Shapeshifter.

6. **Evaluation of the Mission and Intent of Ex TK22.**

- a. Ex TK22 achieved the mission and was successful in concentrating personnel and reconnecting with soldiering. Following Op PROTECT, and the associated disruption to Army's training cycles, the opportunity to concentrate the Land Component to reinforce Army's core role of combat was necessary.
- b. Whilst it could be argued that some units had already progressed in their training as part of the Land Component's regeneration, this has been done in relative isolation and the benefits of conducting a large scale exercise for the Land Component to concentrate and conduct exercise planning and training at this point in the regeneration timeline will be beneficial given the increase in collective training tempo in the near future.
- c. The exercise timeframe was condensed however, the high-tempo nature of the training in Phase 2 was well-received by participants and staff. In particular, personnel noted that safety briefings were clearly conveyed with brevity and this enabled the maximum amount of training opportunity. This met the stated intent of Ex TK22 and serves as a good exemplar for future individual training activities.

7. **Ex TK22 – Waiouru Concept (14 – 30 Nov 22): Evaluation**

- a. In August 2022, the decision was made by LCC to move Ex TK22 from Waiouru to Linton. This was necessary due to competing activities that were not envisaged

when initial planning commenced (i.e. Op TIEKE), and the subsequent impact on participant numbers, equipment and capability.

b. It is important that the work done in planning for Ex TK22 (Waiouru), and the lessons identified, not be lost given the change in location and concept. In particular, the following lessons should be noted:

i. Early engagement to build POCs and planning teams is key. The ambitious scale of Ex TK22 in Waiouru (up to 2500 personnel) placed a large demand on CSS, infrastructure, and personnel support. It became clear that the requisite level of fidelity regarding the exercise concept was not in place at the MPC held 01-02 June 22. This would have been alleviated by identification of, and earlier concentration of suitable planning staff and better communication across the Land Component outside of key commanders.

ii. The scale of CSS support required for Ex TK22 in Waiouru was significant and would have required a large level of support from both 2 and 3 CSS Bns as well as Unit Ech support. The decision to dedicate a CSS Planning team from 3 CSS Bn was critical in advancing planning to a stage where Ex TK22 was logistically supportable, utilising both NZDF and civilian contracted capability.

iii. Planning to concentrate personnel at Waiouru required a significant transport and movement's effort. RNZAF Fixed-Wing transport planners within the JAOC were very supportive from the outset to provide movement of personnel from the South Island but early confirmation of dates is key to ensure competing tasks can be de-conflicted.

iv. It was apparent that road transport capability within Army is relatively limited and significant civilian bus support was needed. Those services were able to provide transport to the planned numbers of personnel but again, early engagement with these civilian providers is key to ensure they are able to meet the demands of an activity of this scale.

v. A key benefit of planning to conduct Ex TK22 in Waiouru was the spotlight placed on Army's scale of entitlement deficiencies. LC(L) staff were supportive of this initial planning and sought to engage with DEMO early so mitigations for equipment shortfalls could be put in place. However this was not tested due to the change in the exercise scope, negating the need for personnel to deploy into the field for a significant period of time.

vi. Overall – the key benefit of the preliminary work done to conduct Ex TK22 in Waiouru was the opportunity to adhere to a deliberate planning process. Where possible, exercise planning was conducted IAW ADFP 7.0.3 Exercise Planning and Conduct (<http://doctrine/pdf/ADFP/ADFP-7.0.3.pdf>). Planning milestones were largely met IAW planned timelines and it should be

noted that the training cadre, EXCON, and CSS support positions were largely filled in August 2022 when the scope and location of the activity was changed. All planning artefacts have been retained in the NZCTC Ex TOROKIKI 22 DDMS site and should be archived within the O/LCC DDMS pages to ensure they can be referenced for future activities.

8. Ex TK22 – Linton Exercise (21 – 27 Nov 22): Evaluation

a. This section will evaluate the conduct of Ex TK22 in Linton Military Camp (LMC) over the period 21 – 27 Nov 22. It will also evaluate the planning and rehearsals conducted as part of preliminary activities. The revised schedule of Ex TK22 was:

- i. Conduct of MPC at LMC OTP 04-05 Oct 22;
- ii. Conduct of Rehearsal of Concept (ROC) Drill at LMC and Raumai Air Weapons Range (RAWR) OTP 15 – 16 Nov 22;
- iii. EXCON estb 21 Nov 22;
- iv. Deployment complete 22 1800 Nov 22;
- v. Phase One complete 23 2359 Nov 22;
- vi. Phase Two complete 26 2359 Nov 22;
- vii. Phase Three complete 27 2100 Nov 22; and
- viii. Re-Deployment complete 28 1800 Nov 22.

b. Ex TK22 Preliminary Planning

i. MPC 04-05 Oct.

(a) The conduct of the MPC at NZCTC was significantly reduced to limit the amount of attendees required. To simplify planning, the following planning responsibilities were allocated:

- (1) 1(NZ) Bde responsible for conduct of 'Longest Day';
- (2) HQ TRADOC responsible for the Simulation activity; and
- (3) NZCTC responsible for the RAWR CCSP and Airmobile activity.

(b) From this point, HQ 1(NZ) Bde were critical in both exercise planning and providing the exercise HQ. Whilst Comd TRADOC

retained his role as the Ex Director, it is recommended that this role reside with the Fmn Comd who is OIC of the training location for future activities. This ensures command continuity and ease of decision-making given responsibility for their respective camp both prior to, and in the execution of, the exercise.

(c) Given the reduced scope of the exercise, and reduced training capacity of the activity locations, it was decided to limit the training audience size to 900 personnel. Despite the pressure on infrastructure (accommodation, messing etc) in Linton Camp, this number was sustainable.

(d) Supporting agencies within LMC (DEI, LRSC, Def Sec, ESS and contract support) were engaged from the MPC to ensure the impact on infrastructure and BAU governance within camp was minimised. Whilst there were differences in understanding of what was possible between planning staff and local infrastructure, H&S, and security management agencies, these were rectified with open and constant communication. In some cases, policy is a limiting factor on training activities within the garrison environment however mitigation measures resolved any issues.

ROC Drill 15 – 16 Nov

i. The ROC drill concentrated on the conduct of Phase Two activities and provided a valuable rehearsal for all 1 Bde units, HQ TRADOC, and NZCTC. A PI from QAMR was provided to conduct the 'Longest Day' and ensure the allocated timings and design of the training was feasible. In addition – this rehearsal was vital in ensuring NZCTC's close combat shooting ranges at RAWR were de-conflicted with the airmobile training and the presence of staff from the Ohakea Tactical Operations Centre (TOC) greatly assisted in this process.

ii. At this point, it was identified that the incorrect dates for rotary wing support had been entered into the Lighthouse planning tool in HQJFNZ and this had not been reviewed prior to the ROC Drill. The problem was rectified through engagement between CO NZCTC and 3 SQN however it highlights the importance of planning and coordination milestones being reviewed and liaison at all levels being maintained.

iii. The ROC drill was essential to the success of Ex TK22. It is recommended that the value of ROC drills and rehearsals that closely resemble the conduct of the exercise is reinforced at all levels. This is a critical action in the planning and execution of training activities within the NZ Army.

c. **Ex TK22 Execution**

EXCON and Training Area Establishment

i. Ex TK22 EXCON was established on 21 Nov and located in HQ 1(NZ) Bde. Personnel were seconded from HQ NZCTC and JSG to ensure sufficient staff capacity. Establishing EXCON in a standing HQ was beneficial and in particular, the work of the S4 cell was key to addressing numerous administrative and log issues prior to 22 Nov. The Bde S3 cell provided an effective pers tracking function that meant that all participants and staff were able to be accounted for, and the personnel state was consistently updated. This was key given the threat that COVID-19 presented if personnel were not quickly isolated.

ii. NZCTC and attached range safety staff established the CCSP ranges and administrative areas on 21 Nov. RAWR remains a viable training area for a number of activities however, there are restrictions in cellular communications and SATPHONE coverage was the only reliable means of maintaining communications from EXCON – albeit limited to specific locations. Given the continued, and likely increased, use of RAWR by both Air and Land elements, improving the communications infrastructure needs to be investigated.

Deployment

i. The deployment of South Island personnel was facilitated by RNZAF B757. Early signposting of the flight requirements with the HQJFNZ JAOC was key in Air Planners ensuring there was availability within a congested activity period. Whilst there was no requirement for an alternative mode of transport, it was decided to not plan for a road and ferry (too much time lost) or civilian air charter option (cost prohibitive).

ii. All personnel, regardless of rank and home location, were given a timing window to arrive at LMC on 21 Nov. This ensured traffic management, security, and exercise administration was confined to a narrow period so as not to disrupt BAU within LMC.

Orders and Battle Preparation

i. All personnel participating in Ex TK22 (including staff) were issued a written brief, accommodation keys, and any expendables required upon arrival at LMC. This created an administrative burden for EXCON staff but ensured all personnel were accounted for, and informed of Ex TK22 timings and locations. This was essential given the tempo of activity over the week and number of personnel under training.

ii. Commander TRADOC, as the Exercise Director, conducted formal orders for all OICs of the Platoon Groups on the evening of 21 Nov. This 'set the tone' for Ex TK22 and highlighted the necessity of formal battle procedure as Army conducts increasingly complex collective training. The Exercise Director then conducted the opening brief at 0745 on 22 Nov which signalled the commencement of Ex TK22 Phase One.

Phase One

i. **Ngati Tu Engagement Activity.**

(a) Originally, Phase One of Ext TK22 focussed on a cultural activity at the Army Marae. The revised LMC concept limited this to a practical activity where all participants rotated through an introduction to, and practice of, the NZ Army haka, and an update on the work done by the Army Culture cell in Army General Staff. The update from Army Culture, including progress on 'The Way of the Warrior', was well received and was effective in linking the role of the individual soldier to the collective strategy of Army Regeneration as directed by the Army Capstone Orders.

(b) The culminating activity was a mass NZ Army haka, conducted on the LMC sports field. This was filmed by DPA, including drone footage, and provided an effective culminating point for Phase One which was quickly circulated across social media through DPA's channels.

ii. **Combat Mind-Set.**

(a) This brief was delivered to participants by Army Psychologists as part of the 'reset' of the tenets of the NZ soldier. In review, the combat mind-set needs to be instilled by commanders at all levels as a perpetual objective of unit and ab-initio training.

(b) The NZDF Psychologist role is to evaluate how the combat mind-set is benefitting commanders and trainers in the development of combat skills amongst their personnel. In retrospect, this brief should have targeted senior personnel within 1(NZ) Bde who will incorporate principles of the combat mind-set into training.

iii. **Capstone Orders Brief.** Lt Col ^{s.6(a)} [REDACTED] Army GS, delivered an update of the writing of the Army Capstone Orders. This was well received and was well-tailored to the audience with a clear link to the objectives of Ex TK22.

Phase Two.

i. Ex TK22 Phase 2 was the key training activity of the exercise. It specifically exposed personnel to the key combat competencies of 'Shoot, Move, Communicate, Medicate', within a moderately challenging environment. In order to accommodate the training audience, three separate groups of 300 personnel rotated across the three-day training package as outlined below:

ii. 'Longest Day'

(a) The Longest Day was based on a skill-at-arms activity where each separate serial was planned and managed by a 1(NZ) Bde or JSG unit. The entire activity took place in LMC and each group completed the activity over a 12 hour period. The specific activities were:

- i) Break Contact and Stretcher Carry – 2 CSSB
- ii) Observation Stand – QAMR
- iii) 9mm Shoot – 1 RNZIR
- iv) Medical Scenario – JSG
- v) Assault Course – PTIs
- vi) Engr CIED – 2 ER
- vii) Pool Activity – JSG
- viii) Mental Skills x 2 – Bde Staff
- ix) Gun Run – 16 Fd Regt

(b) All units ensured the events were safe, effective, and challenging. The conduct of the ROC drill greatly enhanced the effectiveness of the training and identified corrective actions to be taken before the start of Phase Two.

(c) The decentralised C2 model, in which each unit was responsible for their activity, contributed to an effective C2 model where a small EXCON did not have to maintain constant communications with a number of smaller nodes. Rather, EXCON could concentrate on overall exercise monitoring and ensuring that external factors, i.e. visitors or medical events, did not interrupt the 'flow' of the activity.

(d) In some cases, complex training aids such as the “Spookers” actors (JSG Medical Scenario), and 1 RNZIR’s use of facades in the 9mm shoot on Parsons Range, demonstrated how units can design and execute challenging and interesting scenarios even as the Land Component is still regenerating training delivery.

(e) Given the size of the training audience, waivers were granted to mitigate the impractical requirement for familiarisation lessons i.e. personnel conducting the assault course. The small number of injuries demonstrates that oversight by suitably qualified personnel can ensure a relatively large training group, with varying levels of trained competence and experience, do not pose a prohibitive risk to safe and effective training.

iii. **RAWR CCSP and Airmobile Activity.**

(a) **Overview.** The ‘Shoot’ component of Ex TK22 was achieved through the CCSP. This abridged shooting package enabled approximately 150 firers to spend a half day on three range locations at RAWR, whilst concurrently conducting emplane/deplane drills and a familiarisation flight with 3 SQN.

(b) **Movement to RAWR.** NZCTC was the ‘base’ location for the activity. All personnel drew weapons and stores under the supervision of NZCTC staff, then viewed the 3 SQN training video, greatly reducing the time required for any administration at RAWR. Civilian buses were utilised to transport personnel to RAWR. The 300 person groups were split into two waves of 150 PAX in order to accommodate all participants in one day.

(c) **CCSP.**

i) The CCSP shoot was conducted under the supervision of NZCTC range staff, with augmentation from CCSP instructor qualified personnel, including two from RNZAF Force Protection. Splitting the group into three separate ranges, following a central safety brief, ensured the maximum shooting time was allocated to firers.

ii) Participants noted they had not expected to be able to spend as much time shooting within the training window, given an assumed time lag for the variance in the individual trained state. However, there were no safety breaches recorded and the number of safety staff present enabled supervision of less experienced personnel.

iii) A waiver for non-AWQ qualified personnel was approved by LCC with the mitigation that participating personnel conducted LFTTs to demonstrate safe weapon handling.

iv) RAWR remains a suitable, if limited, LFF training area. RNZAF Base Ops staff were engaged early, enabling de-confliction with air operations and fire risk to be mitigated. All EXCON staff were accommodated at RAWR under canvas reducing the transport and stores management burden.

(d) Airmobile Training.

i) 3 SQN were able to support Ex TK22 with multiple aircraft on each training day, enabling all personnel to undertake airmobile training. Serials were conducted whilst live firing continued, as an air corridor was established, and LZ locations sited, that avoided the live firing template.

ii) There was no requirement for aircraft to shut down and for crew briefings to occur, thereby maximising training time. The feedback from the aircraft crews was complementary, as the following extract from 3 SQN reporting to HQJFNZ outlines:

A. RWTF support to Ex TOROKIKI complete. Of note, co-ordination and control of PZ throughout the exercise by Army personnel has been exceptional. Communication has been clear and unambiguous. The combination of this has enabled extremely efficient conduct of high volume trooping serials.

iii) Initial conceptual planning was for all participants to conduct a helo insertion from OHAKEA to RAWR before occupying the ranges. Planning with 3 SQN identified the time to move all pax, coupled with the available crews and airframes, was prohibitive to training. It should be noted that BAU airfield operations at Ohakea can restrict airmobile training due to aircraft having to taxi from identified LZs whilst operating under relatively congested air traffic conditions.

iv. Simulation Familiarisation Activity.

(a) The third component of Phase Two was a round-robin simulation and capability display. The intent of this activity was to appraise personnel of training initiatives under development and the progress made through projects such as Technology Enhanced Learning – Army. It was made up of the following serials:

- i) E-Blank training system;
- ii) Tactical Distraction Device;
- iii) All Arms Call-For-Fire Trainer;
- iv) Mantis X / Blackbeard small arms training system;
- v) RDX / Virtual Shot small arms training system;
- vi) Army Experimentation (including E-Bike and UAS); and
- vii) NZSOF Display.

(b) Whilst there were technical concerns with some of the systems i.e. E-Blank, MANTIS X and RDX/Virtual Shot, this was anticipated and the value of these systems as training enablers was appreciated by a number of personnel. There were issues with participant's familiarity with the systems and how this affected normal weapon drills. This would have been rectified with more coordination and rehearsals.

(c) It was noted that the level of map reading competence was at a poor level amongst the training audience. This greatly affected the amount of time that participants had to conduct AACFF training as significant effort had to be allocated to revising and teaching soldiers to plot a grid. Whilst Ex TK22 was a not a 'testing' exercise, this key training issue should be noted as Army seeks to regenerate individual combat competencies.

(d) The conduct of the simulation activity was dependent on sufficient WiFi coverage in Linton Camp. This was achieved late in the exercise planning phase however it did highlight the importance of 'connectivity' in enabling training, and the current DDG plan to ensure a robust WiFi capability is present in camps needs to be delivered ASAP.

(e) The input of Army Experimentation and Capability Branch was valuable and it enhanced the awareness of the work being done in Wellington to deliver equipment to personnel. It was appreciated that s.6(a) made himself available as it is understood there is hollowness within the Land capability domain.

(f) Similarly, the effort made by TG6 to provide personnel and equipment was greatly appreciated considering their ever-present tempo. Ex TK22 provided the unit a valuable opportunity to showcase

their trade(s), to a wide audience and such opportunities must be factored into future activities.

v. **Phase Three: Immediate Reconstitution and Concert**

(a) Ex TK22 Ph 3 commenced with an immediate reconstitution that centralised all personnel and stores to ensure ease of equipment management. The short turnaround required to repair equipment and weapon deficiencies prior to the Christmas closedown, and in preparation for standing contingencies, necessitated this approach. It should be noted that this task was made considerably simpler by holding Ex TK22 in LMC. If the activity had remained in Waiouru, there would have been a significantly greater demand on the Logistic support to the exercise, and to the residual maintenance plan in a compressed time period before the end of year.

(b) The second component of Ex TK22 Ph 3 was originally intended to be a concert, held in the WMTA, for all participating personnel. This was amended to a concert held in LMC, at a reduced scale. The provision of alcohol and the congregation of personnel caused concern in some quarters, however, these concerns never materialised. Overall, all personnel conducted themselves well, demonstrating that if we treat our personnel as adults, we can expect them to act as such.

(c) Holding the concert in Linton also enabled families to be invited, which significantly added to the success of this activity. The help and support of the Linton Community Coordinator, Leslie Clutterbuck, and the provision of funding from Linton Camp EXCO was essential in conducting this event. Whilst this concert was for all Army personnel and their families, it was obviously not practical for dependents outside of the wider Manawatu or Wellington areas to attend in most cases.

(d) Initial planning for the concert commenced with liaison with s.9(2)(a), Trentham Camp Community Facilitator, who identified that the event production company, 'Precision Live', would ensure a successful event as it would be outside of the Ex TK 22 planning team's capacity to also put on a concert of this scale. Consequently, the planning assistance and expertise of the 'Precision Live' staff was invaluable in staging the event and is recommended they remain an approved vendor and preferred partner for any future activities. The provision of their trained event security personnel meant a 'low profile' security presence was possible and the relative low number of incidents highlighted the benefit of this approach.

(e) The budget required to stage an event of this size was significant and the provision of non-public funding to secure 'Shapeshifter' was essential to the success of the concert. Again, the efforts of Mr Andrew Tuck, the Managing Director of 'Precision Live', in securing a musical act of the standing of 'Shapeshifter' was greatly appreciated. The commitment of sufficient operating expenditure for the NZ Army Band to stage a major production for their fellow soldiers was greatly beneficial to the success of their set. All personnel were reminded of the quality and professionalism that the NZ Army band consistently demonstrates in their performances.

(f) Logistically, there were significant requirements to ensure the concert could be staged successfully. The security and traffic management plan was made more complex given the need to limit access to LMC and maintain BAU traffic flow. The coordinated planning involving NZDF MPs, 1(NZ) Bde staff, and Linton Regional Support Centre security coordinators was essential. However, the security threat assessment pertaining to the event was unrealistic and did not add value to identifying vulnerabilities in the security posture. In addition, LMC does not employ the requisite number of security personnel to cope with an event of scale larger than BAU. This meant soldiers were needed to supplement security staff, which was an unsatisfactory outcome.

(g) Leslie Clutterbuck, Linton Community Facilitator, should be commended for her coordination of the food trucks and the children's area which greatly enhanced the event. The variety of food on offer was appreciated by the soldiers and their families and the voucher system, as part of the exercise ration plan was effective. There was however, a significant administrative burden in both recording and distributing the food vouchers, and the attendance at the concert, which placed pressure on both the NZCTC Comd Spt function and 1(NZ) Bde S4 Branch.

(h) The requirement for the hireage of equipment and the provision of work parties to erect the marquee was necessary, but became complex as planners sought to limit costs through the provision of 1(NZ) Bde (2 CSS Bn and 2 ER) support. In hindsight, it is questionable whether the cost savings realised were justified in the face of unit disruption.

(i) It was clear that the use of ESS to provide the bar services placed pressure on a provider whose capacity to cater for an event of this scale was questionable. In future, it is recommended that the event production company be given this task so as to limit the planning requirements on a separate agency and cause minimal disruption to BAU contract providers.

(j) Overall, the concert was well-received and Army, as well as the wider NZDF, should continue to be ambitious in staging events of a sufficient scale that proved an 'authentic experience' for our people.

vi. **Re-Deployment**

(a) Flights. The re=deployment of all BMC based personnel was executed with no significant issue and again, the support of the RNZAF to transport Ex TK22 participants is to be acknowledged.

CSS

i. **Log Planning.**

(a) HQ 1(NZ) Brigade had identified that early, and detailed, log planning was critical to the success of the exercise. The efforts of 3CSS Bn staff in the initial planning phases in securing contracted support, and identifying necessary equipment brigading was a key enabler to pivoting to a relatively simple plan when the exercise was re-located to LMC.

(b) A key initiative was the 'colour coding' of each training group's weapon and equipment boxes. This meant weapons and key stores could be secured and moved with the training groups across secured locations, negating the need for personnel to draw weapons and controlled stores from the armoury each morning, reducing the burden on the SUPTECH staff and ensuring minimal disruption to training time.

ii. **Stores.** The reduced scope of the activity in LMC meant the provision of stores and expendables did not 'test' equipment stocks and the distribution system if the exercise had been held in Waiouru. A key decision was to only draw weapons from the lower North Island and not bring them up from BMC or as part of the wider Army pool. This meant the reconstitution and transport of personnel was relatively simpler.

iii. **Rationing.** The provision of mess meals for both breakfast and dinner to a large training audience meant mess timings were staggered however, this was not beyond the main mess capacity. The reduction in the demand for ORP, due to moving from an extended field phase in Waiouru to a shortened activity in LMC, was a key contributor in reducing the costings for the exercise.

iv. **Transport.** In addition to the aforementioned points re RNZAF air travel, the provision of buses to transport personnel to RAWR was delivered with no significant delays. NZCTC ensured there was a liaison

POC with the bus at all times so minimal training time was lost. Whilst there was an initial intent for troop lift to be conducted by 10 Tpt Coy, this would have meant a number of personnel would be prohibited from participating in the exercise.

- v. **Accommodation.** The number of external participants on Ex TK22 tested the capacity of the LMC accommodation. Any overflow of personnel were accommodated within the Gymnasium. Ex TK22 highlighted that any activity of scale will continue to test camps in housing personnel, unless 'austere' facilities such as tented camps are established. This, however, will be beneficial in both hardening our personnel and providing sufficient capacity as Army conducts increased collective training activities.

Communications

- i. **'White Fleet'.** Motorola was the primary means of communications across all phases and this was relatively effective in ensuring the timings and momentum of the activities within LMC were not adversely affected. As aforementioned, the use of SATPHONE at RAWR was essential, but intermittent, and an RFI through Air Staff as to the longer term plan for sufficient communications coverage should be submitted.
- ii. **WiFi.** As previously mentioned, WiFi was essential in enabling the simulation stands as well as enabling personal internet access. Whilst WiFi access was enhanced in LMC over the exercise period, Ex TK22 reinforced the need for the rapid delivery of all-encompassing WiFi coverage across NZDF camps and bases as a basic provision to enable BAU activities.

Medical

- i. **Medical Support.**
 - (a) HQ JSG were forward leaning and engaged early to identify both real-time medical coverage and training support. Once the activity was moved to LMC, it was feasible to provide 'on call' medical support from the LMC FHO facility with medical coverage also available at both RAWR and on the 'Longest Day'.
 - (b) Whilst COVID-19 was a key planning consideration, the effect on Ex TK22 was minor. Several personnel tested positive during the exercise however there was sufficient isolation areas to remove them from the training audience. A larger-scale isolation plan was available, but ultimately not required.

(c) In order to ensure requisite NZDF medical support was available to conduct the combat medical training stands, and support the shooting at RAWR, a civilian medical provider (PRO+MED) was contracted. This company was also engaged to provide medical support to the Phase 3 concert, thereby minimising the requirement for uniformed RNZAMC personnel to miss out on the event.

ii. **Medical and Physical Training.**

(a) The 'Longest Day' Tactical Trauma Care stand was well run and engaged the training audience through utilisation of the 'Spookers' Company and their medical trauma moulage team. These professional actors created a realistic scenario and whilst it incurred a cost, the enhanced realism of training means that utilising this company should be considered in future activities. Employing external role-players also reduces the requirement for NZDF personnel to act as casualties and the management structure within the 'Spookers' team meant minimal oversight from a LO was required.

(b) The physical requirements of the 'Longest Day' activity meant the PTI staff were essential to the conduct of the activity. The conduct of the Assault Course was efficient and effective, resulting in minimal injuries amongst the training audience. In addition, the PTIs were able to provide the requisite assurance that familiarisation training for individuals was not required and sufficient mitigation was in place to enable a waiver to be approved by LCC.

NZDF Military Police

- i. The NZDF MP Command element were proactive in conducting planning and risk management, primarily focussing on traffic control and security considerations in Phase 3. CoS 1 Bde has identified that the insertion of a NZDF MP LO into 1 Bde HQ was essential in ensuring the security and traffic management plans executed were able to mitigate any risks associated with the activity.
- ii. In addition to the above, it should be noted that the NZDF MP LO, FLTLT Dan Hynds, was a key component in the success of Phase 3, as he facilitated the cooperation between the Precision Live 'inner security' team and the NZDF MPs, to ensure any security breaches or behaviour issues during the concert were attended to with minimal disruption.

Finance

- i. The initial OPEX committed to Ex TK22 when planned for Waiouru was able to be significantly reduced for the activity held in LMC. XO LCC

was instrumental in ensuring planning and execution of Ex TK22 was not impeded unnecessarily by delays in financial approvals and the consistent and effective communication between the O/LCC and the Ex TK22 planning team enabled key planning milestones to be achieved in the required timeframes.

- ii. Given external training providers were employed (i.e. 'Shooters'), Defence Commercial Services were engaged to ensure any contract negotiations and approved vendor applications were finalised. Future activity planners should note the value that DCS can add in providing advice and staff support when external providers are being employed whilst ensuring that Army acts IAW prescribed industry engagement rules.

Visits. Official visits to Ex TK22 were relatively scarce. The CA's Hon and Regt Cols conference visited the Longest Day and Simulation activity which was a worthwhile opportunity to engage with personnel. The other main visit was a group of NZDF civilian personnel from HQ NZDF who were seeking to gain a greater insight into Army's individual training at the commencement of regeneration. Overall, visits to Ex TK22 had minimal adverse impact on exercise conduct and AGS and HQNZDF engaged early to ensure de-confliction of timings and movement plans within LMC.

Public Affairs

- i. **Early Engagement and Planning.** A key element of Ex TK22's success was the planning and engagement effort of DPA staff, primarily Charlene Williamson. This enabled key themes and messages to be determined by LCC and enabled a comprehensive media engagement plan that resulted in effective media coverage of the event across print, social, and online media platforms. Charlene Williamson's efforts in leading the promotion of Ex TK22 demonstrate the value of embedding a public affairs advisor at the commencement of planning.

- ii. **Media Interest.** Media interest in visiting Ex TK22 was relatively disappointing. Interviews were conducted with both the LCC and Comd TRADOC however, the consensus was exposure of the exercise through online media platforms was generally more effective. There was limited TV and radio coverage however the expected media interest from 'traditional' agencies did not meet expectations.

- iii. **Imagery, Social Media and Video Development.** The efforts of DPA visual media staff should be acknowledged. The photography and video capture of the exercise was essential in 'telling the story' in the public domain and should be factored into planning for any future activities. The rapid dissemination of any imagery is also valuable in informing higher command of the conduct of the exercise when unable to visit training.

9. Summary

a. Ex TK22 achieved LCC's mission and intent and was a valuable reminder that Army can still execute training activities 'at scale' following a sustained period of limited training opportunity. It also built confidence that Army's trainers and leaders can plan and execute challenging training, not without acceptable risk, that engenders excitement and a sense of purpose within personnel. This is what Army should strive for as it regains the ability to conduct complex combined arms training to ensure its *raison d'être*: the development and maintenance of war-fighting capability.

b. The following are metrics for Ex TK22:

i. **870** x participants reported for trg at H-Hr of TOROKIKI from **19** units.
Platoons and composite Platoons from:

- DHO
- FHO
- JMPU
- ACS
- NZCTC
- MCTC
- LOTC
- AGS PI
- CAP BR PI
- Def Rec PI
- NZDC PI
- QAMR
- 1RNZIR
- 2/1RNZIR
- 1CSR
- 2 CSS Bn
- 3 CSS Bn
- 2ER
- 16 Fd Regt
- 1NZSAS Regt

ii. Cumulatively **26,100** training hours achieved across three days with **8** x injuries at role one level = **one injury every 3,263 Trg Hours**;

iii. **1** x illness requiring per to be removed from Ex;

iv. **10** x COVID-19 cases requiring pers to be removed from Ex;

v. **10** x stands across the 'Longest Day' activity covering foundation soldier skills of shoot, move, communicate, medicate, as well as physical and mental resilience stands;

- vi. **18 x** flying hours achieved by 3 Sqn RNZAF in support of EX TOROKIKI, **870** pers Helicopter familiarisation or re-familiarisation achieved.
- vii. **45 000 x** 9 mm rounds fired on cumulative Longest Day activities, **870 x** pers Glock qualified.
- viii. **225 000 x** rounds fired as part of the Close Combat Shooting Package.
- ix. **311 x** support staff/EXCON.
- x. **251 x** pers moved via RNZAF SATS CHCH-OH-CHCH.
- xi. Ex Budget of approx **\$1.3M** OPEX (pending committals).

c. **Recommendations.** It is requested that LCC:

- i. **Note** that a dedicated and unified planning team that was established early in the Ex TK22 planning process was central to the success of the exercise.
- ii. **Note** the benefit in appointing the OIC of relevant Defence area as overall commander of the exercise, even if the location and scope has changed during the planning process.
- iii. **Note** the exceptional work of Fmn and Unit HQs across the Land Component, to plan and execute the exercise at scale, in what were trying circumstances at times.
- iv. **Endorse** Ex TOROKIKI Ph 2 and Ph 3 as being the model for a 3-4 year cycle of Component engagement if repeating this activity were to be justified, noting the impact on the Component, if level of concurrent activity is high.

s.9(2)(k)



JM MURRAY
LTCOL
CO QAMR
Ex TK22 Lead Planner

DTelN: s.9(2)(k)



LCC Comment:

An excellent event superbly run
by Lt Col Spott and Murray!

s.9(2)(k)



MD WESTON
BRIG
LCC

Distribution:

Army GS (Attn: SO1 People and Culture)
O/LCC
O/ACC
Cap Br: Land Domain Lead
HQ 1st(NZ) Bde
HQ TRADOC
HQ JSG
LC(L)
RS(A)