

# Op KOKAKO 01/21

22 Sep 21

HQ JFNZ DO3-0050-03

See Distribution

## POST OPERATION REPORT: JTG653.13

### Reference

- A. HQ JFNZ OPORD 122/21: OP KŌKAKO 01-21: Support to Afghanistan Non Combatant Evacuation of 18 Aug 21
- B. 1 NZ SAS A Sqn AAR: OP KŌKAKO of 27AUG21
- C. Op KOKAKO TU 653.13.1 Post Activity Report, of 10 Sep 21
- D. Op KOKAKO TU Air PAR of 15 Sep 21

### Executive Summary

1. OP KŌKAKO was the NZDF contribution to the successful extraction of NZ nationals and Approved Foreign Nationals (AFN) from Kabul, Afghanistan in August 2021. This short notice Operation saw the rapid deployment of a number of NZDF Force Elements half way around the world into an uncertain and rapidly evolving security environment with less than 96 hours forewarning. Adding to the complexity of the deployment was the high operational threat in a rapidly developing and uncertain security environment framed by a global pandemic, which saw mobilisation occurring with New Zealand at Alert Level 4.

2. Fundamental to the success of this deployment was the amalgamation of High Readiness Units from across the NZDF that had been ring-fenced from OP PROTECT duties. The individual trained states, readiness and experience of the Joint Task Group was crucial in getting forces to the Middle East and effective with the minimum of preparation and pre-deployment admin. The ability of this TG to integrate seamlessly into a wider coalition NEO under a US led security blanket at HKIA is testimony to the benefits of high levels of training and international engagement undertaken by these units.

3. The successful and seamless integration of an NZ Inc inter-agency command and control team at AMAB was crucial to the overall success of the mission and was a primary focus for the NZDF Command Team. With no NZ Consular support in Kabul, the opportunity to collocate the OGA Command teams with the NZDF was crucial in timely and effective decision making. The delay in deploying an inter-agency Command group increased pressure on Op Kokako Command to ensure appropriate consular support was provided to NZDF elements in HKIA in order to ensure effective and efficient identification of NZ and AFN for evacuation. This Consular support was provided by NZ Embassy staff in MER (Abu Dhabi) until dedicated OGA personnel arrived in country.

4. A clear understanding of command intent, empowering and trusting of leadership at all levels to deliver their primary roles and use their initiative to add value wherever possible underpinned success. Operational risk was well considered and appropriate - flexible with elements of cautious. Despite significant environmental factors like heat, noise and Covid-19, and with due cognisance of a HIGH security threat environment in HKIA, the overall success of this mission came down to hard work, good communication, high trained state and preparedness and team work.

5. s. 6(a) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] Noting the constraints on force size for this deployment, the Task Org for OP KOKAKO, reinforced in both C2 and EHC capacity, has been validated as a good start point for a standardised NEO TG. Had there been opportunity to plan the detachment in more detail prior to departing, additional numbers of personnel in key areas would have been a key planning consideration.

6. As with any mission, there are a number of key observations and lessons that have been drawn together across this POR but also in the individual Task Unit reports that provide valuable opportunities for minor improvements moving forward. A key enabling lesson, and one that is worth highlighting, is that NZDF AE capability (both FW and RW), is essential for operations. This needs to be a standing capability brick that is supported across the PRICIE construct. This, amongst other High readiness capability bricks, form a vital set of tools in a tool box that can be thrown together at short notice to effect highly successful and highly dynamic missions like this one.

7. In conclusion, this mission worked because of the sum of the parts working together. Every component did their role, and did it well, but more specifically where personnel limitations were evident, all agencies dug deep to deliver with what they had available to them at the time. This includes not only the deployed elements, but the reach back to HQJFNZ and OGA headquarters as well, all of whom we providing focussed support forward. While C4I, and personnel resourcing is a core component of this POR, it can't be overstated how successful this operation was – particularly given the exceptionally light footprint deployed forward to the front line at HKIA, and the multiple roles everybody played in achieving a common outcome. Moreover, this deployment validated NZDF capability, readiness states and response times for operational front line units, as well as doctrines and procedures. No major changes to equipment (current and planned), training or processes are required as a result of lessons learned in this deployment. NZDF core values were epitomised throughout and as a Commander I could not have been happier with the resources provided, other than to have craved more of them at various stages of the Operation. A remarkable effort across the board and true representation of an NZDF deployed, joint, inter-agency task force.

## Post Operation Report

### Mission Background

8. **General.** The withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan saw a rapid capitulation of the Afghan National Security Forces to the Taliban. This capitulation saw the requirement to evacuate NZ and other foreign nationals from the country. The operation was carried out under a US led security Force with a limited time window as well as a extremely uncertain security situation.

9. **Mobilisation.** JTG653.13 was tasked to deploy to the United Arab Emirates and integrate into the allied evacuation operation quickly, primarily with the Australian Defence Force (ADF). The Cabinet submission and Joint Forces New Zealand (JFNZ) Operation Order (OPORD) highlighted that operations were to be conducted to 'Support MFAT' which is normal in a standard Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO). In this case the NZDF

speed of response and the nature of the security situation in Kabul, including an absence of NZ Consular services on the ground, necessitated an NZDF led response initially, until representatives from MFAT and MBIE could be positioned forward to AMAB. This placed a lot of responsibility on the initial NZDF Special Operations Task Unit (SOTU) advance party which was resolved with good communication between C2 elements during deployment phases in the form of phone calls during domestic to international transfers in Auckland and while conducting a technical stop in Malaysia.

10. From initial declaration of an NZDF operation (public statement on Monday 16th Aug 21) the disparate force elements had all departed from NZ within four days (and within 48 hours of each other). This rapid, fluid deployment of forces meant there was no opportunity for pre-meditated force-integration, or to even meet in many cases, prior to arrival at the forward mounting base (AMAB). Consequently C2 meetings between SNO and SOTU advance party were on cell phone from the airport and during transit. During these communications it was clear the situation on the ground in Kabul was developing very quickly resulting in key deployment considerations and decisions having to be made while SNO and main body were in transit to the AO. This process was supported with reachback through J3 and JFNZ.

11. With the rapid-mobilisation process across the various deploying force elements, centralised coordination of commercial airlift and military airlift was difficult to manage. As such, there was understandably a lack of overall cohesion in booking of all commercial airlift. Due to limited flights to Dubai in the timeframes available, this required some last minute changes to normal booking processes in order to allow C2 elements to conduct planning and read into deployment paperwork during the flights to UAE. Had there had been more capacity on the flight and time to coordinate, sitting key command elements nearby would have allowed maximum use of transit time to conduct coordination/synchronisation. Under current Covid restrictions the ability for passengers to move around aircraft cabins (both during the flight and while conducting technical stops) was limited.

12. For the advance party, being met at DXB s. 6(a) and having the opportunity to meet with Ambassador to the MER (Matt Hawkins) and DA MER (BRIG Margetts) provided a valuable opportunity to provide MFAT oversight of the primary mission to augment the update the SNO had provided the SOTU advance party lead during transit. These briefings enabled the SOTU advance party to deploy to Kabul with clear command intent and clear set of priorities to work on until main body arrived in the AO.

13. For the main body, arrival at DXB and facilitation to AMAB was seamless due to the outstanding support by s. 6(a). By the time main body personnel had arrived at Kiwi Lines, a clear, prioritised plan for equipping and mobilising SOTU was able to be implemented, resulting in a very rapid turn around and onwards deployment into Kabul. Additionally, CTG653.13 was able to discuss with s. 6(a) key leadership engagement at AMAB in order to rapidly integrate into the coalition airlift programme and wider operational C2 construct.

14. **Command and Control.** s. 6(a) . The C2 staff were located at AMAB to run the HQ component of operation (one of which was the SNO). The key observation is that deployment of a DJIATF JCART in accordance with extant

SOPs would have allowed for more flexibility and freedom forward, however this would have also resulted in additional pressures s. 6(a) .

15. An AOG Ops Room concept was able to be implemented in Kiwi Lines once AOG partners arrived with the conscious decision made to have them in the centre of the CP. This worked very well for information flow and the team became fully integrated. Break out space (s. 6(a) ) was also available for segregation when needed to allow independent briefings.

16. The opportunity-based addition of a POLAD was welcome and provided another perspective that was also highly beneficial. Noting this was first time a POLAD had integrated with HQ DJIATF it took some time to begin to fully exploit the benefit of this element. Limited previous exposure to a POLAD function in a previous deployment provided CTG653.13 with the basis to build the relationship. It is anticipated that this would have worked well in-concert with a CWO or CoS if deployed. This concept warrants longer term investigation for HQ JFNZ employment with potential for supplementary DJIATF shadow post commitment.

17. **AMAB C4I:** The small size of the deployed Op Kokako C2 team, the high-intensity of the overall operation and the strong demand for information flow back to strategic leadership in NZ proved very challenging. With an 8 hour time zone difference and the various functions that needed constant Command oversight and attention, there was very limited ability to construct a shift system to cover 24-hour operations which was required for the majority of the operation. This resulted in 18-20-hour days for all C2 pers for the duration of the evacuation. As a consequence with the small number of staff, concurrent deliberate planning was very difficult to conduct, necessitating a lot of 'abridged' planning. The major consequence with this outcome was the impact it had on capturing operational decision making processes.

18. The addition of deployed Plans and Ops pers would have assisted greatly and allowed a better 24 hour coverage. This was alleviated somewhat by the great support of HQJFNZ (specifically DPSC, J1, J2, J3, J4) reach back for assistance as they effectively became the watch-keeper during the local silent hours.

19. s. 6(a), s. 6(b)(i) [Redacted]

20. s. 6(a), s. 6(b)(i) [Redacted]

21. To this end a proposed AOG deployable UNCLASS network remains highly desirable and its development is being supported by DJIATF. Ideally the steady state of NZ AOG operations would be run on a common UNCLASS network. This will allow basic info sharing, printing, scanning, VTC etc. This is being worked on by NEMA and NZDF needs to be an early adopter of this.

22. Annex L states daily reporting to be completed NLT 2300 time zone Mike (GMT + 12). Due to the deployed time zone Delta (GMT + 4) this timing was consciously modified due to high tempo battle rhythm, workload and ongoing events. This modification was mindful to not compromise HQJFNZ daily battle rhythm. It is recommended a review of the 2300M timing be conducted to provide flexibility of deployments to work a more suitable battle rhythm in country.

23. Another observation validating the standing DJIATF JCART concept was the absence of a standalone independent military advisor (eg CWO/SEL) to the Commander. As a result, different perspectives were not always able to be brought to the table in a timely fashion. This also resulted in a lot of time and effort on the part of the commander around integrating OGA partners, which could ideally would have been delegated or shared by an advisor. Additionally, due to the number of disparate elements involved within theatre, there was no one within the C2 team able to concentrate on the integration of the functions and collating messaging to ensure optimal lines of communication. It was noted that both of these concepts were well utilised by the ADF HQ elements s. 6(a), s. 6(b)(i) which had a much more traditional deployed C2 element.

24. **OGA Integration.** Successful integration of an NZ Inc inter-agency command and control team at AMAB was crucial to the overall success of the mission. Without a fully integrated and embedded inter-agency operations room, the ability to support frontline forces in Kabul in the rapid identification and localisation of NZ citizens and approved foreign nationals would have been exceptionally difficult and almost certainly would have resulted in a less successful outcome.

25. Moreover, meeting MFAT and MBIE intent in supporting the processing and onwards mobilisation of evacuees was only possible through a joint operations room, where NZDF elements could liaise directly with inter-agency partners to help facilitate key requirements for the safe and effective processing of evacuees.

26. Once they arrived in the AO, the MFAT and MBIE representatives deployed to AMAB were crucial in providing mission essential support to evacuation operations in HKIA. Due to their being no NZ Consular presence in Afghanistan, this was not a classic MFAT led NEO. As such JTG653.13 command element focussed initially on providing situational understanding and highlighting the significant MFAT and OGA support required to achieve mission success in a very constrained operating environment and timeframe. This saw CTG653.13 spend significant time and effort considering the integration of OGAs, when they arrived, and getting that relationship right to ensure seamless integration and maximise operational effect.

27. In order to facilitate this, OC TU 653.13.1 became fully committed to enabling and integrating OGAs on arrival and had to step back from direct C2 of the EHC personnel, leaving the EHC to the team leaders. This was rectified after 72 hours once the OGAs had reached FOC. The process of integrating the OGA staff relied heavily on the preliminary

liaison done with AUS OGAs and ADF by NZDF personnel and OC TU653.13.1 was the primary conduit for these activities.

28. **SOTU/Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA).** A SOTU PAR is provided at ref B. Key observations from this PAR include appreciation that the definition of Op Area in HKIA as the 'HKIA security environment', versus 'HKIA perimeter', made a big difference and was a critical enabler for mission success. This definition provided the freedom of action the SOTU required to safely and effectively identify and rendezvous with NZ/AFN as well as provide, and receive support, of coalition partners.

29. <sup>s. 6(a)</sup> NZSAS members deployed as the SOTU <sup>s. 6(a)</sup> [redacted]. This was augmented by a two person DJIATF C2 node. The utility of the NZSAS operators led to increased freedom of action and ensured NZ representation at key nodes around HKIA was implemented with minimal resources. Due to the inherent skills of the operators the SOTU had sufficient integral medical, signals and tactical skills. The SOTU ability to be resourceful and survive in austere conditions meant very minimal logistics tail and further enhanced speed and effectiveness of decision making conduct of rescuing evacuees. Most members deployed forward in fighting order only, living out of their armour until resources arrived or could be secured in HKIA. This approach provided freedom of manoeuvre which directly contributed to a successful mission outcome.

30. <sup>s. 6(a)</sup> [redacted]. This allowed representation at the BG level up to and including the brigade commanders. The <sup>s. 6(a)</sup> female engagement team members proved exceptionally capable and invaluable to mission success also. Their ability to search females and manage family groups, co-ordinate the holding areas and add value across the entire operation was noteworthy and a real value add for the NZDF HKIA footprint. This small element worked effectively to evacuate 391 (387) NZ Citizens and Visa holders from HKIA.

31. **HKIA C2:** The forward deployed C2 node alleviated the reporting burden from the SOTU and provided representation at the Multi-National Coordination Centre (MNCC). <sup>s. 6(a)</sup> [redacted]. The DJ HQ signaller provide excellent communications support which enabled faster and more consistent communications further enhancing the speed and effectiveness of operations. These processes were further enhanced with the arrival of other government agency representation in the AMAB Ops Room – allowing timely and accurate reporting lines directly between front line units and decision makers in AMAB. For tactical level execution the SOTU reinforced to provide integral CP staff would have been sufficient for the execution of this operation as O5 oversight was not required. Fast and flat communication between SOTU and COMJTF653.13 enabled mission command and facilitated freedom of action.

32. **Covid-19 Management.** A key element in the accomplishment of the mission was effective management of COVID-19 (C-19). The use of a multi-disciplined risk assessment team to identify risks and controls above those provided within the JFNZ risk register proved highly successful. Due to high C-19 infection rates within Afghanistan, the two highest risk areas identified were those personnel working within the EHCs and holding camps, and those returning from HKIA. Pragmatic considerations around risk boundaries, segregated ablution and laundry facilities, and different PCR testing regimes allowed for the safe re-integration of personnel into Kiwi Lines and provided protection to the rest of the force. This

was shown to be effective through the identification of two positive C-19 cases from returned HKIA personnel during their mandatory isolation period. Both of these positive cases were able to conduct their isolation within Kiwi Lines and there were no further positive cases identified for the rest of the deployment.

33. Notwithstanding the above, two positive cases were identified during routine MIQF testing once the detachment was back in NZ. It is worth noting this was not until Day 5 and 6 of the isolation period (which equates to Day 8 and 9 out of AMAB) indicating that infection likely occurred either in Dubai during the respite period, or during return travel. Both of these were managed in accordance with MIQF procedures.

34. **Evacuee management at AMAB.** TU 653.13.1 was originally established to process the 100 anticipated evacuees, however as the mission progressed and both GoAUS and GoNZ approved greater numbers of evacuees, evacuee numbers to AMAB rapidly increased to approximately 3000 (400 for GoNZ, 2600 for GoAUS). The highest number of evacuees accommodated in AMAB at the peak of the extraction was approximately 2750 at one time. This number was significantly beyond all initial planning estimates and required significant lateral and creative thinking to ensure the safe and effective processing of evacuees could be achieved with minimal risk to evacuees and also officials (noting the global Covid-19 and other associated mass-evacuation health and security risks).

35. The unanticipated increase in evacuee numbers departing HKIA and arriving at AMAB created a number of second and third order implications – including security, health and RLS capacity at AMAB. TU 653.13.1 was involved in the processing of 26 out of 29 evacuation flights and supported the reception, processing and onwards movement of 2600 evacuees, once AFNs were taken into account. While small in number TU 653.13.1 was able to have a disproportionately large effect due to their ‘can do’ attitude, strategic integration with OGA, ADF, and UK forces. The key observation with the benefit of hindsight, is that the deployment of the HRTU in total would have provided sufficient qualified and appropriately trained personnel to manage the unanticipated surge in evacuee numbers. Conversely, it would have also placed additional pressure on detachment accommodation requirements and as such compromises would have occurred. Notwithstanding, the knowledge, training and experience of the TU653.13.1 personnel validated the role and purpose of the NZDF HRTU.

36. Noting the above, the shortfall in qualified personnel to manage EHC operations required significant lateral thought and the support of all NZDF detachment personnel at various stages under OC TU 653.13.1 guidance/leadership.

37. TU 653.13.1 adopted 24/7 operations early, leading the ADF in this area which then enabled the processing of greater numbers. Given his knowledge and experience, OC TU 653.13.1 used his initiative and was extremely resourceful in undertaking deliberate mission creep to better understand the NZ OGA requirements and how they would interface with the Aus OGAs. This initiative enabled an in-depth HOTO between respective OGA reps once the NZ MFAT and MBIE contingent arrived in AMAB - allowing them to be effective almost immediately on arrival. The NZ OGAs were able to rapidly integrate into the 24/7 operations cycle and manage their own personnel alongside NZDF and ADF.

38. Due to the significant personnel requirement in safely and effectively managing the EHC function, TU 653.13.1 had minimal little capacity to effectively run terminal operations for the evacuees, requiring significant lateral thinking and innovation. A

noteworthy example of NZ innovation was the chartering of an Etihad flight to land at the camp to move evacuees to New Zealand via Australia. While this was an excellent means of moving multiple evacuees directly to NZ, due to the time taken to negotiate with the carrier, this left very little time for the actual planning and execution of processing. Fortunately, led by OC TU 653.13.1, a small scratch team of MFAT, MBIE, and NZDF officers developed an outline plan and secured resources (Terminal building and ramp space) that allowed an APOE to be established to support an ETIHAD charter flight for 146 evacuees on 27 Aug 21. This was replicated on 1 Sep 21, when 159 evacuees, including 77 Aus AFNs, were evacuated on a second ETIHAD charter flight.

39. Facilitation of the APOE was only made successful by the wider JTG, in particular the C130 air and maintenance crews, security and medical support teams, who provided personnel to help staff the terminal operations despite having conducted flight operations into HKIA that morning. These two terminal operations demonstrated the flexibility of NZDF personnel, and highlighted significant resourcefulness and a willingness to get the job done well.

40. The requirement to reassign NZDF to secondary and tertiary tasks was evident throughout the evacuee handling period. Additional staff also had to be sought to cover the security for the holding camps. As a consequence, all NZDF contingent personnel (including C2 elements and SOTU) were involved in supporting TU 653.13.1 in the management and processing of evacuees when able, in addition to their primary roles. The key enabler for mission success within TU 653.13.1 and the supporting elements was a common 'can do' attitude and shared culture focussing on getting the job done. This was apparent across JTG 653.13 and all OGAs as a shared attitude. While resulting in very long hours and reduced rest in extreme temperature conditions, the shared culture underpinned the NZ Inc collective success.

41. **Medical Element.** A medical element was mounted from three separate locations, and deployed within 48 hrs. The medical element consisted of:

- a. AE trained MO, NO and s. 6(a) medics
- b. Deployable AE equipment pack-up
- c. SNCO medic and primary health kit

42. The AE pack-up and medical personnel were deployed from RNZAF Ohakea and RNZAF Whenuapai by RNZAF P3K2 Orion Aircraft. On arrival in Whenuapai the AE pack-up was re-configured in order to reduce weight and volume. As a result, the deployed AE equipment was decreased in respect of numbers of patient serials it could support, but not scope or extent of clinical care.

43. Having deployed via Civair, the medical element was required to establish in AMAB without any equipment until the arrival of the C130-H(NZ). Initial efforts focussed on integration of NZDF MO, NO and Medics with ADF medical elements, and supporting the ADF medical teams in the EHC. s. 6(a), s. 6(b)(i)

44. Due to the complex and diverse nature of Op Kokako, NZDF Health Support tasks were required operate across a number of key areas. The training and capability of NZDF Medical staff, and the suitability of equipment provided an ability to conduct a range of



simultaneous tasks, all of which were required to be prioritised depending on the phase of the operational activities. They included:

- a. COVID-19 swabbing, testing, infection control and surveillance.
- b. Health planning support to JTF653.13.
- c. Primary health care of NZDF FE.
- d. Medical support to the EHC.
- e. AE Support on evacuation flights .
- f. Medical support in the EP Holding Camps in support of ADF, Aspen and AUSMAT medical teams, including specialist assistance with high risk maternity cases.
- g. Medical support and advice to OGAs to plan civilian repatriation flights, including liaison with MoH.
- h. Strategic Aeromedical Evacuation by NO and AE equipment of an EP requiring continuous oxygen by chartered civilian flight.
- i. MO support to critical incident debriefing process.

45. **FWTF.** A comprehensive TU 653.13.2 PAR is attached ref. D. One C-130H(NZ) and a 48 person contingent comprising of aircrew, maintenance, SECFOR, ALT, INT, CIS and DPA formed the TU Air component of OP KOKAKO. The personnel were selected from across all bases for their previous experience in the MEO in order to de-risk the short notice nature of the deployment. Personnel were initially established and prepared under the umbrella of a 40 SQN led detachment, but subsequently re-distributed once the ORBAT was finalised under DJIATF, EHC and s. 6(a) elements. 83.8 total flying hours were conducted with 24.3 operational over 3 sorties.

46. Due to the short notice of the detachment, and a limited window for operations into HKIA due to reliance on US security support, only 3 operational sorties were able to be completed. The first sortie was able to be conducted with only one day in AMAB to reconfigure the aircraft from transit to theatre operations. This period was also essential to allow the aircrew to be briefed and read into HKIA ops as well as conduct liaison with ADF crews. Following the first evacuation sortie, and in light of evolving classified operational planning, a deliberate decision was taken not to fly a sortie on Tues 24th. This reset allowed planning to be conducted but also ensure crew availability for a forecast surge period over the planned coalition drawdown which initially had planned NZDF withdrawal from HKIA approx 28/29 Aug. The recommencement of flying operations on 25 Aug was part of an anticipated 5 day surge. However, with no consular presence on the ground in Kabul, and the ADF planned withdrawal moving forward, this effectively meant the ability to safely and effectively process NZ evacuees at HKIA was removed – which was one of a number of planned NZDF withdrawal criteria. A second withdrawal criteria was a destabilising security situation in Kabul which would have meant placing evacuee lives in danger with no guarantee of being able to bring them onto HKIA for evacuation. This criteria was realised on 26 Aug with the detonation of an IED at Abbey Gate – shortly after the coordinated withdrawal of ADF and NZ forces.

47. **Al Minhad Air Base (AMAB).** AMAB was used as a Forward Mounting Base (FMB) for ADF, NZDF and UK MOD air assets and also as a C2 node for ADF and NZDF. Having access


to a suitable living and working accommodation capability, s. 6(a), s. 6(b)(i) [redacted] was critical to the effective completion of Op Kokako within such a constrained time window. Being co-located alongside the ADF C2 component s. 6(a), s. 6(b)(i) [redacted] was extremely effective and facilitated a rapid induction for NZDF force elements into theatre. Of note, the insertion of SOTU Advance party and SOTU Main Body into HKIA was made possible through coalition airlift s. 6(a), s. 6(b)(i) [redacted], and also the ability for FWTF advance party to fly with ADF crews into HKIA for exposure to HKIA ops prior to C130 arrival in theatre.

48. From an evacuee handling perspective, as noted earlier in this report, the ability to accommodate and process evacuees safely, was only made possible through shared support and use of the ADF facilities, with support from host nation. The Key Leadership connections maintained s. 6(a) [redacted] were also essential in facilitating a high operational tempo with minimal time on the ground for NZDF units.

49. s. 6(a), s. 6(b)(i) [redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]

50. s. 6(a), s. 6(b)(i) [redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]

51. s. 6(a), s. 6(b)(i) [redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]



**NJ OLNEY**  
GPCAPT  
CJTG 653.13/SNO OP KOKAKO

s. 6(a) [redacted]

## **Annex(es)**

- A. . Mission Observations
- B. OP KOKAKO COMMUNICATIONS OBSERVATIONS: s. 6(a) **Withheld in full under s. 6(a)**
- C. Key SOTU Recommendations **Withheld in full under s. 6(a)**
- D. Op KOKAKO TU 653.13.1 Evacuee Handling Centre Key Observations
- E. Medical Detachment Key Observations
- F. Air Load Team Key Observations

## **Distribution:**

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**MISSION OBSERVATIONS**

1. 180 observations have been entered into EARLLS. The observations below are considered significant and are recommended as priority themes.

<b>ISSUE</b>	Authorities and permissions.
<b>OBSERVATION</b>	Authorities and permissions were appropriate and necessary (Nat Com and OpCom).
<b>RECOMMENDED COA</b>	Maintain this approach to empower commanders.
<b>SME</b>	J3, J5, COMJ, Component Commanders
<b>RAISED BY</b>	SNO, HKIA LO, SOTU, FWTF

<b>ISSUE</b>	s. 6(a)
<b>OBSERVATION</b>	
<b>RECOMMENDED COA</b>	
<b>SME</b>	
<b>RAISED BY</b>	

<b>ISSUE</b>	s. 6(a)
<b>OBSERVATION</b>	


	s. 6(a)
RECOMMENDED COA	
SME	
RAISED BY	

OP KOKAKO TU 653.13.1 EVACUEE HANDLING CENTRE KEY OBSERVATIONS

39. Key points from TU 653.13.1 are below. All points in detail are at Ref C.

- a. s. 6(a) should be sustained as part of NZDF's support to other missions. s. 6(a) was able to provide effective real life support to TU653.13.1 and the evacuees. s. 6(a) provided outstanding assistance in securing facilities for the Evacuation Point supporting the MFAT charter flights.
- b. OGAs should synchronise their deployment timings with NZDF, it would be beneficial to pull them into pre-deployment training and administration. This would start the integration process earlier and allow all parties to make best use of transit time. NZDF should also look to assist OGAs with welfare support during the operation, post deployment administration and medallic recognition.
- c. The HRTU deployment pack up needs to include approved CIS hardware to complete the scanning and printing requirement. This hardware needs to be high speed and capacity to support the high volume of throughput during a NEO s. 6(a)
- d. TU 653.13.1 required two OPSIS with means of developing and maintaining digital manifests, to enable 24 hour evacuee tracking, which would have greatly reduced the burden of manifest creation for MFAT and enabled reporting of evacuee numbers to GoNZ. These personnel will also need access to all coalition IT systems.
- e. s. 6(a), s. 6(b)(l)
- f. TU 653.13.1 required a task organised infantry platoon from HRTU with an attached section from terminal platoon (5MOV) to deliver effective terminal operations.
- g. NZDF needs to resource itself with medical PPE as required by the situation either through our own means or through a contract.
- h. For short notice tasks HRTU needs to have deployable females competent in search and dealing with civilians. This requirement can either be resolved by attaching more female service personnel to HRTU in the current Taskorg (noting

that these service personnel will be pulled from their primary role) or generating another FET for HTRU to use in the processing team.

- i. HRTU needs a deployable SOE to be held at 1RNZIR CSS Company to include NZ Flag, Kiwi Caps and badges, hot weather socks, tropical boots and UBA shirts. Non Goretex, hot weather shoes for the dessert and dri – fit under shirts need to be issued for deployments to hot weather climates.
- j. s. 6(a)  

- k. MBIE manage EziSpeak, the AoG interpreter network. This should be leveraged in future to meet the requirement for interpreters.
- l. Future high readiness forces need to leverage the inherent NZ culture to succeed with focus on integrating and getting the job done, particularly when working in the JIM environment.

### OP KOKAKO TU 653.13.1 MEDICAL DETACHMENT KEY OBSERVATIONS

1. **Medical Support.** The I-RWAE personnel unit and modular equipment pack-up was well suited to a short notice deployed operation of this nature. Recommend this is sustained and advanced as a model for platform agnostic deployable AE & RNZAF health support capabilities.

2. s. 6(a) [REDACTED]. Individual members of AE teams have trained, exercised, and deployed in this space successfully. Training currency and equipment deficiencies in this space create a risk for NZDF. Recommend that:

a. RNZAF Health elements under FHO command continue to conduct military skills training and currency, in order to support non-permissive AE tasks at short notice.

b. s. 6(a) [REDACTED]

3. Deployed NZDF Health Support is expected to provide care in a coalition environment to a population that extends beyond the traditional military combat trauma role. s. 6(a) [REDACTED]. Recommend that NZDF Health ensures its clinicians acquire and maintain basic clinical skillsets relevant to the general population, including elderly, paediatric and maternity patients. This can be achieved by supporting significantly greater opportunities for clinical attachments with civilian health services (hospital ED, ambulance and rescue helicopter services). Many of these opportunities already exist formally, but rely on command support to be made available to medical personnel.



## AIR LOAD TEAM KEY OBSERVATIONS

1. **Air Load Team.** s. 6(a) Air Load Team (ALT) for the OP KOKAKO NEO response enabled flexibility to support multiple geographic locations, military and civilian charter aircraft, on-aircraft ALT duties as members of the crew, and around the clock shifts. Although s. 6(a) MOVOP personnel were included in the s. 6(a) ALT, they had little utility within the Air Movements specific tasking and were appropriately re-assigned to support movements control duties as augmented staff within the s. 6(a) Evacuation Handling Centre (EHC). For future NEO tasks it is recommended that:

- a. Unless NZDF is required to establish its own EHC, MOVOP personnel should be included as an additional capability to the Air Load Team, rather than an integrated capability.
- b. The ALT include a mixture of male and female members so that adequate support can be provided during passenger terminal and on-aircraft duties.
- c. Greater consideration be provided to deploying an element of the ALT forward to ensure contribution equity amongst coalition partners.

2. s. 6(a)

For future NEO operations, it is recommended that:

- a. A minimum two-shift ALT footprint be considered to provide utility to the NZDF mission.
- b. An RNZAF Air Movements liaison is included within the OGA and NZDF HQ planning team, particularly to ensure that NZ civilian charter aircraft are adequately supported.
- c. s. 6(a)

3. The ACC authority to make deviations from typical cargo and passenger limitations was essential to providing the Air Movements Officer (AMO) and Aircraft Captain the flexibility to

make operational decisions without delay to the mission. In preparation for future NEO deployments, it is recommended that:

- a. HQJFNZ seek to draft a quickly releasable ACC authority that covers likely passenger and cargo scenarios that will be encountered during the mission.
- b. The AMO remain the custodian of this Authority to ensure the ACC intent is adhered. Greater consideration should be provided to deploying ALT forward to ensure that air worthiness compliance is closely monitored IAW ACC intent and that essential passenger and cargo information is relayed to the aircraft to minimise time on ground.

## Glossary / Acronyms

AE - Aeromedical Evacuation

PRICIE – Personnel; Research and Development; Infrastructure and Organisations; Concepts, Doctrine and Training; Information Technology; Equipment, Logistics and Resources.

C4I – Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence

SNO – Senior National Officer

AO – Area of operations

DJIATF JCART – Deployable Joint Inter-Agency Task Force Joint Command and Reconnaissance Team

CP - Command Post

POLAD - Political Advisor

VTC – Video Telephone Conference

CWO – Command Warrant Officer

SEL - Senior Enlisted Leader

PAR – Post Activity Report

BG – Battle Group

HRTU - High Readiness Task Unit

HOTO – Handover Takeover

SECFOR – Security Force

INT – Intelligence

CIS – Communications and Information Systems

DPA – Defence Public Affairs

MEO - Middle East Operations or Middle East Area of Operations (MEAO)

ORBAT – Order Of Battle

FWTF – Fixed Wing Transport Force

OPIS – Operational Support and Information Specialist

FET - Force Extraction Team

SOE - Scale of Entitlement

JIM – Joint, Interagency, Multinational

I-RWAE - Interim Rotary Wing Aeromedical Evacuation

MOVOP – Movements Operator